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Abstract
The implementation of the Maastricht criteria, establishment of the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP), creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) raised several challenges for the European
Union (EU) countries. The main aim of this dissertation is to analyse the economic
implications of those institutional changes. Chapter 2 provides an empirical answer
to the question of whether Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules have affected growth in
the EU countries. Results from the estimation of a growth equation show that growth
of real GDP per capita in the EU was not negatively affected in the period after
Maastricht. The main conclusion of this analysis is that the institutional changes that
occurred in some European countries after 1992 were not harmful to growth.
Chapter 3 tries to identify the main causes of excessive deficits in the EU. A
conditional logit model is estimated over a panel of EU countries, where an
excessive deficit is defined as a deficit higher than 3% of GDP. Results indicate that
a weak fiscal stance, low economic growth, elections and majority left-wing
governments are the main causes of excessive deficits. They also show that the
institutional constraints imposed after Maastricht over the EU countries have
succeeded in reducing the probability of excessive deficits, especially in small
countries and in countries traditionally affected by large fiscal imbalances.
A widespread idea in the business cycles literature is that the older is an
expansion or contraction, the more likely it is to end. Chapter 4 provides further
empirical support for this idea of positive duration dependence controlling
simultaneously for the effects of other factors on the duration of expansions and
contractions. This study employs for the first time a discrete-time duration model to
analyse the impact of some variables on the likelihood of an expansion and
contraction ending for a group of EU and non-EU countries. The evidence suggests
that the duration of expansions and contractions is not only dependent on their actual
age: the duration of expansions is also positively dependent on the behaviour of the
OECD composite leading indicator and on private investment, and negatively
affected by the price of oil and by the occurrence of a peak in the US business cycle;
the duration of a contraction is negatively affected by its actual age and by the
duration of the previous expansion.
Finally, Chapter 5 raises the question of whether central banks’ monetary
policy can be described by a linear Taylor rule or, instead, by a more complex
nonlinear rule. This chapter also analyses whether those rules can be augmented with
a financial conditions index containing information from some asset prices and
financial variables. A forward-looking specification is employed in the estimation of
the linear and nonlinear rules. A smooth transition model is used to estimate the
nonlinear rule. The results indicate that the behaviour of the Federal Reserve of the
United States can be described by a linear Taylor rule, whilst the behaviour of the
ECB and Bank of England is best described by a nonlinear Taylor rule. In particular,
these two central banks tend to react to inflation only when inflation is above or
outside their targets. Moreover, the evidence also suggests that the recently created
ECB is targeting financial conditions, contrary to the other two central banks.
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11. Introduction
In 1992 the twelve countries that formed the European Economic Community
signed a Treaty – the Maastricht Treaty – that formally established the European
Union (EU) and led to the creation of a new currency, the Euro. With this Treaty
they agreed to comply with some fiscal and monetary criteria in order to actively
control their public accounts and to converge in nominal terms before taking part in
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by 1999.
By taking part in EMU, these countries had to cede control over exchange
rate and monetary policies to a new monetary institution, the European Central Bank
(ECB). This organization was created to conduct the monetary policy in the group of
countries that adopted the Euro as new currency. The only policy remaining in the
hands of EMU members is fiscal policy, but even this is limited by the requirements
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The SGP was created to regulate fiscal
policy after the introduction of the Euro, i.e. to prevent countries from relaxing their
convergence efforts or their fiscal policy after they have taken part in EMU.
The intention of the countries that are taking part in this challenge is to create
an economic area in which – besides factors mobility – trade and general economic
relations between them can be simplified, intensified and improved so that they can
benefit from a common higher level of development and economic growth and, in
the end, economic and political stability.
Given the asymmetries between some of the member countries and the
complexity of the integration process, some authors have raised doubts about its
success. Thirlwall (2000), Arestis et al. (2001), Warin (2005) and Wyplosz (2006)
argue that the fiscal criteria imposed by the Maastricht Treaty and reinforced by the
2SGP may have undermined economic growth in the EU countries. The fiscal criteria
impose that over the economic cycle countries should avoid deficits higher than 3%
of GDP and keep public debt lower than 60% of GDP.
Arguments for fiscal rules have their foundations in the theory of Optimal
Currency Areas, which states that when countries form an EMU they lose their
independence over both monetary policy and the exchange rate. Therefore, a
significant centralization of the national budgets to accommodate asymmetric shocks
in the different countries would be desirable or expected. However, in the EU context
this did not occur because of the fears that the resulting temporary fiscal transfers
might become permanent, which could create political problems among the EU
countries and endanger the unity of the EU. Therefore, the alternative was to leave
fiscal policy in the hands of national governments – to face asymmetric shocks when
necessary – and to put in place rules to avoid excessive deficits. Those rules are
important because governments’ temptation to create budget deficits to absorb
negative shocks in an EMU can lead to problems of sustainability of those deficits
and to growing government debts. There could also be negative spillovers for other
EMU states, and the price stability policy of the ECB could be threatened. These
issues led to the definition in the Maastricht Treaty of the fiscal rules for the deficit
and debt – that countries have to satisfy in order to take part in EMU – and to the
creation of the SGP, for countries in EMU, to avoid the problems mentioned above.
However, with those fiscal constraints and without the monetary instruments,
the margin of manoeuvre of the countries in EMU to face asymmetric shocks is
substantially reduced. Hence, countries have to rely on supply side measures for
adjusting to adverse situations. Since the labour market is not as flexible and
dynamic as required, and factor productivity varies substantially between some
3member countries, it may take some time until countries can fully adjust to the new
economic reality. Meanwhile, economic growth in the EU might be compromised by
the restrictions imposed over important instruments of macroeconomic policy.
As the phenomenon of economic integration in the EU is still relatively
recent, few empirical studies have yet focused on studying the implications of EU
institutional changes on economic growth. The most relevant studies that have
attempted to analyse empirically the effects of this process on economic growth were
provided by Savona and Viviani (2003), Hein and Trugger (2005) and Soukiazis and
Castro (2005). However, they tend to either use an ad-hoc specification without
taking into account the economic growth literature (Hein and Trugger, 2005) or
ignore important assumptions of this literature (Savona and Viviani, 2003 and
Soukiazis and Castro, 2005), like the role of physical and human capital.
The economic growth literature has a long tradition in economics that goes
back to the works of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. However, the first attempt to
model growth analytically was made by Robert Solow and Trevor Swan only in the
1950s. Their models comprise some equations showing the relationship between
labour, capital, investment and output. Here the role of technological change became
important, while labour and capital are assumed to have diminishing returns. One
important implication of these models is that economic growth is generated by an
increase of capital relative to labour. However, given the diminishing returns the
economy will converge to a point at which no additional increase in capital will
produce more growth. This point is called a “steady-state”. Only technology
improvements are able to increase this steady state, so more investment will generate
more growth. As all this growth process is exogenous and data do not confirm the
4predictions of these models, a new group of growth theorists decided to revise them
“endogenizing” the technology.
Thus, in the late 1980s, Paul Romer, Robert E. Lucas and Robert J. Barro
developed the “endogenous growth theory” to explain the technological advance.
This framework incorporates human capital as well as physical capital. Returns to
capital are now considered constant and growth does not slow as capital accumulates,
but it depends on the type of capital a country invests in (i.e. human or physical).
The most recent advances in the economic growth literature rest on these
important theoretical developments. The first study developed in this dissertation is
greatly based on this literature, extending it to the analysis of the impact of
Maastricht criteria and SGP fiscal rules on economic growth. Hence, contrary to the
other empirical works for the EU, this study builds the analysis around a formal
growth model. The growth equation estimated in the first part of this dissertation is
augmented with fiscal variables and variables to control for the period in which fiscal
rules were implemented over the EU countries. Dynamic fixed effects, pooled mean
group and generalized method of moments estimators are employed in the estimation
of the growth equation for the period 1970-2005 over a panel of 15 EU countries.
Some other OECD countries (non-EU countries) are used as a control group. These
advances in the method of analysis allow us to confirm some of the results of other
studies on economic growth and to conclude that the institutional changes that
occurred in some European countries after 1992 were not harmful to growth.
Taking into account the problems that may arise from unbalanced public
accounts for countries in an EMU pointed out in the first essay, this dissertation also
tries to find the reasons why EU countries sometimes run excessive deficits. The
literature provides a plethora of interrelated economic and political causes for public
5deficits, but the particular study of the determinants of excessive deficits remains
practically unexplored. Therefore, this study intends to contribute to the literature
with a broad analysis of the economic, political and institutional determinants of an
excessive public deficit and, in that way, help to explain why EU countries are
sometimes affected by excessive deficits and try to clarify what conditions may help
them to avoid such a situation in the future. As this analysis focuses its attention on a
group of EU countries, it defines an excessive deficit as a deficit higher than 3% of
GDP, in line with the legal concept established by the Maastricht Treaty and later
reinforced by the SGP.
According to the Keynesian theory, (large) budget deficits may arise when an
economy is in recession. Hence, these are the result of the redistributive policy that a
government follows to stabilize the impact of a recession. On one hand, more
subsidies are transferred for people who lost their jobs and more public investments
should be undertaken; on the other side, less revenue is collected due to the economic
slowdown. However, during expansions public deficits should disappear to satisfy
the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. According to this theory this
should be the case, but some economists noticed that – especially in the 1980s –
several industrial countries were still presenting excessive deficits even when they
were in expansion. Given that evidence, they started to look for other reasons for
those deficits. Political variables were then added to the equation to tackle that issue.
In an important seminal paper on the political and economic determinants of
public deficits Roubini and Sachs (1989) demonstrate that deficits are more common
when many parties are present in a ruling coalition. Their paper opened the road to
several other studies on the analysis of political factors that can lie behind a public
deficit. Many equations for the public deficit were filled with political variables like
6timing of elections, ideological orientation of the government, fragmentation and
type of government, among others. These led to a better understanding of public
deficits in industrial democracies. However, with the establishment of a criterion for
excessive deficits that EU countries have to accomplish, more research is required to
better understand the reasons why those countries sometimes violate that criterion.
Contrary to the traditional literature on public deficits, this study estimates an
equation for a binary dependent variable (excessive deficit) instead of an equation for
a continuous variable (public deficit). This kind of analysis permits us to infer more
directly the factors that may lead an EU country to break the reference value for the
public deficit. Another novelty is the inclusion of political variables in this kind of
analysis. As noticed above, political variables are often used in the study of public
deficits but, to our knowledge, no other study has provided so far a detailed analysis
of the political conditionings of excessive deficits. This part of the dissertation
provides that analysis controlling especially for opportunistic and partisan effects and
political fragmentation. Finally, this study also focuses its attention on the effects of
the constraints imposed after Maastricht over fiscal behaviour of governments.
This analysis provides evidence that a weak fiscal stance, low economic
growth, parliamentary elections and majority left-wing governments are important
causes of excessive deficits in the EU. The results also indicate that the institutional
constraints imposed after Maastricht over EU countries’ fiscal policy have been
important in reducing the probability of excessive deficits in the EU, especially in
small countries and in countries traditionally affected by large fiscal imbalances.
Hence the first two essays provide interesting evidence that the institutional
changes in which the EU countries were involved did not undermine their economic
performance and that fiscal discipline was important to consolidate their accounts.
7The next topic studied in this thesis arose from an idea raised by Buti et al.
(1997) and Metz (2005). These authors notice that the EU fiscal rules may generate
longer recessions in the EU countries because they are not allowed to run sufficiently
large deficits to stimulate the economy. Considering this issue as a starting point, the
analysis provided in this dissertation was then extended to the broader study of the
duration of the business cycle phases: expansions and contractions. Besides
considering some EU countries, we also enlarge the analysis to other non-EU
countries to study this issue in more detail. In the case of the EU countries, we test
for the validity of the argument raised by Buti et al. (1997) and Metz (2005).
The tendency for an economy to behave in a cyclical fashion has been a
puzzle for economists for a long time. Expansions, contractions and their turning
points were the central focus of seminal studies in this area by Fisher (1925) and
Burns and Mitchell (1949). They were the first to analyse consistently the
mechanisms by which output alternates between states of expansion and recession,
and to study the effect of duration on transition probabilities between those states.
The issue of whether business cycles are duration dependent – i.e. whether the
likelihood of an expansion or recession ending is dependent on its age – has gained
special interest in the last two decades, due to an increase in the average duration of
expansions and a decrease in the duration of recessions after World War II.
The literature in this field rests on the idea that the older is an expansion or
recession, the more likely it is to end (see Sichel, 1991). This is known as positive
duration dependence. Several papers using different methods have tried to provide
empirical support for this idea and most of them have been successful in finding
some evidence of positive duration dependence for expansions and contractions (see
references in Chapter 4). However, little attention has been given to the potential
8effects of other factors. With this study we intend to shed more light on the analysis
of the duration of business cycle phases by looking at other factors that can affect the
likelihood of an expansion or recession ending, beyond its own length. Hence,
several other variables are taken into account in this analysis.
Some recent studies have found that leading or coincident indices can be very
useful in predicting the end of an expansion or contraction (Filardo, 1994, Filardo
and Gordon, 1998, Kim and Nelson, 1998, Di Venuto and Layton, 2005 and Layton
and Smith, 2007). However, like most studies in this field, they have focused almost
exclusively on the US business cycle. This study enlarges the analysis to other
industrial countries and considers the effect of other variables. It starts by
considering the impact of a composite leading indicator – constructed by the OECD
– on the likelihood of an expansion or contraction ending. This indicator is
considered to contain relevant information (or expectations) about the future
behaviour of the economy. The effect of the length of the previous phase on the
duration of the current phase, private and government investment, the price of oil,
spillover effects from the US business cycle on other economies and political
conditionings are also taken into account in this analysis. The last issue analysed here
is whether the great moderation in output volatility registered in the last two to three
decades has affected the duration of expansions and contractions.
Duration models will be used in this analysis. To our knowledge, this is the
first time that these models have been employed to test simultaneously for duration
dependence and for the effect of the factors mentioned above on the likelihood of an
expansion or contraction ending. Our results provide evidence of positive duration
dependence for both expansions and contractions in a group of industrial countries
(EU and non-EU countries) for the period after World War II. The duration of
9expansions in those countries has proved to be linked to the behaviour of the
variables in the OECD composite leading indicator and affected by private
investment, the price of oil and a peak in the US economy. The duration of
contractions is essentially explained by the duration of the previous phase. Regarding
the recent behaviour of the EU business cycle, our evidence does not support the idea
that fiscal rules may have lengthened recessions in the EU, a conclusion that is in
line with the findings provided in the first essay. The political factors did not prove
to be important in explaining the duration of the business cycle phases. Finally, the
evidence and magnitude of duration dependence are not significantly affected during
the period of great moderation in output volatility, except for the US.
The last issue analysed in this dissertation is concerned with the monetary
policy followed by some influential central banks such as the ECB, the Fed and the
BOE. In this part, special attention is given to the monetary policy behaviour of the
recently created ECB. As the ECB and the creation of the single currency – the Euro
– are other outcomes of the institutional changes that occurred in some European
countries over the 1990’s, we think that the best way of completing this study is by
analysing the behaviour of this new institution, the ECB, in comparison with the
behaviour of other well established monetary institutions like the Fed and the BOE.
In our view, this complements the analysis of the economic implications of the
institutional changes that occurred in the EU countries over the last two decades.
Above all, it is worth mentioning that monetary policy has acquired an
important role in Economics during the last fifty years as more and more influential
papers have contributed to clarify the way it works and/or should work. Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) were the first to demonstrate the
advantages of rules over discretion in the conduct of monetary policy and to
10
emphasize the important role of reputation in controlling inflation. The independence
of central banks from the political power is another idea that gained relevance and
support with those studies. Consequently, those papers influenced the way
policymakers started to look at monetary policy, as well as its understanding and the
focus of research in the last two decades.
In the 1990s, influenced by those advances, some central banks began to
adopt inflation targets to make monetary policy more transparent. An important
contribution to the understanding of inflation targeting and the use of monetary rules
was offered to the literature by Taylor (1993), who set the agenda for most of the
following empirical analyses on monetary rules. In his paper he defines a simple
algebraic interest rate rule that demonstrates quite well how the Fed adjusts its
interest rate to inflation and the output gap. This rule is known as the “Taylor rule”.
Over the last years several papers have extended this rule in different directions by
including in its basic structure expectations, interest rate smoothing and variables
such asset prices, exchange rates, money supply among others; other central banks,
besides the Fed, have also been under the scope of most of those studies.
More recently some authors have started to question the assumption of
symmetric preferences on which the Taylor rule is grounded. In fact, contrary to
what is stated by the linear Taylor rule, central banks can react differently to inflation
or output above or below their targets. This recent development in the literature has
influenced greatly the work presented in the last chapter of this dissertation. Adding
to this the fact that the ECB has been recently created – and that little is known about
its actual behaviour – more needs to be done to improve our knowledge of its policy.
To analyse the behaviour of the ECB – and to compare it with the behaviour
of two other influential central banks (the Fed and the BOE) – we make two
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extensions to the forward-looking Taylor rule developed by Clarida et al. (1998,
2000). First, we extend it by considering the reaction of the central bank to an
indicator that collects information from some asset prices and financial variables;
second, we test whether the monetary policy followed by the ECB, Fed and BOE can
be described by a linear Taylor rule or, instead, by a more complex nonlinear rule.
We start by considering whether the basic Taylor rule could be augmented
with a variable that collects and synthesises the information from asset and financial
markets, i.e. whether central banks are targeting the relevant economic information
contained in a group of financial variables and not simply targeting each financial
variable per se. Therefore, we estimate a Taylor rule augmented with a financial
conditions index that captures the information contained in some financial variables.
This index synthesises the relevant information provided by those variables in a
single variable, where the weight of each asset and financial variable is allowed to
vary over time. Synthesizing that information in a weighted index permits us to
extract the particular relevance of each variable at each point in time and, therefore,
put together an amount of information that is more likely to be targeted by the central
bank at any time. The results from the estimation of a linear Taylor rule indicate that
the ECB targets the information contained in the financial conditions index
developed in this study, but the Fed and BOE are not doing so; they only take into
account one or two financial variables and clearly do not target asset prices.
The traditional Taylor rule can be viewed as an optimal policy rule that is
derived from the minimization of a symmetric quadratic central bank’s loss function
assuming that the aggregate supply function is linear. However, in reality, this may
not be the case and the central bank can have asymmetric preferences, therefore,
following not a linear but a nonlinear Taylor rule. As stated before, only very
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recently some studies started to consider these asymmetries or nonlinearities in the
analysis of monetary policy (Martin and Milas, 2004, Taylor and Davradakis, 2006,
Assenmacher-Wesche, 2006, Surico, 2007a, 2007b and Petersen, 2007). This
dissertation extends the analysis into two areas not yet explored by those studies.
First, it applies, for the first time, a nonlinear model to the study of ECB monetary
policy, where the presence of asymmetries is taken into account directly in the
structure of the model. This procedure will provide answers to the following
questions: Can the ECB’s monetary policy be characterized by a nonlinear Taylor
rule, or more precisely, is the ECB reacting differently to levels of inflation above
and below the target? Does the ECB attempt to hit the inflation target precisely or
keep inflation within a certain range? Second, this study also extends the nonlinear
specification of the Taylor rule with the financial index used in the linear estimations
to check whether, after controlling for nonlinearities, the ECB and the other two
central banks are still (or not) reacting to the information contained in this index.
The results from the estimation of the nonlinear smooth transition regression
model provide evidence that the ECB’s monetary policy can indeed be described by
a nonlinear Taylor rule and show that the ECB only reacts actively to inflation when
it is above a certain level; moreover, it only reacts to the business cycle when
inflation is stabilised well below that threshold. The results also show that the ECB –
contrary to the other central banks – continues to consider the information contained
in the financial index even after nonlinearities are controlled for. Moreover, we find
weak evidence to reject the linear model for the US; but, we find enough evidence to
reject it for the UK, where the BOE seems to be pursuing a target range for inflation.
To summarize, this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 – analyses the
impact of the European Union fiscal rules on economic growth. This chapter starts
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by presenting some motivation for this analysis and an overview of the literature.
The econometric model is specified next, followed by a description of the data used,
estimation of the model and discussion of the empirical results. The main findings of
this approach are emphasized in the last section of this chapter.
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the causes of excessive deficits in the EU. It
starts with a review of the literature on the causes of public deficits. A simple
theoretical framework and the empirical model to be estimated are described next.
The data and the empirical results are analysed in the following section. This chapter
ends providing a summary of the main findings and some ideas for future research.
Chapter 4 discusses the factors that affect the duration of expansions and
contractions. After reviewing the literature on business cycle duration dependence,
this chapter presents the data, main hypotheses to test and the econometric model.
The empirical results are presented and discussed next. The last section emphasizes
the main findings and offers some suggestions for future research.
Chapter 5 analyses whether central banks’ monetary policy can be described
by a linear or nonlinear Taylor rule and analyses the role of a financial conditions
index in a monetary rule. This chapter starts by presenting a brief review of the
literature on the Taylor rule. The specification used to estimate the linear Taylor rule
is then described, as well as the data. It proceeds with the analysis of the empirical
results of the estimation of the linear Taylor rule augmented with a financial
conditions index. The model used to estimate the nonlinear Taylor rule is presented
and estimated in the following section. The last section concludes this chapter.
Finally, Chapter 6 synthesises the main conclusions of this thesis.
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2. The impact of the European Union fiscal rules on
economic growth
2.1. Introduction
The impact of Maastricht criteria and Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) fiscal
rules on economic growth is an important issue that has generated a lively discussion
among economists. This discussion has progressed much further in the theoretical
field than in the empirical one.
Arguments for fiscal rules have their foundations in the theory of Optimal
Currency Areas, which states that when countries form an Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) they lose their independence over both monetary policy and the
exchange rate. Therefore, a significant centralization of the national budgets to
accommodate asymmetric shocks in the different countries would be desirable or
expected. However, in the European Union (EU) context this did not occur because
of the fears that the resulting temporary fiscal transfers might become permanent,
which could create political problems among the EU countries and endanger the
unity of the EU.
Therefore, the alternative was to leave fiscal policy in the hands of national
governments – to face asymmetric shocks when necessary – and to put in place rules
to avoid excessive deficits. Those rules are important because governments’
temptation to create budget deficits to absorb negative shocks in an EMU can lead to
problems of sustainability of those deficits and to growing government debts. There
could also be negative spillovers for other EMU states, and the price stability policy
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of the European Central Bank (ECB) could be undermined. For example, a country
that allows its debt-GDP ratio to increase continuously can force the EU interest rate
upwards, which will increase the burden of government debts in the other countries
and force them to follow more restrictive fiscal polices to stabilize their debt-GDP
ratios. This might also compel countries to pressure the ECB to relax its monetary
stance, which could endanger the stability of prices in the EMU.
These considerations led to the definition in the Maastricht Treaty of
budgetary rules that countries have to satisfy in order to take part in EMU: the 3% of
GDP deficit rule and the 60% of GDP debt rule. These same rules were later
reinforced in the SGP for countries in EMU, in order to avoid the problems
mentioned above.
Some politicians and economists have recently argued that, despite the
justification for fiscal rules in an EMU without a centralised budget, EU fiscal rules
may have undermined economic growth.1 However, very few empirical contributions
exist to sustain or refute such a suggestion. This study tries to contribute to the
literature by evaluating empirically the impact of the EU fiscal rules on economic
growth in the framework of a simple growth model. The results presented here do not
support the contention that fiscal rules have damaged growth in the EU countries.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents
some motivation for the analysis of the impact of the EU fiscal rules on growth:
Maastricht and SGP rules are described and EU economic performance is evaluated;
an overview of the literature is presented and some ideas are advanced to fill its gaps.
Section 2.3 specifies the econometric model and the estimation techniques. Section
1 See, for example, Thirlwall (2000), Arestis et al. (2001), Warin (2005) and Wyplosz (2006), among
others.
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2.4 presents the data followed by the estimation of the model and discussion of the
empirical results. Finally, section 2.5 concludes emphasizing the main findings.
2.2. Motivation and literature on EU fiscal rules
The aim of this section is to present an overview of the EU fiscal rules
complemented with some data analysis and references from the literature that try to
assess the implications of those rules on the recent economic performance in the EU.
2.2.1. From the Maastricht Treaty to the Stability and Growth Pact
The first great step toward the creation of an EMU in Europe was the signing
of the Maastricht Treaty by some European countries in 1991. With this step, twelve
EU countries promised to abide by some criteria in order to be accepted as members
of the future EMU.2 Those criteria were numerically very simple and clear. To take
part in the EMU by 1999: (i) a country should have a government budget deficit and
debt not higher than 3% of GDP and 60% of GDP, respectively; (ii) its inflation rate
should be no more than 1.5 percentage points above that of the three best performing
states; (iii) its nominal long-term interest rate should be no more than 2 percentage
points above the average rate of the three best performing member states concerning
inflation; (iv) and finally, its currency should remain stable in the normal bands of
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) for at least 2 years without devaluations.
Having committed to these criteria, the EU countries lost some degree of control
over monetary policy and some degree of flexibility at the economic policy level.
2 The countries that formed the EU in 1992 were the following: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995.
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By 1999, almost all countries had accomplished most of the criteria, with the
exception of Greece which fulfilled none, and Sweden and the United Kingdom
which did not have their currencies in the ERM, meaning that 12 of the (at the time)
15 EU countries could take part in EMU. Furthermore, Denmark and the United
Kingdom decided not to take part, arguing that they were not prepared yet to lose
their independence over monetary policy. Thus, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain were the
first countries to take part in the EMU created in 1999. Greece joined in 2001.
By taking part in EMU, these countries ceded control over exchange rate and
monetary policies to the ECB. The only policy remaining in the hands of EMU
member states is fiscal policy, but even this is limited by the requirements of the
SGP. The main objective of the SGP is to regulate fiscal policy after the introduction
of the Euro in 1999, i.e. to prevent countries from relaxing their convergence efforts
or their fiscal policy after they have taken part in EMU. Therefore, the SGP was
supposed to guide national fiscal policies in the EMU and persuade countries to
achieve balanced deficits in the medium-term, with the aim of producing greater
budgetary flexibility when members suffer asymmetric shocks and fall into
recession, without disturbing price stability.
Basically, the SGP consists of two parts: a surveillance part and a dissuasive
part.3 The surveillance part or the warning mechanism of the SGP intends to prevent
countries from falling into excessive deficits. The Council of the Ministry of
Finances (ECOFIN) examines national stability programmes and recommends
adjustments if a country’s budget deviates from the medium-term objective.
3 For more details on the working of these mechanisms see, for example, De Grauwe (2005).
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The dissuasive part is activated when surveillance is not efficient in avoiding
excessive deficits. In the original version of the SGP an excessive deficit was defined
as a deficit higher than 3% of GDP, unless it was considered exceptional, i.e. unless
it resulted from an unexpected event (like a natural disaster) or from a severe
economic slowdown. The latter was defined as an annual decline of GDP of at least
2%. In such a situation no excessive deficit procedure was activated. If the fall in real
GDP was between 0.75% and 2% and the deficit was higher than 3%, the member
state could present arguments to justify the excessive deficit and then the Council
would decide whether the arguments were valid or not. However, when the decline in
real GDP was less than 0.75% no exceptionality could be invoked. So, if a deficit
was detected, the Council should issue a recommendation for the member state to
correct it. If it was not corrected, sanctions could be imposed: the country in default
would have to make a non-interest bearing deposit of 0.2% of GDP plus 0.1% for
each point of the deficit above 3% of GDP. The maximum amount of the deposit was
set at 0.5% of GDP. If the excessive deficit was not corrected in two years it was
turned into a fine; otherwise, it was returned to the country in question.
However, in practice, this process presents some flaws. Because the fines can
only be decided upon by a qualified majority of the Council of Ministers of Finance,
the original SGP creates a situation in which the judges who have to decide about the
sanctions are the same persons (countries) who could be adopting the defence
position next time (De Grauwe, 2005). That was probably one of the main reasons
why no sanctions were applied to France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Portugal when
they broke the 3% rule several times in this decade. The Commission insisted that
those countries should correct their excessive deficits even in the middle of a
declining business cycle (2002-2003), but France and Germany, in order to avoid a
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deeper economic slowdown, preferred not to follow this recommendation. This
undermined the SGP power, which boosted the discussion of its reform.4
A consensus on the reform of the SGP was achieved in March 2005 and some
changes were introduced:5 (a) the medium-term objective now refers to the cyclically
adjusted budgetary position of a country; (b) countries with low debt ratio (and a
high growth potential) are allowed to maintain a deficit of 1% over the business
cycle; the others have to maintain a balanced budget over the business cycle; (c) the
3% budget deficit ceiling is maintained for all countries and more importance is
given to the reduction of the debt ratio to less than 60% of GDP; (d) it is now enough
to have a negative growth rate or a “protracted period of very low growth relative to
potential growth” for a country to be allowed to (temporarily) exceed the 3% limit;
(e) countries are now able to invoke more special circumstances for exceeding the
3% ceiling; for example, investment programmes or pension reforms that increase
the debt today while improving the future sustainability of government finances will
be accepted as special circumstances allowing for a temporary breach of the 3% rule;
(f) the adjustment path to the medium-term objective is now defined in conformity
with the business cycle: countries have to commit to reinforce consolidation when
the economy is growing, but that effort can be reduced in phases of weak economic
growth; (g) countries which exceed the 3% ceiling, but have low debt levels, will be
allowed to stretch the adjustment over a longer period of time.
With a large number of specificities contemplated in the reformed Pact, it is
clear that more flexibility was obtained at the cost of less simplicity and
4 The critics and suggestions of reform to the SGP are not new. Arestis et al. (2001) and Arestis and
Saywer (2003) have already proposed its abolition and the creation of an alternative ‘Full
Employment, Growth and Stability Pact’; Buiter and Grafe (2004) also called for the rethinking or
revision of the existing SGP, given its flaws.
5 On the reformed SGP, see Artis and Onorante (2006), Buti (2006) and Diebalek et al. (2006).
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transparency. However, despite that trade-off, it is important to emphasize that both
the former and reformed SGP – and even the Maastricht Treaty – stick to the idea
that fiscal policies in a Monetary Union (without a centralised budget) should be
subjected to rules. Whether those rules have affected the economic performance of
the EU countries is an issue that this essay will start to analyse in the next section.
2.2.2. Economic growth in the EU and in other OECD countries
In this section, the evolution of growth of real GDP in the EU countries is
compared with growth in a group of industrial (non-EU) countries. Those countries
are the following OECD countries: Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of
growth of real GDP in each EU country and in the EU as a whole; Figure 2.2 reports
the evolution of this variable in the other countries. In the analysis of these figures,
particular attention should be given to the EU countries in the post-Maastricht period.
Figure 2.1 shows a higher synchronisation of economic growth in the group
of EU countries in the period after Maastricht. This evidence can be interpreted as
the natural result of the efforts of integration towards the creation of an EMU in
Europe. Besides countries presenting similar growth trends, it is even possible to
identify a long lasting episode of sustainable economic growth in the post-Maastricht
period: after the recession of 1993, countries grew at rates of around 2% to 4% until
2001 (Ireland and Luxembourg reached even higher rates).
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Figure 2.1. Growth of real GDP in the EU countries 1971-2005
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Source: OECD (2006). Statistical Compendium.
Figure 2.2. Growth of real GDP in the other OECD countries 1971-2005
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That episode of sustainable growth is followed by a slowdown in economic
activity in almost all EU countries. As the economic slowdown of 2001-2003 is the
first episode of low growth after important institutional changes that have occurred in
some European countries, economists wonder whether that prolonged period of low
growth can be due to those changes. More specifically, as this period is characterized
by the implementation of fiscal rules (the SGP rules for the deficit and debt),
economists ask whether those rules are influencing overall economic performance in
in the EU countries. The aim of this study is to answer this question, or more
precisely, to identify what has been the real impact of the fiscal rules imposed by the
Maastricht Treaty, and later reinforced by the SGP, on EU economic growth.
Looking just at Figure 2.1 and comparing EU economic performance before
and after the imposition of fiscal rules in Europe, no significant differences in
economic growth are found between both periods.6 Furthermore, there is no
substantial difference in growth rates even when average growth in the EU is
compared with average growth in the other OECD countries (or simply with the US)
for the period after Maastricht.7 However, as there are many countries involved in the
6 On average, the growth rate of real GDP is not substantially different in both periods. In fact, the
results of the simple computation of the annual average growth across the 15 EU countries shows an
average rate of about 2.9% for the period before Maastricht (1971-1991) and 2.7% for the period after
Maastricht (1992-2005). However, the annual average growth in the period in which the fiscal rules
started to be officially assessed (1997-2005) is slightly higher than in the period before: 3.0% in the
period 1997-2005 versus 2.5% in the period 1970-1996.
7 The annual growth rate across the 8 OECD countries for the period 1992-2005 is, on average,
approximately 2.8% (and it is 3.1% for the period 1971-1991). These averages are the same when we
compare the pre- and post-97 periods. These values are not very different from the ones obtained for
the EU countries in the same periods. In fact, a simple (unconditional) differences-in-differences
estimation (controlling for fixed and time effects) has shown no significant differences in growth rates
between the EU and OECD countries as a result of the imposition of the fiscal rules. The following
equation was used in this analysis: yit=βdit+ηi+τt+εit, where yit is the growth rate of real GDP, dit is a
variable that takes the value of 1 in the period in which EU countries are affected by the fiscal rules
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analysis and non-EU countries present a mixed behaviour (see Figure 2.2), we cannot
simply rely in the analysis of these figures. It is necessary to proceed with a more
sophisticated and accurate statistical analysis. That work will be done in the
empirical part of this chapter.
2.2.3. Literature and its gaps
In the literature there are several studies that try to evaluate the effectiveness
of the EU fiscal rules. Some simply raise doubts about the rules and the way they
were defined in the SGP. Others analyse, either theoretically or empirically, the
impact of those rules on the conduct of fiscal policy by national governments (deficit
and debt behaviour) and their impact on public investment and economic growth.
2.2.3.1. EU fiscal rules and the behaviour of fiscal policy
One group of studies analyses the response of fiscal policy to the business
cycle. Their results seem to indicate that the improvement of budgetary balances in
Europe was mainly the result of good economic growth rather than active policy
adjustments. However, the effect of those adjustments on growth is not examined.
Gali and Peroti (2003) and Annett (2006) evaluate to what extent the
constraints associated with the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP have affected the way
national governments have conducted fiscal policy. Their results show that fiscal
policy has become more counter-cyclical (or less pro-cyclical) over time: before
Maastricht it was pro-cyclical, but after Maastricht it is essentially a-cyclical.
(either after 1992 or after 1997) and 0 both in the other periods and for the unaffected countries
(OECD countries), ηi and τt are the fixed and time effects, respectively, and εit is the error term. The
estimated coefficient for d is 0.002 (t-value = 0.55) when the threshold is 1992 and 0.004 (t-value =
1.28) when the threshold is 1997.
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Marinheiro (2004) confirms that EU fiscal rules have reinforced the counter-
cyclicality of fiscal policy and that this result is even more evident during
downswings. However, the results provided by Annett (2006) seem to indicate that
fiscal policy in the EU countries has become pro-cyclical during the SGP period.
More recently, Artis and Onorante (2006) estimate a set of structural vector
autoregression (SVAR) models for each Eurozone country with the purpose of
assessing the importance of a set of fiscal rules, in particular the SGP rules in its old
and reformed versions. Their results suggest that fiscal policy had a limited
smoothing effect on the cycle in the 1990s. They also state that the changes in the
rules of the Pact are likely to have very little impact on fiscal policies and conclude
that the extra margin to conduct fiscal policies is extremely limited resulting in a
negligible effect on growth.
2.2.3.2. EU fiscal rules and public investment
The relation between EU fiscal policy rules and public investment is analysed
in another group of papers. Unfortunately, these studies do not proceed to test the
subsequent effect of public investment on EU economic growth.
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) blame the SGP for putting no pressure on the
reduction of current government spending and consider it important to exclude (net)
public investment from the definition of the budget deficit. However, this rule for
excluding public investment from the computation of the deficit may present some
problems like the possibility of “creative accounting”, risk of a growing debt and
unequal treatment of expenditure on human and physical capital. According to
Balassone and Franco (2000) the idea of creating such a ‘golden rule’ in the EU may
not be the best option because it can conflict with the objective of a sound fiscal
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stance. Verde (2004) suggests a more consensual approach of (temporarily)
excluding high quality – or growth promoting – public spending from the
computation of the fiscal deficit during periods of economic slowdown.
By applying an empirical analysis, Gali and Peroti (2003) seek to confirm
whether Maastricht and SGP rules have a negative effect on investment. Their results
show a mildly pro-cyclical behaviour of public investment both before and after
Maastricht. However, they conclude that the observed decline in public investment as
a percentage of GDP in the last decade among the EU countries is not due to the
constraints of either the Maastricht criteria or the SGP. Indeed the decline in public
investment started well before Maastricht and other industrial countries have
registered an even greater decline. Perée and Välilä (2005) and Välilä and Mehrotra
(2005) came to a similar conclusion. They also show that the SGP deficit rule is not
responsible for the observed decline in public investment in Europe. For that reason,
they are sceptical about the exclusion of public investment from fiscal deficit targets.
2.2.3.3. EU fiscal rules and economic growth
Another group of authors emphasizes the need to boost economic
performance as a condition for improving a country’s budgetary position in the long
run. According to this view, economic growth should receive precedence over a strict
application of the fiscal rules. Von Hagen (2003) argues that countries should be
encouraged to adopt more growth-friendly policies by restructuring their government
tax and expenditure systems. He supports the idea that authorities should pay more
attention to the role of economic growth in achieving sustainable public finances.
Using simple graphical analysis he observes that an increase in public investment,
primary spending cuts, and reductions in direct taxes have a positive impact on GDP
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growth, which provides a strong foundation for the subsequent sustainable reduction
of the deficit and debt. Therefore, he blames the SGP for focusing excessively on
annual deficits which prevents governments from adopting important fiscal reforms
that might result in larger deficits initially but which would bring the desired positive
growth effects in the future.
A detailed examination of the extent to which the quality of the consolidation
efforts during the 1990s affected macroeconomic performance in the EU is provided
by Fatás et al. (2003). Their evidence indicates that fiscal adjustments based on the
reduction of primary expenditures (wages and transfers in particular) are more
persistent and successful in terms of debt reduction and are less damaging to growth
than revenue-driven consolidations. They show that the growth rates remained
persistently above the EU average after expenditure-driven consolidations, while the
difference vanishes quickly after revenue-driven consolidations. Thus, they conclude
that tax-driven consolidations have been less favourable to growth than expenditure-
led consolidations.
Few empirical studies have intended to demonstrate how economic behaviour
in the EU countries has been affected by Maastricht and SGP rules. Furthermore,
there are some methodological flaws in these works and the results are unsatisfactory
or do not provide a clear answer. For example, Hein and Truger (2005) examine the
effects of EMU monetary and fiscal policies on growth and on convergence across
the Euro-area. They observe that, despite a significant convergence in nominal
variables (interest rate, inflation rate, deficit/GDP, debt/GDP), there was no
convergence in terms of GDP growth, labour productivity and unemployment rates.
Using simple pooled least squares regressions for 11 EU countries (1981-2001) they
show that EMU macroeconomic policy institutions (ECB policy stance and SGP
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rules) have had restrictive effects on growth. More specifically, they show that an
increase in interest rates and a reduction in the structural primary government deficit
have a negative effect on growth. Therefore, they conclude that the years before and
after the introduction of the Euro were characterized by a restrictive policy mix that
has not been conducive to aggregate growth or to real convergence.
However, Hein and Trugger’s (2005) study presents some flaws that may
undermine their results. First, the conclusion that EMU macroeconomic policy
institutions have restrictive effects on growth seems too strong, in the sense that in
their model they are analysing the whole period 1981-2001 without distinguishing
the periods before and after the institutional cooperation has become stronger. They
could, for example, use a dummy for the period after 1992 or proceed to a separate
analysis for the periods before and after Maastricht. Second, they use an ad hoc
model specification without taking into account the economic growth literature.
Hence, their specification can be criticised for a lack of important variables.
A more consistent analysis can be found in Savona and Viviani (2003) and
Soukiazis and Castro (2005). Despite some flaws, their approaches are more in
conformity with growth theory. However, a more adequate specification could be
used, including, for example, physical and human capital and short-term dynamics in
the model, since both studies use annual data.
Savona and Viviani (2003) perform econometric tests in a fixed effects panel
data model for a group of 12 EU countries for the period 1987-2002 and find
evidence of a negative effect of current public spending on output growth and a
positive impact of public capital spending on growth. According to their results, they
argue for the modification of the rules of the Pact: it should exempt public
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investment from its constraints, but the automatic checks on current public spending
should be maintained.
Like Hein and Truger (2005), Savona and Viviani (2003) do not analyse the
pre- and post-Maastricht (or SGP) periods separately nor the direct impact of
Maastricht criteria and SGP rules on growth. Soukiazis and Castro (2003, 2005)
perform such direct analysis by using panel data estimations for the 15 EU countries
for the period 1980-2001. They observe that the fiscal discipline after Maastricht was
harmful to both growth of real output and convergence in per capita income in the
EU. But the evidence behind this conclusion is not strong enough: although they find
a lower rate of convergence in per capita output after Maastricht, their dummy for the
period after Maastricht is not statistically significant. Moreover, they do not proceed
in separately estimating the effects of the components of the deficit (current
spending, public investment, tax revenues) on growth and they do not include human
capital in their regressions. The inclusion of those variables would make the analysis
more interesting and more in line with recent economic growth theory.
2.2.4. Aims and contributions of this study
Using the existing literature as starting point, this study intends to provide a
clear empirical answer to the question of whether the Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules
have affected growth in the countries that formed the EU at the time those rules were
created and implemented (i.e. without considering the 12 new countries that entered
the EU after 2004; in fact, this study considers just the period before the SGP has
been reformed). The analysis of this issue will be based on the estimation of a growth
equation augmented with fiscal and economic variables.
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This study also tries to contribute to the literature through some
improvements relative to the previous empirical works on the impact of EU
institutional changes on growth. First, in this study the econometric analysis of the
economic phenomenon is built around a formal growth model, contrary to the
existing approaches that rely on ad-hoc growth specifications.
Second, short-run dynamics of output are controlled for by using both short-
run regressors in the growth equations for annual data and a five-year time spans
analysis. These procedures are not used in the previous empirical studies in this area.
Third, a recently developed estimator is implemented in this analysis: a
pooled mean group estimator. As this estimator allows for heterogeneity not only on
the intercepts but also on other coefficients, it has some advantages over a simple
fixed effects estimator in the estimation of a growth equation using annual data.
Fourth, a new time dummy for the period in which fiscal rules started to be
officially assessed is now used, instead of just a dummy for the period after
Maastricht. This dummy seems to be more appropriate because it covers the period
of effective enforcement of the fiscal rules. Additionally, an indicator to control more
directly for the constraints that result from the implementation of the fiscal rules is
developed and included in the analysis: a margin of manoeuvre indicator.
Finally, this study goes even further by providing a comparative analysis
between the economic performance of the EU countries and a group of industrial
non-EU countries for the period after Maastricht, regarding the effects of the EU
fiscal rules.
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2.3. Specification of the model and estimation techniques
A growth equation augmented with fiscal and economic variables will be
used in the analysis of the impact of EU fiscal policy rules on economic growth. The
aims of this section are the following: (i) to derive the growth equation to be
estimated; and (ii) define the adequate econometric estimation techniques.
2.3.1. Specification of the growth equation
Following the works of Mankiw et al. (1992), Islam (1995) and Bassanini and
Scarpetta (2001), a policy-augmented growth equation can be derived from a
traditional constant-returns-to-scale growth model. The standard neo-classical
growth model is derived from a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production
function of the type:
  ,)()()()()( 1   tLtAtHtKtY (2.1)
where the level of output at time t (Y(t)) is a function of physical capital (K(t)),
human capital (H(t)), labour (L(t)) and the level of technological and economic
efficiency (A(t)). The partial elasticities of output with respect to physical and human
capital are represented by α and β, respectively. Labour is assumed to grow at a rate
n(t): )()()( tLtntL  .
Next, according to Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001), it is assumed that A(t) can
be divided in its two components: economic efficiency (E(t)), which will depend on
economic policy and institutions; and level of technological progress (T(t)), which is
assumed to grow at a constant rate g: )()( tgTtT  Therefore, we have:
,)(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln 0  j jj tXqqtTtEtTtA (2.2)
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where Xj(t) is a vector of variables affecting economic efficiency.
The remaining two time paths on the right hand-side variables of equation
(2.1) are described as follows:
)(])([)()()()()( 1 tkdtnthtktAtstk k 
  (2.3.1)
)(])([)()()()()( 1 thdtnthtktAtsth h 
  (2.3.2)
where, k=K/L, h=H/L, sk and sh are the investment rates in physical and human
capital, respectively, and d denotes the constant depreciation rate of both types of
capital.
Under the assumption that α+β<1 (i.e. decreasing returns of physical and
human capital), the system of time path equations can be solved to obtain the steady-
state values of k and h.8 Thus, after taking logs, we get:
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where ”*” denotes steady-state values. Taking logs in the production function and
substituting these two equations there, we obtain the expression for the steady-state
path of output in intensive form:
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(2.5)
8 This system of equations includes equations (2.2), (2.3.1), (2.3.2) and the time paths for labour and
technological progress. For further details on its derivation, see Mankiw et al. (1992) and Bassanini
and Scarpetta (2001).
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The steady-state value of output per capita, y*, is represented as a function of
the steady-state stock of human capital (h*) instead of a function of investment in
human capital (sh) because: (i) the data available to represent human capital (h) is the
‘stock’ of years of schooling of the (working-age) population from 25 to 64 years of
age; and (ii) it can be shown that the unobserved h* is a function of the actual human
capital (h):
.
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Assuming that observed growth rates include out-of-steady-state dynamics,
then a linear approximation of the transitional dynamics can be expressed as follows
(Mankiw et al., 1992):9
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where )( represents the convergence factor as a function of the speed of
convergence to the steady-state (λ=(1-α-β)[n(t)+g+d], -1<λ<0). Adding short-term
dynamics to equation (2.7) in order to capture the short-run components of the
dependent variable,10 we obtain the basic functional form that is empirically
estimated in this study:
9 This equation is obtained substituting equations (2.2) and (2.6) into (2.5) and proceeding to the
subsequent linear approximation around the steady-state.
10 See Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001).
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Using the estimated coefficients from this equation and comparing them with
those in equation (2.7), we can obtain estimates of the steady-state coefficients and
the parameters of the production function. The estimated speed of convergence to the
steady-state ( ˆ ) can be derived from the estimated convergence parameter (ˆ ) as
follows: )ˆ1ln(ˆ   ; the time to cover half way to convergence (hwtc) can be
computed as: )ˆ1ln(/)5.0ln( hwtc ; the estimated long-run effects or coefficients
on the investment rate, human capital and population growth on output (or the
estimate of the respective elasticities) are given by ˆ/ˆ1a , ˆ/ˆ2a and ˆ/ˆ3a ,
respectively; a similar deduction can be done to get the long-run coefficients on the
other variables: ˆ/ˆ 4ja ; finally, an estimate of the share of physical and human
capital in output (α and β) can be obtained, respectively, as follows: )ˆˆ/(ˆˆ 11 aa  
and )ˆˆ/(ˆˆ/)ˆ1(ˆˆ 122 aaa   .
2.3.2. Econometric estimation techniques
In this model the observed growth of GDP per capita is the result of
technological progress, the convergence process to each individual-specific steady-
state and the shifts in the steady-state that may arise from changes in policy,
institutions, investment rates and changes in population growth rate (Bassanini and
Scarpetta, 2001).
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Annual data are used to estimate the growth equation – in line with the works
by Cellini (1997) and Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) – instead of averages over time
(twenty or five-year time spans) as in the works by Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam
(1995). Data with annual frequency is preferred because large time spans can involve
the loss of important information. Moreover, according to Cellini (1997), the use of
annual data produces more plausible values for the elasticity of output to the
exogenous variables than the estimates reported by lower frequency regressions.
However, annual variations in output contain cyclical components. Thus, it is
necessary to consider a specification that takes into account those short-run
dynamics. A way of controlling for those business cycle fluctuations is by including
first-differences of the determinants of growth as short-run regressors in the
equations.11 As a result, the general form of the growth equation can be written as an
error correction model:
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where ε symbolizes the error term and θs represents the long-run coefficients. As
usually assumed in the growth literature, a value of 0.05 is assigned to the constant
g+d.12
11 Another way of controlling for those annual fluctuations on output is by using longer time spans.
Despite the already mentioned loss of important information, a specification for a longer time span
(five-year time spans) will be considered latter in this chapter with the aim of comparing results.
12 For details see, for example, Mankiw et al. (1992) and Cellini (1997).
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The model will be estimated by using pooled cross-country time-series data
for 15 EU countries, controlling for country-specific effects. In some particular
regressions 8 additional industrial countries (OECD countries) will be included for
comparative purposes. Equation (2.8) will be the basis for these estimations and the
long-run coefficients (θs) will be obtained as indicated in Section 2.3.1.
Fixed effects are preferred to random effects because the population of the 15
EU countries is entirely represented in the sample for the period under analysis.
Thus, according to Marinheiro (2004), in a case like this it makes no sense to use a
random effects estimator. A similar argument can be used for the estimations with
the 23 OECD countries. The use of fixed effects will also allow controlling for and
capturing the actual specific characteristics of each country in the sample.13
However, this may not be the most adequate method for this analysis. The
fixed effects estimator allows intercepts to differ across countries while the other
coefficients are constrained to be the same. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that
the speed of convergence to the steady-state should be the same across countries
(Bassanini and Scarpeta, 2001). Although there are reasons to believe in common
long-run coefficients across EU countries – given they have access to common
technologies and have intense trade relations – short-run dynamics and the speed of
convergence may not be the same across them. In order to control for that case a
pooled mean group (PMG) estimator is employed in a second phase of this study.
This estimator, developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), allows the intercepts,
speed of convergence, short run coefficients, and error variances to differ freely
across groups, but imposes homogeneity on long-run coefficients. Thus, with the
13 Hausman tests also support the fixed effects estimator in most of the regressions (see Table 2.2)
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PMG procedure, we are able to estimate directly the following error correction
version of the growth equation:14
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and the long-run homogeneity hypothesis permits the direct identification of the
parameters that affect the steady-state path of output per capita ( iiss a  /, ).
This method requires a T large enough such that we can estimate the model
for each group separately. Therefore, when the data allow, this method will be used
and its results compared with the results obtained with the dynamic fixed effects
estimator.
2.4. Empirical work
This section starts by describing the data and variables used in the estimation
of the growth equation. Then, the empirical results obtained from both the dynamic
fixed effects estimator and the pooled mean group estimator will be presented and
analysed. In the final part of this section those results will be compared with the
results from the estimation of a growth equation using data for five-year time
intervals instead of annual intervals.15
14 Note that both this equation and equation (2.9) rely on the assumption that regressors are
cointegrated.
15 All growth equations were estimated by using the statistical software STATA 9.0.
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2.4.1. Data and description of the variables
The annual data used to estimate the growth equation derived in the previous
section were mainly collected from the OECD Statistical Compendium (2006) for 23
OECD countries over the period 1970-2005. Besides the 15 EU countries, Australia,
Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the USA are also
included in the sample, which will permit a comparison of their economic
performance with the performance of the EU countries in the period after Maastricht.
This procedure allows us to determine whether economic growth was significantly
higher or lower in the EU than in other developed countries during the period in
which fiscal rules were imposed over the EU countries.
A detailed description of the main variables used in this study, respective
sources and descriptive statistics can be found in Annex (see Table A.2.1.1 and Table
A.2.1.2). The dependent variable is defined as the growth rate of real GDP per capita
(ΔlnGDPpc). Traditional economic growth literature considers that the rate of
accumulation of physical capital, the accumulation of human capital and population
growth are the most important factors in determining the level of real output per
capita.16 Indeed, significant differences in the investment rate over time and across
countries are seen as a source of cross-country differences in output per capita.
Studies on growth also assume that labour force skills and experience can represent a
form of capital: human capital (Mankiw et al., 1992). The variables used to collect
the effects of the physical and human capital are the ratio of real private fixed capital
formation to real GDP (lnPInv) and the average number of years of schooling of the
working-age population (lnHK), respectively. Population growth (lnPop) is another
important variable to be considered in the growth equation.
16 See Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995).
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Like several other works on economic growth, Bassanini and Scarpetta
(2001) verify that some macroeconomic issues must also be considered in a growth
analysis, namely the impact of fiscal policy, the benefits of having low and stable
inflation and the benefits of exploiting comparative advantages from trade.
According to their analysis – and a previous contribution by Kneller et al. (1999) –
fiscal policy can affect output and growth in the medium-term and over the business
cycle. Those effects may come from the financing and composition of public
expenditure. More than the overall deficit, it is the composition of public spending
that is relevant for economic growth. These studies show that negative effects on
growth arise when the government relies more on distortionary taxation (direct taxes)
and when its expenditure focuses on unproductive activities (current consumption).
Hence, the impact of fiscal policy will be evaluated in this study by looking at the
effect of government revenues (direct to indirect taxes ratio: lnGovTx) and
expenditures – government consumption (lnGovC) and investment (lnGovI) – on
GDP per capita.
Finally, a low and stable inflation can have a positive effect on the level of
capital accumulation and consequently on growth because investment decisions are
usually made with a long-run perspective. On the other hand, higher volatility in
inflation brings uncertainty which discourages firms from investing in some
interesting projects. Additionally, gains from trade and exposure to external
competition must be also taken into account because of their potential positive effect
on growth. The effects of inflation volatility are captured by the standard deviation of
the rate of growth in the consumer price index (SdInfl) and the log of the ratio of
exports to imports (lnX/M) is used as a proxy for gains from trade.
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Besides the traditional determinants of economic growth described above,
some dummies or qualitative variables to control for the period in which fiscal rules
were imposed in over the EU are included in the growth equation. Particular
attention is given to the results from those variables because they will allow us to
answer the question of whether EU fiscal rules have affected real economic growth
in the EU countries and, if so, whether that impact has been positive or negative.
A dummy variable, similar to the one used by Soukiazis and Castro (2005),
was built to control for the period after Maastricht. This dummy is named D92EU
and is equal to 1 when we are observing an EU country for the period 1992-2005,
and 0 over the period 1970-1991. It will take value 0 over the entire period 1970-
2005 for the other OECD countries. As an alternative, a second dummy is built and
used for the period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit is to be
officially assessed. This period started in 1997 with the assessment of the countries
that would take part in EMU.17 This second dummy is called D97EU and takes value
1 for EU countries in the period 1997-2005 and 0 otherwise. In practice, D97EU can
be seen as a dummy that will account for the impact of the SGP rules since they
really come into effect, i.e. since the 3% fiscal rule has to be really accomplished,
otherwise sanctions can be imposed.
To circumvent the problem that these dummies might be capturing the effects
of other factors and not exclusively the effect of the EU fiscal and institutional
changes, the other 8 non-EU countries will also be included in the sample to control
for common macroeconomic effects. Both the EU and the non-EU countries are
industrialised countries with similar characteristics, intense economic relations,
access to common technologies and linked economic cycles, which means that they
17 Before 1997 countries just had to make efforts to converge; there was no particular sanction if the
convergence criteria were not accomplished in a particular year between 1992 and 1996.
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are more or less similarly affected by economic shocks (like the recession after
September 11th 2001, the effect of an increase in oil prices, the slowdown of the US
economy, etc.). The dummies will, in this case, capture and reflect with more
accuracy the particular effect of the EU fiscal constraints and not the effects of other
specific factors that affected growth in both groups of countries. Assuming that those
other effects will affect both groups in a similar way, the main differences will come
from the specificities of the institutional changes in the EU economy, where the
fiscal rules assume an important role.
This analysis can be done either for the period after Maastricht (1992-2005)
or just for the period in which rules were officially assessed (1997-2005). In this
case, as dummies D92EU and D97EU take the value of 1 for EU countries and 0 for
non-EU countries, they can be used as the indicator to compare the performance of
both groups of countries in those periods. Therefore, these dummies are now
controlling for specific effects on the EU economy in the period post-Maastricht.
Considering that the fiscal rules established by the Maastricht Treaty and SGP are a
very important specific characteristic of the EU economy during the period 1992-
2005, this will mean that the coefficients on both dummies will allow us to conclude
whether those rules have had a particular impact on the EU economic growth. This
approach constitutes an original contribution to the analysis of the impact of the EU
fiscal rules on growth.
According to the alternatives mentioned above, we may have either a time
comparison (panel of EU countries over the period 1970-2005) or a cross-country
comparison (panel of EU and non-EU countries over the post-Maastricht period) of
the impact of the EU institutional changes on economic growth – or even both.
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Finally, to control more directly for the effects of the main (and well known)
constraint imposed over the budget deficit after 1992, this study builds an indicator
for the margin of manoeuvre of fiscal policy (MgM). This indicator measures the
(normalised) distance of the actual level of the government budget surplus to the 3%
fiscal rule for the deficit imposed after Maastricht. The (normalised) MgM variable
takes values from 0 to 1, where 0 means no margin of manoeuvre and 1 means total
margin of manoeuvre over fiscal policy.18 The expectation is that the greater the
margin of manoeuvre is this period, the stronger will be economic growth in the next
period, because countries with a good fiscal margin of manoeuvre can always boost
the economy in “bad times”. As Maastricht and SGP rules reduce the margin of
manoeuvre of fiscal policy in most EU countries then, if the coefficient on this
variable is significantly positive, we can infer that the impact of those rules on EU
economic growth was negative.
Regression results for growth equations taking into account those alternatives
are provided in the next section. In practice, the growth equations to be estimated are
equal to equations (2.9) or (2.10) – depending on which estimator is used – plus the
term tid , , where tid , represents one of the qualitative variables that controls for the
period in which EU fiscal rules were imposed in the EU (D92EU, D97EU or MgM).
18 There are three special cases to consider here: (i) the EU countries are considered to have total
margin of manoeuvre over fiscal policy before Maastricht; (ii) the same is assumed for the period after
Maastricht if a country is running a surplus or is in a severe recession; (iii) on the contrary, if a
country breaks the rule, it is assumed that it has no margin of manoeuvre over fiscal policy. In the
other cases the MgM is computed as indicated above. See Table A.2.1.1 in Annex for further details
on how this indicator is built.
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2.4.2. Regressions and interpretation of the main results
Based on the theoretical approach and data presented above, this study will
proceed with the empirical analysis to determine whether fiscal rules imposed in
Europe in the period after Maastricht have had a significant effect on growth in the
EU countries. First, it presents and analyses the results from the dynamic fixed
effects (DFE) estimator and then the results from a PMG estimator. Additionally,
some robustness checks and sensitivity analyses will be provided.
However, before proceeding to the estimation of the error correction models,
using either the DFE estimator or the PMG estimator, it is convenient to analyse
whether the regressors are I(0) or I(1), i.e. whether they are stationary or not.
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) show that the same algorithm can be used to
compute the PMG estimators whether regressors are I(0) or I(1), but their asymptotic
distributions are slightly different. If the regressors are not stationary but are I(1),
then it is convenient that they are cointegrated. This would make the error term a
stationary process for all countries. Therefore, the order of integration of the
regressors is established in first place and then – if they are non-stationary or I(1) –
cointegration tests are performed.
Panel unit root tests for each variable are presented in Table 2.1. Statistics
were obtained by applying Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) unit root test. This test
assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis. Results provide
evidence that most of the regressors can be considered non-stationary at a
significance level of 5%: only SdInfl and lnPop seem to be clearly stationary; the
other regressors are either non-stationary or borderline, so this study proceeds with
treating them as non-stationary.
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Table 2.1. Panel unit root and cointegration tests
Panel unit root tests Level 1st diff. Pedroni panel cointegration tests
lnGDPpc
lnPInv
lnHK
lnPop
lnGovI
lnGovC
lnGovTx
SdInfl
lnX/M
-1.43
-1.93
-0.38
-2.34
-1.39
-1.80
-1.71
-3.32
-1.92
-3.57
-4.39
-3.58
-4.88
-4.15
-4.05
-4.29
-5.56
-4.22
  Panel υ –statistic 
Panel rho-statistic
Panel pp-statistic
Panel ADF-statistic
Group rho-statistic
Group pp-statistic
Group ADF-statistic
4.54
2.28
-2.69
-1.85
3.67
-1.99
-0.71
Notes: In the panel unit root tests the critical values for 1%, 5% and 10% are -2.04, -1.90, and -1.81, respectively;
for example, a k<-1.90 implies rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root or non-stationarity at 5%. Results
and critical values for these tests were obtained by using the ‘ipshin’ command in STATA.
Pedroni tests were performed by using a procedure written by Peter Pedroni for RATS; all reported values
for Pedroni statistics are distributed N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no cointegration and those statistics
are one-sided tests with a critical value of -1.64 for a level of significance of 5% (k<-1.64 implies rejection
of the null), except the υ-statistic that has a critical value 1.64 (k>1.64 means rejection of the null 
hypothesis).
Having concluded that the series are essentially integrated of order 1, some
cointegration tests were performed by using Pedroni (1999) tests. Pedroni’s panel
tests for cointegration are also reported in Table 2.1. Results show that 4 of the 7
tests reject the null hypothesis of no-cointegration (panel υ, pp, ADF and group pp 
tests). Although not all tests reject the null hypothesis, the majority do. This fact
provides some evidence of cointegration among the variables, which permits us to
proceed with the estimation of the growth model presented above using either a DFE
estimator or a PMG estimator in the context of an error correction mechanism.
2.4.2.1. Dynamic fixed effects panel data estimation
The results from a dynamic panel data estimation controlling for fixed effects
are presented in Table 2.2. The presence of any pattern of heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation is controlled for by using robust standard errors. Economic policy
variables are lagged one period in all estimations in order to better identify their
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long-run impact on output, to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the
usual delays in the reporting of economic data. As the time trend has never proved
statistically significant, it is not included in the analysis presented here.19 Columns 1,
2 and 3 of Table 2.2 present results just for EU countries over the period 1972-2004.
In the remaining estimations the non-EU countries are included with the aim of doing
a comparative analysis.
Results for the traditional determinants of economic growth are as expected.
The convergence coefficient is statistically significant in all the regressions presented
in Table 2.2. Estimations show that convergence in output per capita in the EU
countries runs at an annual rate of about 3.5%, which indicates that each year an
economy’s GDP covers about 3.5% of its distance from the steady state.20 This
means that it takes about 19 years to reduce by half the differences in output per
capita among EU countries.21
The coefficients on physical and human capital and population growth have
the expected signs and are highly significant in almost all specifications. Thus, an
increase in private investment and years of schooling and a decrease in population
growth have a positive impact on output per capita. It is important to notice that in
this analysis more attention is given to the long-run coefficients because short-run
dynamics are just used to control for cyclical fluctuations.
19 Note that, in practice, the time trend is replaced by the fiscal dummies for the periods after
Maastricht.
20 Although rather low, this value is in accordance with some seminal empirical contributions to the
growth literature. Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw et al. (1992), among others,
show that countries converge to their steady-state level of output per capita at a slow rate of
approximately 2% to 3% per year.
21 This seems quite a long time, but we will verify below, in Table 2.3, that for the period 1997-2004
that time was reduced to about 7 years (see column 6 in Table 2.3). This means that the EU countries
have been converging in real terms at a good pace over the last few years.
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Table 2.2. Results from dynamic fixed effects panel data estimations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
lnGDPpcit-1
Implied λ 
hwtc (a)
-0.0346
(-2.99)***
[0.035]
19.7 years
-0.0375
(-3.33)***
[0.038]
18.1 years
-0.0350
(-3.12)***
[0.036]
19.4 years
-0.0352
(-4.53)***
[0.036]
19.3 years
-0.0590
(-3.71)***
[0.061]
11.4 years
-0.0275
(-2.06)**
[0.028]
24.9 years
-0.0697
(-4.39)***
[0.072]
9.6 years
lnPInvit 0.8103
(2.57)**
0.6537
(2.40)**
0.7960
(2.60)***
0.5073
(2.31)**
0.8021
(2.19)**
0.1897
(0.41)
0.4055
(1.42)
lnHKit 1.662
(3.85)***
1.1573
(3.65)***
1.6359
(5.22)***
1.1010
(3.99)***
1.1815
(3.08)***
0.4656
(0.88)
0.8096
(2.54)**
lnPopit -1.589
(-2.35)**
-1.4384
(-2.56)**
-1.5892
(-2.46)**
-1.7553
(-3.86)***
-1.4018
(-3.09)***
-0.2449
(-0.41)
-1.1757
(-3.45)***
lnGovIit-1 0.3694
(2.19)**
0.3616
(2.40)**
0.3550
(2.21)**
0.3203
(2.66)***
0.1027
(1.18)
0.1935
(0.91)
0.1508
(1.94)*
lnGovCit-1 -2.411
(-2.80)***
-2.164
(-3.06)***
-2.366
(-2.97)***
-2.0996
(-4.11)***
-0.9888
(-2.65)***
-0.6251
(-1.20)
-0.9780
(-3.17)***
lnGovTxit-1 0.1270
(0.68)
0.1137
(0.67)
0.1286
(0.70)
-0.0352
(-0.26)
-0.0193
(-0.16)
0.2387
(1.08)
0.0263
(0.27)
SdInflit-1 -0.0577
(-1.97)**
-0.0581
(-2.18)**
-0.0577
(-2.01)**
-0.0514
(-2.33)**
-0.0681
(-1.99)**
-0.0581
(-0.36)
-0.0658
(-2.41)**
lnX/Mit-1 0.8044
(2.42)**
0.7181
(2.45)**
0.7800
(2.48)**
0.5004
(2.26)**
0.4101
(1.29)
0.6157
(1.45)
0.1462
(0.57)
D92EUit -0.0007
(-0.25)
0.0039
(0.61)
D97EUit 0.0054
(2.22)**
0.0060
(2.98)***
0.0112
(1.97)**
0.0093
(3.72)***
MgMit-1 0.0012
(0.52)
ΔlnPInvit 0.1045
(5.52)***
0.1047
(5.59)***
0.1050
(5.54)***
0.1025
(7.12)***
0.1106
(4.42)***
0.1171
(3.77)***
0.1143
(4.77)***
ΔlnHKit -0.0509
(-0.81)
-0.0250
(-0.40)
-0.0541
(-0.87)
0.0264
(0.49)
-0.0784
(-1.42)
0.0005
(0.01)
-0.0668
(-1.23)
ΔlnPopit 0.0116
(0.94)
0.0104
(0.83)
0.0120
(0.96)
0.0099
(1.00)
0.0155
(1.36)
-0.0200
(-1.85)*
0.0154
(1.37)
ΔlnGovIit 0.0364
(3.72)***
0.0372
(3.81)***
0.0361
(3.67)***
0.0354
(4.28)***
0.0341
(3.40)***
0.0357
(2.68)***
0.0354
(3.56)***
ΔlnGovCit -0.2585
(-8.08)***
-0.2593
(-8.12)***
-0.2586
(-8.09)***
-0.2618
(-10.32)***
-0.1841
(-5.27)***
-0.1904
(-4.69)***
-0.1850
(-5.54)***
ΔlnGovTxit 0.0258
(2.20)**
0.0252
(2.14)**
0.0260
(2.22)**
0.0141
(1.49)
0.0145
(1.37)
0.0288
(1.97)**
0.0177
(1.72)
ΔSdInflit 0.0001
(0.11)
-0.0001
(-0.03)
0.0001
(0.10)
-0.0003
(-0.35)
-0.0022
(-1.12)
0.0014
(0.36)
-0.0021
(-1.09)
ΔlnX/Mit -0.0118
(-0.52)
-0.0139
(-0.62)
-0.0117
(-0.52)
-0.0154
(-1.06)
0.0342
(1.29)
0.0500
(1.40)
0.0286
(1.13)
Constant 0.0489
(0.40)
0.1134
(1.00)
0.0511
(0.47)
0.0652
(0.89)
0.2382
(1.40)
0.2504
(1.74)*
0.3505
(2.09)**
R2 0.5873 0.5913 0.5875 0.5634 0.5946 0.5030 0.6133
Hausman test 27.1 (0.076) 32.3 (0.020) 29.5 (0.043) 93.4 (0.000) 27.7 (0.067) 21.9 (0.235) 28.5 (0.055)
Time period 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1992-2004 1997-2004 1992-2004
No. countries 14 14 14 21 21 21 21
No. Observ. 448 448 448 641 273 168 273
Sources: See Table A.2.1.1 in Annex.
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%; the
estimated speed of convergence to the steady-state (λ) is in square brackets. Models estimated controlling for fixed effects as
suggested by the Hausman test: the Chi2 statistic (for 18 degrees of freedom) are reported and the respective p-values are in
parenthesis; the null hypothesis is the hypothesis that the differences in the coefficients are not systematic (random effects);
the alternative is the fixed effects hypothesis; (see also text for reasons why fixed effects make more sense in this context; the
equation in column 6 was estimated by random effects because Hausman test suggests that and because the dummy D97EU
was dropped in the fixed effects estimation due to lack of variability). In all estimations the presence of any pattern of
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation was controlled for by using robust standard errors. The long-run coefficients, their
respective standard errors and t-statistics were estimated according to the relation θs=asi/фi.
Luxembourg and Iceland were excluded from the sample due to lack of observations for human capital.
(a) hwtc means half way to convergence and measures the time it takes to go half way to the new steady-state output per capita or
the time it takes to reduce half of the differences in output per capita among countries.
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As expected, government investment (lnGovI) has a positive and significant
impact on real output per capita while government final consumption expenditure
(lnGovC) affects it negatively. These results support the view of the EU authorities
that cuts in current expenditures to control for the deficit may have positive effects
on output in the long-run, but they also enhance the relevance given by some authors
to public investment (Savona and Viviani, 2003, Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2004 and
Verde, 2004). In fact, EU authorities should take into account not only the
importance of controlling for excessive deficits but also the benefits of ‘productive’
public investment in the definition and application of the fiscal rules to the EU
countries. It was also expected that a shift from taxing factor incomes to taxing
consumption would have positive growth effects. Nevertheless, this study does not
identify those positive effects in the EU context. The long-run coefficient on the
variable lnGovTx is not statistically significant in any of the regressions.
The variability of inflation (SdInfl) has a negative impact on output per capita,
which is consistent with the findings of Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001). As inflation
shows a high correlation with the convergence variable and human capital, the
variability of inflation is used instead.22 The results also suggest significant gains
from trade and exposure to external competition in the EU context. The sign of the
coefficient on lnX/M means that the higher the proportion of exports over imports the
higher output per capita.
However, the results of most interest in this analysis come from the dummy
variables for the post-Maastricht period. In the first regression presented in Table 2.2,
22 Theoretically, it makes more sense to use the variability of inflation than its level, because the
variability of inflation affects much more the decisions of consumption and investment (and economic
growth) in the medium and long-term than its level.
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the dummy D92EU was used to control for the growth effects in the EU-15 for the
period after Maastricht. The coefficient on this variable is not significant. A similar
result was obtained by Soukiazis and Castro (2005) in their analysis of output per
capita convergence. This result seems to indicate that the institutional changes that
took place in Europe after Maastricht were not harmful to output growth. Indeed,
when a dummy for the period in which the fiscal rules started to be assessed
(D97EU) is considered, it is even possible to conclude that growth of real GDP per
capita is significantly higher than before: results show that after 1997 growth of real
GDP per capita is, on average, about 0.5 percentage points higher than before.
Therefore, these results allow us to conclude that economic growth in the EU was not
negatively affected by those rules, contrarily to what some authors argue.23
The third regression includes the indicator for the margin of manoeuvre
lagged one period, but results show an insignificant coefficient. One interesting
conclusion can be retrieved from this result: the reduction of the margin of
manoeuvre over fiscal policy in the period after Maastricht did not have the expected
negative impact on growth, meaning that fiscal rules were not harmful to growth of
real GDP per capita.24
23 If the coefficients associated with those dummies were significantly negative, it would not be clear
that the low economic growth was essentially caused by the fiscal constraints or by other factors. But
as the coefficient on D97EU is significantly positive and D92EU is not significant, we have evidence
to say that growth was not lower in the period in which fiscal rules were imposed in Europe than
before. In reality, evidence shows (on average) a higher growth after 1997 than before.
24 This variable was also included in other regressions instead of the dummies, but it remained
insignificant. It was even included as regressor in a simple government investment equation, similar to
the one used by Perée and Välilä (2005), to test if it might affect growth indirectly via a potential
effect on public investment. Nevertheless, even in that case, the coefficient on this variable was not
significant. Given this lack of significance and to keep the analysis parsimonious, those results are not
presented here.
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Next, other industrial OECD countries were included in the sample for the
period 1972-2004. Column 4 in Table 2.2 presents the results for the whole period.
The coefficient on the dummy D97EU remains significant. In this case, that means
that growth of GDP per capita in EU was not only higher than before 1997 but, at the
same time, higher than in the other non-EU countries.25 To separate the temporal
effect from the cross-country effects, estimations were performed just for the period
after Maastricht. The results for the period after 1992 are reported in column 5. In
this case, the dummy D92EU is directly comparing the difference in growth between
EU countries and non-EU countries. Results for the dummy do not show a significant
difference in growth of GDP per capita: the estimated coefficient on the dummy is
positive but insignificant. However, when we consider only the period after 1997,
and D97EU is included instead, it is possible to observe a significantly higher growth
in the group of EU countries than in the other group. In this case, a random effects
estimator was used because the dummy D97EU was dropped in the fixed effects
estimation due to lack of variability. In order to overcome that problem, an
estimation for the period 1992-2004 was performed (column 7) using the dummy
D97EU. The significance of the coefficients improves and the dummy remains
highly significant. In fact, it is strengthening the idea that growth in the EU countries
was not negatively affected by the fiscal constraints and institutional changes that
occurred in Europe after 1992. Indeed, if we gather the results from columns 6 and 7,
there is evidence that growth was not lower in the EU than in the other non-EU
countries.
25 In the unconditional differences-in-differences estimations no significant differences were found
between EU and non-EU countries’ growth rates (although the estimated coefficient on the dummy
was positive – see footnote 7), but when control variables are included in the equation, results indicate
a significantly higher growth in the EU countries than in the OECD countries in the period after 1997
(see columns 4, 6 and 7 in Table 2.2).
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2.4.2.2. Pooled mean group panel data estimation
Results of the PMG estimations and some robustness analyses are presented
in Table 2.3. Only long-run and dummy coefficients are reported, but all equations
were estimated including short-run dynamics and a constant. In the first 3 columns of
Table 2.3 we report the results of the PMG estimations for the EU countries over the
period 1972-2004. The results of some robustness checks are shown in the remaining
part of the table.
In the fixed effects estimations it was considered that intercepts could differ
across groups but the other coefficients were constrained to be the same. Although
the fact that the EU countries have access to common technologies and intense
economic relations may justify the presence of common long-run coefficients, the
speed of convergence to the steady-state and the short-run dynamics may not be the
same across countries. Indeed, each country can follow a different path to the steady-
state. Therefore, the PMG estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999)
seems to be a suitable instrument to control for these specificities.
This method improves the significance of most estimates and generates a
higher convergence coefficient. These results are a consequence of the improvements
made on the assumptions of the model and are in line with the examples presented by
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). Now results suggest that it takes about 10 years to
reduce by half the differences in output per capita among EU countries. Indeed, this
result seems to be more adequate for industrial countries that have been increasing
their efforts of integration over the last decades.
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Table 2.3. Pooled mean group panel data estimations and robustness analysis
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
lnGDPpcit-1
Implied λ 
hwtc (a)
-0.0700
(-6.72)***
[0.073]
9.6 years
-0.0643
(-7.59)***
[0.066]
10.4 years
-0.0594
(-7.87)***
[0.061]
11.3 years
-0.1726
(-5.51)***
[0.1894]
3.7 years
-0.0377
(-2.14)**
[0.0384]
18.0 years
-0.0871
(-3.28)***
[0.0911]
7.6 years
-0.0886
(-1.35)
[0.0928]
7.5 years
lnPInvit 0.5451
(4.21)***
0.3551
(3.09)***
0.4937
(3.87)***
0.4745
(4.48)***
0.5679
(1.67)*
1.1965
(2.40)**
0.2398
(0.30)
lnHKit 1.2879
(7.78)***
0.8142
(3.89)***
1.4183
(10.27)***
-0.0131
(-0.07)
0.8971
(1.78)*
-0.7826
(-0.96)
2.3633
(1.59)
lnPopit -0.9556
(-5.28)***
-1.0070
(-4.52)***
-0.9183
(-3.99)***
-0.4429
(-4.78)***
-1.8416
(-1.89)*
-0.5974
(-2.31)**
-1.4288
(-1.10)
lnGovIit-1 0.1770
(3.14)***
0.2672
(3.01)***
0.2120
(3.21)***
0.1089
(3.21)***
0.2812
(1.29)
0.1041
(0.83)
0.0407
(0.18)
lnGovCit-1 -1.5428
(-5.42)***
-1.5558
(-4.36)***
-1.8797
(-5.23)***
-0.3853
(-2.42)**
-1.9274
(-1.75)*
-0.1352
(-0.35)
-1.6997
(-1.15)
lnGovTxit-1 0.0077
(0.10)
-0.0428
(-0.43)
0.0925
(1.12)
0.0187
(0.42)
-0.2074
(-0.86)
-0.0357
(-0.22)
-0.3744
(-1.03)
SdInflit-1 -0.0421
(-3.48)***
-0.0547
(-4.34)***
-0.0480
(-3.48)***
-0.0131
(-0.74)
-0.0507
(-1.63)
-0.0358
(-0.78)
-0.0531
(-0.68)
lnX/Mit-1 0.1948
(1.41)
0.4043
(3.17)***
0.3992
(3.09)***
0.1634
(1.51)
0.7463
(1.73)*
0.3146
(0.78)
0.3369
(0.70)
D92EUit -0.0010
(0.29)
D97EUit 0.0087
(4.06)***
0.0101
(5.38)***
MgMit-1 0.0012
(0.42)
R2 0.5953 0.7355 0.6172
Log-likelihood 1472.3 1469.9 1464.2
Time period 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1997-2004 1972-1996 1997-2004 1997-2004
No. countries 14 14 14 21 14 14 7
No. Observ. 448 448 448 168 336 112 56
lnGDPpcit-1 (b) -0.1946
(-2.40)**
-0.0593
(-2.32)**
-0.0611
(-2.70)***
-0.0592
(-1.71)*
D92EUit (b) 0.0068
(0.87)
Time period 1992-2004 1972-1991 1992-2004 1992-2004
No. observations 252 266 182 91
Sources: See Table A.2.1.1 in Annex.
Notes: All equations were estimated including short-run dynamics and a constant, but to keep the analysis parsimonious
only long-run and dummy coefficients are reported. PMG estimations are presented in columns 1, 2 and 3; Arellano-
Bond techniques are used to estimate model 4; and a fixed effects estimator is used to estimate models in columns 5, 6
and 7. Robust standard errors are used to control for the presence of heteroscedasticity. t-statistics are in parentheses
(z-statistics for the PMG and Arellano-Bond estimations); significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected:
***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%.; again, the speed of convergence (λ) is in square brackets.
Luxembourg and Iceland were excluded from the sample due to lack of observations for human capital.
(a) See Table 2.2.
(b) In these lines the convergence coefficient and the coefficient on the dummy D92EU (when included in the model,
instead of D97EU) are presented and result from a similar specification to the one above but using another time period
or threshold; the coefficients on the other exogenous variables are not reported here to save space, but results remain
quite similar to the ones presented above.
Estimated coefficients on physical and human capital and population growth
have the expected signs and remain highly significant. Evidence on fiscal variables is
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also consistent with the previous findings: there is evidence favouring both the
positive impact of public investment and the negative effect of public consumption
on GDP per capita; and, once again, the positive effect of shifting taxes from factor
incomes to consumption is not evident in the data. Finally, results confirm the
negative impact of inflation on output and the expected gains from trade.
The most important findings are provided by the time dummies and by the
margin of manoeuvre indicator. The coefficient on the dummy for the period after
Maastricht remains insignificant. Considering the dummy for the period in which the
fiscal rules started to be officially assessed (D97EU), we get evidence that supports
the previous finding that real growth of GDP per capita was slightly higher during
that period than before. In this case, results show that after 1997 growth in real GDP
per capita is, on average, about 0.9 percentage points higher than before. Finally,
when the indicator for the margin of manoeuvre is included instead of the dummies,
results confirm the insignificance of its coefficient.
Thus, evidence from the fixed effects estimator is now corroborated by the
PMG estimator: the results from the PMG estimations reinforce the conclusion that
in the period in which fiscal rules were implemented in Europe economic growth was
not negatively affected by them, in contrast to what some authors claim.
Robustness checks are presented in columns 4 to 7 of Table 2.3.26 Those
checks are performed with the purpose of confirming if the results obtained so far are
26 The intention was to proceed with a comparison of the economic performance of the EU and non-
EU countries using the PMG estimator, but PMG estimations become impossible in these cases
because of the lack of variability of the dummy variables when the model is being estimated for each
country separately before retrieving the PMG estimates. Moreover, the PMG estimator requires a T
large enough such that the model can be estimated for each country individually. This means that it is
not viable to proceed with a comparative analysis of the model for the periods before and after
Maastricht either. Due to the very low number of degrees of freedom it is not possible to get estimates
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statistically solid. Column 4 presents the results of an identical specification to
columns 6 of Table 2.2, but using a different estimation method, which is more
adequate to cases like this where the number of time periods is substantially smaller
than the number of individuals (T small, N large). This specification is based on the
application of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator. In this case, the regression
equation is written in the form of a dynamic model using lnGDPpc as a dependent
variable and subsequently transformed for reasons of comparability with the other
equations. Time-invariant country specific effects are removed by taking first-
differences in the estimation. Then the right-hand-side variables in the first-
differenced equation are instrumented.27 This method improves the statistical
significance of the results and allows us to conclude that after 1997 growth of GDP
per capita in the EU countries is, on average, higher than growth in other industrial
OECD countries; when the threshold is 1992 no significant differences are found (in
this case only the results for the convergence coefficient and the dummy are
reported).
In columns 5 and 6, the economic performance of the EU countries before
and after 1997 is compared (the same is done for the periods before and after 1992,
but only the convergence coefficient is reported). Instead of using dummies, a
separate regression for each period is estimated. The focus of this analysis is in
comparing the convergence coefficient of each regression. The convergence
coefficient for the period before 1997 is considerably lower (in absolute value) than
the one for the period after 1997, meaning that the speed of convergence to the
for the convergence coefficient for some countries in the sample. Therefore, in this case, a fixed
effects estimator is used.
27 In the regression of column 4, the log of real GDP per capita is instrumented with its second and
subsequent lags and the other variables are instrumented with their own values.
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steady-state is higher in the period in which fiscal rules are officially enforced than
before. This evidence confirms the result given by D97EU above. When the pre- and
post-Maastricht periods are compared separately no substantial differences are found
either, confirming once again the results obtained before when D92EU was used.
The last column of Table 2.3 reports estimates to compare the performance of
the non-EU countries (column 7) with the performance of the EU countries (column
6) in the period after 1997 (and 1992). Despite the problems of significance – due to
the small number of observations in the regression for non-EU countries – results
show that the speed of convergence in the EU countries is not substantially different
from the other OECD countries, whichever period is considered. This represents
more evidence to sustain the idea that EU fiscal constraints were not harmful to
growth in the EU countries.
From this simple analysis it is possible to conclude that output growth was
not negatively affected in the period after Maastricht in the EU and that Maastricht
and SGP fiscal rules for the deficit and debt should not be blamed for being harmful
to growth of real GDP per capita in the EU countries. Moreover, our evidence shows
that growth is, on average, higher in the period in which the fulfilment of the 3%
criteria for the deficit started to be officially assessed. This is true either comparing it
with the past performance of the EU countries or even with the performance of other
developed countries.
2.4.2.3. Sensitivity analysis
In addition to the robustness checks presented above, other estimations were
performed to verify whether the main results are sensitive to the exclusion or
inclusion of some variables. Some of the results of that sensitivity analysis are
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reported in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. Those results were obtained by using a PMG
estimator and the regressions were performed including either a dummy for the
period after Maastricht (D92EU) or for the period in which fiscal rules are officially
assessed (D97EU).
As the variable used to control for the revenue side of the government budget
(lnGovTx) was never statistically significant, a new variable was included in the
model: the log of the total government tax and non-tax receipts divided by GDP
(lnGovRv). Nevertheless, its coefficient is not significant either and the main results
are not affected (see column 1 in Table 2.4).
Despite the justifications advanced before to use the volatility of inflation
instead of its level, the results of a regression including the level of inflation (Infl) are
reported in column 2 of Table 2.4. They show a significant negative effect of a
higher level of inflation, but its inclusion in the model does not change the main
conclusions of this study. Those conclusions remain valid even when both lnGovTx
and SdInfl are excluded from the model (column 3), or when a simple growth
specification à la Mankiw et al. (1992) is considered (column 4).
Some other variables were included in the model to control for the omission
of other potential factors that might affect output, like the OECD crude oil import
price (lnOilPr) and the average real GDP growth in the OECD countries
(OECDgdp). Empirical evidence shows that the price of oil has a negative impact on
output per capita, whilst a better economic environment in the group of OECD
countries has a positive spillover affect on convergence in output per capita in the
EU. Nevertheless, the most important point to emphasize here is the fact that the
other results are not substantially affected by the inclusion of those control variables.
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Table 2.4. Sensitivity analysis I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
lnGDPpcit-1 -0.0623
(-6.99)***
-0.0657
(-9.24)***
-0.0678
(-9.40)***
-0.1062
(-6.88)***
-0.0538
(-7.48)***
-0.0593
(-7.02)***
-0.0722
(-7.37)***
-0.0629
(-6.35)***
lnPInvit 0.4559
(3.32)***
0.5297
(3.74)***
0.4361
(3.22)***
0.4521
(6.91)***
0.4669
(3.10)***
0.6222
(4.03)***
0.4250
(3.33)***
0.4578
(3.31)***
lnHKit 1.2519
(7.10)***
1.0804
(5.22)***
1.5567
(8.70)***
0.8579
(14.58)***
1.7914
(6.44)***
1.4134
(7.61)***
0.9969
(5.85)***
1.2262
(6.94)***
lnPopit -0.9477
(-5.11)***
-0.4132
(-2.84)***
-1.1205
(-5.27)***
-0.6763
(-5.26)***
-0.8816
(-3.52)***
-1.0763
(-4.70)***
-0.8216
(-4.19)***
-1.0391
(-5.06)***
lnGovIit-1 0.2112
(3.26)***
0.2971
(3.43)***
0.1815
(3.20)***
0.2110
(2.36)**
0.1668
(2.64)***
0.2802
(3.35)***
0.2432
(3.91)***
lnGovCit-1 -1.9465
(-3.12)***
-1.6298
(-4.33)***
-1.5047
(-4.94)***
-1.2972
(-3.60)***
-1.5463
(-4.71)***
-1.0231
(-4.58)***
-0.8947
(-3.95)***
-lnGovTxit-1 0.2615
(3.07)***
0.1679
(1.57)
0.0763
(0.91)
-0.0131
(-0.17)
-0.1172
(-1.35)
lnGovRvit-1 0.0915
(0.37)
SdInflit-1 -0.0509
(-3.68)***
-0.0505
(-3.04)***
-0.0378
(-2.78)***
-0.0399
(-3.57)***
-0.0296
(-2.36)**
Inflit-1 -0.0314
(-4.12)***
lnX/Mit-1 0.0482
(0.29)
0.4305
(2.84)***
0.1882
(1.36)
0.6289
(2.84)***
0.1389
(0.97)
0.2443
(2.03)**
0.1852
(1.42)
lnOilPrit-1 -0.2046
(-2.86)***
OECDgdpit 0.3411
(7.15)***
Debtit-1 0.0001
(0.03)
ΔDebtit-1 -0.0208
(-4.09)***
D92EUit -0.0002
(-0.04)
-0.0035
(-1.24)
0.0001
(0.02)
0.0054
(1.18)
-0.0070
(-2.36)**
-0.0004
(-0.11)
0.0011
(0.32)
-0.0005
(-0.13)
lnGDPpcit-1 (a) -0.0460
(-8.11)***
-0.0427
(-8.23)***
-0.0450
(-11.13)***
-0.0841
(-5.93)***
-0.0595
(-6.57)***
-0.0582
(-7.80)***
-0.0732
(-6.20)***
-0.0526
(-6.17)***
lnOilprit-1 (a) -0.1716
(-3.66)***
OECDgdpit (a) 0.3481
(6.15)***
Debtit-1 (a) 0.0001
(0.05)
ΔDebtit-1
(a) -0.0266
(-3.82)***
D97EUit (a) 0.0080
(2.90)***
0.0078
(3.98)***
0.0062
(2.54)**
0.0110
(3.36)***
0.0090
(3.41)***
0.0065
(3.45)***
0.0076
(2.77)***
0.0053
(2.11)**
Time period 1972-2004 1971-2004 1971-2004 1971-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004
No. countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
No. Observ. 448 462 462 462 448 448 439 436
Sources: See Table A.2.1.1 in Annex.
Notes: All equations were estimated including short-run dynamics and a constant, but only long-run and dummy
coefficients are reported; a PMG estimator is used to estimate the models; z-statistics are in parentheses; significance
level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%.
Luxembourg is excluded from the sample due to lack of observations for human capital.
(a) In these lines only the convergence coefficient, the coefficients on the control variables and debt and the coefficient on
the dummy D97EU (when included in the model, instead of D92EU) are presented and come from a similar
specification to the one above; the coefficients on the other exogenous variables are not reported here to save space,
but the results remain quite similar.
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Table 2.5. Sensitivity analysis II
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
lnGDPpcit-1 -0.0959
(-5.77)***
-0.0810
(-7.51)***
-0.0625
(-7.38)***
-0.0665
(-7.36)***
-0.1004
(-4.40)***
-0.0599
(-2.57)***
-0.0997
(-2.10)**
lnPInvit 0.2218
(1.73)*
0.3771
(3.12)***
0.4537
(3.70)***
0.4380
(3.86)***
0.3967
(3.46)***
1.0348
(4.65)***
0.5205
(5.52)***
lnHKit 0.9069
(10.42)***
1.3549
(8.22)***
1.4433
(10.72)***
1.4600
(11.49)***
1.3724
(5.08)***
0.7508
(4.68)***
0.5444
(3.73)***
lnPopit -0.9707
(-6.25)***
-0.9518
(-5.38)***
-0.9324
(-4.26)***
-0.8825
(-4.40)***
-0.8830
(-3.93)***
-1.0884
(-3.96)***
-0.2041
(-1.86)*
lnGovIit-1 0.2152
(3.77)***
0.2188
(3.31)***
0.2215
(3.53)***
0.1978
(1.85)*
0.1756
(2.60)***
lnGovCit-1 -1.2463
(-5.35)***
-1.8386
(-5.59)***
-1.7376
(-5.91)***
-1.5269
(-3.54)***
-0.0477
(-0.29)
lnGovTxit-1 -0.0688
(-0.88)
0.1085
(1.33)
0.0770
(0.98)
SdInflit-1 -0.0162
(-2.23)**
-0.0395
(-3.72)***
-0.0499
(-3.86)***
-0.0480
(-4.03)***
-0.0433
(-3.67)***
0.0201
(1.43)
lnX/Mit-1 0.0332
(0.46)
0.2802
(2.12)**
0.4169
(3.31)***
0.3948
(3.40)***
0.5277
(2.75)***
0.2429
(1.89)*
GBSit-1 0.0239
(5.11)***
DefRuleit-1 0.0039
(2.65)***
D92EUit -0.0014
(-0.25)
-0.0008
(-0.21)
-0.0075
(-1.20))
0.0023
(0.37)
0.0110
(1.89)*
MgMit-1 (b) 0.0031
(1.02)
0.0027
(0.90)
lnGDPpcit-1 (a) -0.0985
(-5.56)***
-0.0765
(-10.07)***
-0.0775
(-4.69)***
-0.0555
(-3.81)***
-0.0871
(-5.27)***
GBSit-1 (a) 0.0192
(4.90)***
DefRuleit-1 (a) 0.0065
(2.41)**
D97EUit (a) 0.0044
(0.84)
0.0097
(2.97)***
0.0096
(2.06)**
0.0098
(3.52)***
0.0045
(0.66)
Time period 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1971-2004
No. countries 14 14 14 14 6 8 7
No. Observ. 448 448 448 448 192 256 231
Sources: See Table A.2.1.1 in Annex.
Notes: See Table 2.4. Regression 5 considers only the sample of the 6 EU countries that have had problems in
accomplishing the 3% rule for the deficit (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and UK), whilst regression 6
encompasses the other 8 countries; column 7 presents the results of a regression including just the non-EU countries.
(a) In these lines only the results for the convergence coefficient and the coefficients on the deficit and D97EU variables
(when included in the model, instead of D92EU) are reported and come from a similar specification to the one above;
by the reasons already mentioned, the estimated coefficients on the other exogenous variables are not reported here.
(b) In column 3, the margin of manoeuvre was computed in the same way as before, but the values for the GBS were
estimated by rolling regressing GBS as a function of time; In column 4, the margin of manoeuvre was computed
considering the following non-linear relation: MgM=exp{GBS} if GBS<0 and year>1991; and MgM=1, otherwise.
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Theoretically, we would expect that a higher level of public debt had a
negative impact on output (Saint-Paul, 1992). Estimations presented in columns 7
and 8 of Table 2.4 show that, in the case of the EU countries, it is not the level of
debt (Debt) but the accumulation of (ΔDebt) that has a negative impact on output per
capita. This evidence supports the concern of the EU authorities in avoiding growing
debts and, somehow, justifies the rule for the public debt.
Results also support the rule for the deficit. When the government budget
surplus (GBS) is included instead of the other fiscal variables (see column 1 in Table
2.5), we observe that output decreases as the deficit increases. However, the results
of this estimation can be criticised due to a bias coming from the reciprocal causality
between the government budget surplus and the dependent variable. A way of
attenuating that problem and, at the same time, taking into account the rule for the
deficit in the model more directly is to include a dummy that takes the value of 1
when the deficit is lower than 3% of GDP (DefRule). The lag of this variable is
included in the regression presented in column 2 of Table 2.5. Results show that
deficits lower than 3% of GDP in the present are positively related to a higher level
of GDP per capita in the future. This result can be interpreted as some evidence in
favour of the EU rule for the deficit. Thus, as the significance of the other variables,
especially the dummies, is not affected by the inclusion of those fiscal variables, we
again conclude that fiscal rules were not harmful to growth in the EU.
The margin of manoeuvre was also included in all the specifications reported
before instead of the dummies, but it remained insignificant (results are not reported
here). Some attempts were made to improve this indicator. In a first attempt, the
values for the deficit (or GBS) were estimated from a rolling regression of the GBS
on a time trend to control for the time effects on the deficit and to make the deficit
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endogenously determined. Then the margin of manoeuvre was computed as the
linear relation indicated in Table A.2.1.1 in Annex. However, when included in the
growth specification, the coefficient associated with this variable is not significant
(see column 3 in Table 2.5). This variable remains insignificant even when estimated
directly from a rolling regression of the (original) marginal of manoeuvre variable on
a time trend. In another attempt, the following non-linear relation was considered in
the computation of the margin of manoeuvre: MgM is equal to the exponential of
GBS if GBS<0 and year>1991; and equal to 1, otherwise. This indicator allows some
(little) margin of manoeuvre even when the deficit is higher than 3% of GDP. The
idea is to capture the implicit margin of manoeuvre that the countries that broke the
rule in this decade seem to have enjoyed without being sanctioned. But, once again,
no effect on output comes from this variable (see column 4).28 Thus, this evidence
seems to give more support to the argument that the reduction of the margin of
manoeuvre over fiscal policy in some countries in the period after Maastricht did not
have a negative impact on growth of real GDP per capita.
Another interesting aspect to clarify is whether growth in the group of
countries that have had problems in accomplishing the 3% rule for the deficit
(France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and UK) was indeed affected in the
periods after Maastricht and after 1997. Results presented in column 5 confirm the
findings obtained with the panel of all EU countries: growth of GDP per capita is not
28 Similar results were obtained when the square of the (original) MgM was used as another alternative
and when a different relation was considered to compute the margin of manoeuvre for large and small
countries. In this second case, the original MgM variable was used for large countries (France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, UK), while the square of that variable was used for the other countries,
meaning that a larger margin of manoeuvre is allowed for large countries than for small countries.
Given this lack of further new and relevant evidence, those results are not reported here to keep the
analysis parsimonious.
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significantly different in the periods before and after Maastricht but it is higher, on
average, in the period after 1997. The same happens when we consider a regression
with the other 8 EU countries that have accomplished the rule (see column 6).29 One
interesting finding comes from the fiscal variables: cuts in government spending
have a positive and significant effect on output per capita in the group of countries
that have had problems in accomplishing the 3% rule for the deficit. These cuts are
important because they promote not only a higher growth but also the necessary
reduction of their deficits (directly, via the cuts, and indirectly, via a higher growth).
Hence, this group of countries should promote measures to reduce their public
spending. On the contrary, in the group of countries that has achieved a stable
budgetary position, it is not spending cuts but the government investment that has a
significant impact on output per capita.
A final analysis assesses whether growth was higher in the non-EU countries
after 1997, like it was in the EU countries. If so, the higher growth in the EU in the
period in which fiscal rules started to be officially assessed can be due to
international spillovers that may help to cover eventual negative effects of the rules.
Nevertheless, results show that, on average, growth was not significantly higher in
the other OECD countries after 1997 (or even after 1992 – see column 7).30
Therefore, this gives more support to the idea advanced in this study that EU
29 This can mean that the first group of countries did not take advantage of the ‘good years’ after 1997
to stabilize their public accounts in order to have enough budgetary margin of manoeuvre to avoid
breaking the rule in the ‘bad years’. This does not seem to be the case in the other 8 EU countries that
have been accomplishing the rule. They also present a higher growth after 1997, but they seem to have
taken advantage of it to stabilize their accounts.
30 In this case, we consider just a basic specification of the model to avoid the loss of more degrees of
freedom, once we consider just a small sample of countries in this PMG estimation. In reality, the
PMG estimator does not converge and cannot retrieve the estimates when the other variables are
included. The same problem affected regressions 5 and 6, but it was solved by simply excluding
lnGovTx.
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economic growth was not negatively affected by the fiscal constraints and
institutional changes.
Other additional experimental regressions – not reported here – were
performed including some political and institutional variables, like the timing of
elections, ideological orientation of the government, constraints on the executive, and
even including variables controlling for the iteration of the exogenous variables with
the dummies. However, the coefficients associated with those variables were not
significant in any of the experiments, providing no additional explanation for the
understanding of the behaviour of economic growth in the EU. Moreover, the results
of this study were not significantly affected by the inclusion of those variables. The
results and conclusions of this work have also proved to be robust to the exclusion of
one EU country at a time from the sample and to the exclusion of the 3 EU countries
that did not take part in the EMU (Denmark, Sweden and UK).
In sum, the main conclusions of this study remain valid even when some
variables are excluded from or included in the model: growth was not negatively
affected in the period after Maastricht; and in the period in which fiscal rules are
officially assessed we have (on average) a higher growth of GDP per capita in the
EU. Additionally, the results of the sensitivity analysis for the fiscal variables give
support to the rules for the deficit and debt and call attention to the importance of
government spending cuts in the group of countries that have failed to accomplish
the fiscal rule for the deficit.
2.4.3. Estimations using five-year time intervals
In the empirical work done so far, annual data have been used to estimate the
growth equation. Yearly time spans are used to avoid the loss of important
61
information that might result from the use of larger time spans. The justification for
the choice of annual data becomes more evident when the economic performance of
the EU and non-EU countries is compared and when a separate comparative analysis
for the periods before and after Maastricht (or SGP) is made. Nevertheless, this
choice implied the inclusion of short-run dynamics in the equation to control for
cyclical fluctuations of output.
Another way of avoiding the problem of the short-run business cycle
fluctuations of output is by using data from larger time intervals. Therefore, despite
the mentioned loss of information that may result from the use of these larger time
spans, this study will proceed with the estimation of some growth equations using
data from five-year time intervals in line with the works by Islam (1995), Caselli et
al. (1996), Bond et al. (2001) and Ederveen et al. (2006). The objective of this final
analysis is basically to evaluate the robustness of the results to a change in the time
spans and assess whether the main conclusions are affected or not by that change.
As a result of the use of five-year time intervals, the generic form of the
growth equation can simply be written as:
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(2.11)
for Ni ,...,1 and Tt ,...,2 , where tiy ,ln is the log difference in output per capita
over a five-year period, 1,ln tiy is the logarithm of output per capita at the start of
that period and tix , is a vector of additional variables to be included in the basic
growth equation. These variables and the other explanatory variables (lnsk, lnh,
ln(n+0.05)) are measured as the average over five-year periods. A dummy or
qualitative variable ( tid , ) is added to the equation to control for the period in which
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EU fiscal rules were imposed in the EU, similarly to the case where annual data was
used instead.
Considering the same data and time period used in the annual analysis (1970-
2005), 7 five-year time spans are constructed for the 15 EU countries. These data are
then used in the estimation of equation (2.11). Different estimators have been used in
the literature to estimate this kind of dynamic panel data model. In this analysis,
fixed effects (FE) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators are
employed.
Fixed effects are widely employed in several growth studies. However,
Caselli et al. (1996) argue that this estimator may lead to inconsistent estimates in the
context of a dynamic panel data model because it does not take into account the fact
that some of the explanatory variables can be endogenous and measured with error.
Additionally, the incorrect treatment of country-specific effects may lead to omitted
variable bias. A way of addressing this problem is using a first-differenced GMM
estimator (DIF-GMM). This estimator was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
and introduced in the growth literature by Caselli et al. (1996). The idea is to take
first-differences of the regression equation, written in the form of a dynamic model,
to remove unobservable time-invariant country-specific effects. Then the right-hand-
side variables in the first-differenced equation can be instrumented. This procedure
will solve the problem of omitted variable bias that is constant over time; parameters
are estimated consistently despite the endogeneity of right-hand-side variables; and
the use of instruments allows for consistent estimation even in the presence of
measurement errors.
However, Bond et al. (2001) show that this method may present a serious
problem when the empirical growth models are based on five-year averages to avoid
63
the high persistence of the output series. This procedure reduces the number of time
periods considered in the analysis to a small number and the first-differenced GMM
estimator has been found to have poor finite sample properties in terms of bias and
imprecision. In fact, under these conditions, lagged levels of the variables are only
weak instruments for the first-differences (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). Therefore,
the results of this estimator must be analysed with caution.
A refinement to this estimator that tries to solve the problem of the small
sample bias was developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and then introduced in the
growth literature by Bond et al. (2001). These authors demonstrate that more reliable
results can be obtained by using a system GMM estimator (SYS-GMM). The idea is
to estimate a system of equations for both first-differences and levels, where the
additional instruments used in the levels equations are lagged first-differences of the
series. Since Bond et al. (2001) consider that this estimator may have superior finite
sample properties, they recommend using the system GMM estimator for empirical
growth research.
The results of the estimation of the growth equation using these estimators for
five-year time spans are reported in Table 2.6. Growth regressions were essentially
estimated including the same variables used in the annual analysis and incorporating
a dummy either for the period after Maastricht or for the period in which fiscal rules
started to be assessed.31 The indicator for the margin of manoeuvre (MgM) was also
included in some regressions.
31 As we are considering five-year time intervals, it is not possible to use dummies covering exactly
those periods. The best we can do is to use a dummy that takes value 1 from the time interval 1991-
1995 onwards (D91EU) and a dummy that takes value 1 in the intervals starting in 1996 and 2001
(D96EU).
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Table 2.6. Results from five-year time spans estimations
(1)FE (2)FE (3)DIF-GMM (4)SYS-GMM (5)SYS-GMM (6)2SLS
lnGDPpcit-5
Implied λ 
hwtc (a)
-0.3427
(-5.44)***
[0.084]
8.3 years
-0.3272
(-5.15)***
[0.079]
8.7 years
-0.5334
(-4.57)***
[0.152]
4.5 years
-0.3802
(-3.10)***
[0.096]
7.2 years
-0.3123
(-2.96)***
[0.075]
9.3 years
-0.2825
(-3.67)***
[0.066]
10.4 years
lnPInvit 0.1935
(2.91)***
0.1972
(3.08)***
0.1204
(1.10)
0.1217
(2.14)**
0.1028
(3.10)***
0.0859
(1.94)*
lnHKit 0.3989
(3.61)***
0.4586
(6.94)***
0.6555
(3.13)***
0.3094
(2.88)**
0.2658
(2.31)**
0.2400
(3.01)***
lnPopit -0.2443
(-4.19)***
-0.2822
(-5.32)***
-0.2363
(-4.76)***
-0.2436
(-5.71)***
-0.2296
(-4.07)***
-0.2212
(-2.73)***
lnGovIit 0.0126
(0.63)
0.0062
(0.31)
-0.0290
(-2.19)**
0.0240
(1.21)
0.0462
(2.10)**
lnGovCit -0.3309
(-3.81)***
-0.3429
(-4.08)***
-0.3239
(-3.45)***
-0.0880
(-0.82)
0.1083
(-1.52)
-lnGovTxit 0.0750
(2.25)**
0.0769
(2.33)**
0.0874
(1.57)
-0.0282
(-0.81)
0.0365
(1.42)
SdInflit -0.0110
(-1.17)
-0.0112
(-1.26)
-0.0111
(-1.36)
-0.0100
(-1.02)
-0.0108
(-0.98)
lnX/Mit 0.1587
(2.19)**
0.1362
(1.84*)
0.0648
(0.64)
0.1689
(2.06)*
0.1511
(1.83)*
D96EUit 0.0151
(0.84)
0.0149
(1.07)
0.0432
(3.47)***
0.0444
(2.59)**
0.0369
(2.05)**
MgMit 0.0294
(1.21)
R2 0.6115 0.6162 0.4418
Hansen J-test 0.74 0.90 0.63
lnGDPpcit-5 (b)
Implied λ 
hwtc (a)
-0.3251
(-4.96)***
[0.079]
8.8 years
-0.4606
(-4.52)***
[0.123]
5.6 years
-0.2866
(-1.76)*
[0.068]
10.3 years
-0.2322
(-1.81)*
[0.053]
13.1 years
-0.2303
(-3.13)***
[0.052]
13.2 years
D91EUit (b) -0.0141
(-0.91)
-0.0217
(-1.79)*
0.0059
(0.33)
0.0070
(0.49)
-0.0010
(-0.05)
R2 0.6114 0.3986
Hansen J-test 0.70 0.92 0.65
No. countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
No. time periods 7 7 6 7 7 6
No. Observ. 98 98 84 98 98 84
Sources: See Table A.2.1.1 in Annex.
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *,
10%; the estimated speed of convergence to the steady-state (λ=[-ln(1-ф)]/5) is in square brackets. In columns 1 and 2
the model is estimated controlling for fixed effects. The instruments used for DIF-GMM are the second and third lags
of the log of output per capita; all other right-hand-side variables are assumed exogenous and are instrumented with
their own values; the additional instrument used in the SYS-GMM is the difference of the log of output per capita
lagged one period. A two-stage least squares estimator is used to obtain the results presented in column 6 (here the log
of initial output per capita is instrumented with its second lag). The presence of any pattern of heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation is controlled for by using robust standard errors. The values reported for the Hansen’s J-test are the p-
values for the null hypothesis of valid instruments. Luxembourg was excluded from the sample due to lack of
observations for human capital.
(a) See Table 2.2.
(b) These results come from a similar specification to the one reported above in the same column but including the
variable D91EU instead of D96EU; the estimated coefficients on the other exogenous variables are not reported here
since they have proved to be quite similar to the ones reported above in the same column.
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The estimates presented in column 1 and 2 were obtained by using a FE
estimator. The convergence coefficient has the correct sign and is statistically
significant in any of the estimations presented in those two columns (i.e. either
including D91EU, D96EU or MgM). Results show that convergence in output per
capita runs at an annual rate of about 8%.32
The coefficients on physical and human capital and population growth also
have the expected signs, according to the growth literature, and are significant. The
additional variables do not present robust results: only the government consumption
(lnGovC) and the log of the ratio of exports over imports (lnX/M) have the expected
signs and are significant; a shift from taxing factor incomes to taxing consumption
has a negative effect on output, contrarily to the expected; and the other variables are
not significant.
Moreover, neither of the dummies nor the margin of manoeuvre are
significant, which can be interpreted as additional evidence that the institutional
changes that took place in Europe after Maastricht were not harmful to growth.
However, as the fixed effects estimator may lead to inconsistent estimates in
the context of empirical growth models for the reasons indicated above, results from
GMM estimators are reported in columns 3 to 5. The instruments used for DIF-
GMM are the second and third lags of the log of output per capita. All other right-
hand-side variables are assumed exogenous and are instrumented with their own
values only in order to avoid the problem of too many instruments. The additional
instrument used in the SYS-GMM is the difference of the log of output per capita
32 This value is not very different from the one obtained by Islam (1995) using a fixed effects
estimator in a basic growth equation over a panel of 22 OECD countries.
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lagged one period.33 Moreover, the Hansen’s (1982) test of over-identifying
restrictions does not reject the overall validity of those instruments.
Results for the DIF-GMM estimator show a higher rate of convergence in
output per capita to its steady-state, but the physical capital variable is no longer
significant and government investment has a coefficient opposite to the expectations.
As the sample contains just a small number of time periods, this might be the result
of the finite sample bias and imprecision of this estimator. In order to avoid that
problem, we also report the results from a system-GMM estimator (SYS-GMM) that
seems to produce more reliable results in this kind of studies.
The SYS-GMM estimator reports a lower estimate for the speed of
convergence than the DIF-GMM, but not very different from the one obtained by
33 Here it is important to clarify two technical issues:
First, despite being reasonable to consider that some other right-hand side variables like, for
example, physical and human capital and population growth, can be considered endogenous because
they can be determined simultaneously with the rate of growth (Caselli et al., 1996), practical and
technical reasons inherent to the finite sample used in this work impede us from proceeding in that
way. When those variables are treated as potentially endogenous in the estimation, we end up with a
problem of too many instruments in comparison with the number of observations. Although this fact
does not bias the coefficient estimates – indeed, treating those variables as endogenous did not affect
greatly the coefficient estimates or their statistical significance in this work (results are not reported
here) – it increases the distance of the feasible efficient GMM estimator from the asymptotic ideal and
weakens the Hansen’s (1982) test to a point it generates unreliable p-values of 1.000 (Roodman,
2006). Therefore, the solution to reduce the number of instruments and solve this problem was to
consider those right-hand side variables as exogenous. In fact, Ederveen et al. (2006) also consider
them as exogenous in a growth specification to study the impact of structural funds in a group of 13
EU countries.
Second, Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond et al. (2001) argue that in finite samples the
asymptotic standard errors from a two-step GMM estimator can be biased and unreliable for
inference. Therefore, the choice was to present the results from the one-step GMM estimators, with
robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity, which seem to be more reliable for finite sample
inference.
67
using a FE estimator.34 In fact, the majority of the coefficients are not very different
from the ones obtained with fixed effects. The main difference comes from the
dummy for the period in which fiscal rules are officially assessed. In this case, we
find evidence of a higher growth rate in that period than before. Results show that in
the period after 1996 the annual growth of real GDP per capita is, on average, about
0.86 percentage points higher than in the period before.35 In addition, no significant
differences in growth are found in the pre- and post-Maastricht periods.36 Hence,
these results strengthen the conclusion that EU economic growth was not negatively
affected by the imposition of fiscal rules in this period.
As the coefficients associated with the additional explanatory variables are
not significant, a simple basic growth model was considered in the regression
presented in column 5. Despite the evidence of a slightly lower speed of
convergence, the main conclusions of this study remain.
As a final robustness check to the results obtained so far, column 6 reports the
results obtained by a simple two-stage least squares estimator (2SLS), where the log
34 The SYS-GMM estimates indicate a speed of convergence of about 7% to 9%. These estimates are
very similar to the ones obtained with the PMG estimator for yearly-time spans. They are also close to
the GMM estimates obtained by Ederveen et al. (2006) in a growth study for 13 EU countries. Caselli
et al. (1996) also find a high rate of convergence (10% per year) in their study, which they consider as
an indication that countries are very close to their steady states and consequently the important
differences in output per capita across countries will be explained by differences in their steady-states.
35 This result is in line with the one obtained when annual data was used. The value of 0.86 was
computed dividing the estimated coefficient on D96EU by 5. In fact, as here the dependent variable
represents the growth over each five-year period, we just need to divide the coefficients by 5 to get the
annual impacts on growth. This is the same as estimating the same regressions using ΔlnGDPpc/5 as
dependent variable.
36 The margin of manoeuvre was also included in the GMM estimations, instead of the dummies.
However, as in the case of the FE estimations, its coefficient was never statistically significant (results
are not reported here). This supports the idea that the constraints imposed by the fiscal rules over
fiscal policy after Maastricht did not affect growth (either positively or negatively).
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of the initial output per capita is instrumented with its second lag. As the sample size
is not large, reasonable results are expected from this estimator. Indeed, the main
findings are not substantially different from the ones obtained with the other
estimators.
In sum, the results obtained using five-year time spans corroborate the main
conclusion of the yearly-time spans analysis: growth of real GDP per capita in the
EU was not negatively affected in the period after Maastricht, i.e. in the period in
which fiscal rules were imposed over the EU countries.
2.5. Conclusions
Although some economists have been claiming that the SGP fiscal rules may
have affected EU growth negatively, others argue that those rules are necessary to
promote fiscal consolidation and economic stability in the EMU, which, in turn, will
be beneficial for growth in the long-run. Nevertheless, very little empirical work has
been done to clarify this debate. The work presented in this chapter intends to find a
clear empirical answer to that issue and, in doing so, it also tries to contribute to the
literature with some improvements relative to previous empirical works like, for
example, using a different method of estimation (pooled mean group estimation), a
dummy for the period in which fiscal rules started to be officially assessed, a margin
of manoeuvre indicator and providing a cross-comparison between EU and non-EU
countries.
Considering those improvements and using a specific growth equation for
both yearly and five-year time spans, this study shows that growth was not
negatively affected in the period after Maastricht in the EU. This is true either
comparing recent performance of EU countries with their past performance or with
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the performance of other developed countries. Therefore, this chapter concludes that
Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules should not be blamed for harming growth of real
GDP per capita in the EU area. On the contrary, evidence shows that, on average,
growth is statistically higher in the period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria
for the deficit started to be officially assessed. Furthermore, this study also presents
some evidence favouring the EU fiscal rules for the public deficit and debt.
Even though the results presented in this chapter show that EU fiscal rules
may not have affected growth in the EU countries in the post-Maastricht period,
evidence from the annual analysis also indicates that an increase in government
investment has a positive and significant impact on real output per capita. Therefore,
EU authorities should give some special attention to the potential benefits of
productive public investment when assessing whether an excessive deficit exists.
Otherwise, some countries could find it easier to cut public investment than current
expenditures in ‘bad’ times to accomplish the 3% for the deficit. According to the
findings of this study, such behaviour would be prejudicial for output growth.
Nevertheless, the results also show that the efforts to reduce current expenditures
must not be relaxed, especially in the countries that have been breaking the rule for
the deficit in recent years.
It would be interesting to extend the analysis provided in this chapter to the
countries that have recently joined to the EU. The study of the impact of the fiscal
constraints and institutional changes that they have to face to control their public
accounts and to enhance the credibility of their institutions may possibly bring some
additional insights to the understanding of the impact of those constraints on their
economic performance. One obstacle to do that study comes from the lack of data for
the decades of 1970s and 1980s for some of those countries.
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Finally, once more data becomes available, another possible extension to this
study could be to analyse how the EU countries have been coping with the reformed
SGP and what have been its implications for economic growth. In particular, it would
be interesting to analyse whether the reformed SGP has continued to promote the
necessary balanced budgets in periods of economic expansion and whether it has
been more flexible in allowing the required margin of manoeuvre for the EU
countries to stimulate growth in periods of economic slowdown or recession. In other
words, it would be worthwhile to analyse whether the reformed SGP has been more
growth promoting while it tries to keep EU governments’ accounts on the track of a
balanced budget over the medium-term.
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Annex 2.1. Description of the variables and descriptive statistics
Table A.2.1.1. Description of the main variables and respective sources
Dependent variable:
ΔlnGDPpc – growth rate of real GDP per capita of population aged 15-64 years old at price levels and
purchasing power parities (PPP) of 2000.
Convergence variable:
lnGDPpct-1 – lagged real GDP per capita of population aged 15-64 years at price levels and PPP of
2000.
Basic economic growth explanatory variables:
lnPInv – the logarithm of the ratio of the real private fixed capital formation to real GDP is used as a
proxy for the propensity to accumulate physical capital.
lnHK – the stock of human capital is proxied by the logarithm of the average number of years of
schooling of the (working-age) population from 25 to 64 years of age.
lnPop – represents the log of population (aged 15-64) growth (i.e. n) plus the constant g+d to which is
assigned the value of 0.05 as in Mankiw et al. (1992).
Exogenous economic policy variables:
lnGovI – the log of the ratio of government (gross) fixed capital formation to GDP (both at market or
current prices) is used as proxy for government investment.
lnGovC – represents the log of government final consumption expenditure divided by GDP (both at
market or current prices).
lnGovTx – log of the ratio of direct to indirect government tax revenues (both at market or current
prices).
SdInfl – inflation volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the rate of growth in the consumer
price index (CPI) computed as a centred three year moving average.
lnX/M – the log of the ratio of exports to imports (both at 2000 prices) is a proxy for gains from trade.
Qualitative variables to control for the period of EU fiscal rules:
D92EU – dummy that takes the value of 1 for EU countries for the period 1992-2005 and 0 otherwise.
D97EU – dummy that takes the value of 1 for EU countries for the period 1997-2005 and 0 otherwise.
MgM – indicator for the margin of manoeuvre of fiscal policy, which is defined according to the SGP
rules: before Maastricht it is assumed that EU countries have total margin of manoeuvre over
fiscal policy => MgM.=1; after Maastricht the margin of manoeuvre is computed as follows:
MgM = (GBS+3)/3 if GDP growth>-0.75% and -3%<GBS<0%
= 1 if GDP growth < -2% or GBS > 0%;
= 0.5 if -2% < GDP growth < -0.75% and GBS < -3%;
= 0.5*1+0.5*(GBS+3)/3 if -2% < GDP <-0.75% and -3% < GBS <0%;
= 0 if growth GDP>-0.75% and GBS<-3%;
GBS means government budget surplus and 0.5 is a plausible guess for the probability of the
deficit not being considered ‘excessive’ by the European Commission in a situation of
moderate recession. To simplify the analysis, this indicator is normalized to the interval [0;1]; 0
means no margin of manoeuvre and 1 means total margin of manoeuvre over fiscal policy.
Sources: OECD Statistical Compendium, April 2006 (for all variables except human capital). Data for human
capital from 1970 to 1990 was interpolated from five-year observations from De la Fuente and Domenéch
(2000). For the period 1996 to 2004 data were obtained from OECD Education at a Glance, various issues
(1998 to 2006). Missing observations were filled by linear interpolation.
Notes: The panel of countries for which data were collected is the following:
EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK;
Non-EU countries: Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the US.
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Table A.2.1.2. Descriptive statistics for the EU and non-EU countries
EU countries Non-EU countries
Variable Obs Mean StdDev Min Max Obs Mean StdDev Min Max
ΔlnGDPpc 510 0.0213 0.0238 -0.0863 0.1050 272 0.0178 0.0233 -0.0770 0.1318
lnGDPpc 525 10.2738 0.3001 9.3344 11.2840 280 10.4329 0.2286 9.7696 10.9771
lnPInv 537 -1.7140 0.1833 -2.1742 -1.2210 288 -1.7490 0.1871 -2.1969 -1.2350
lnHK 490 2.2434 0.2245 1.5831 2.6101 245 2.4640 0.1049 2.1223 2.6325
lnPop 510 -2.8822 0.1018 -3.3093 -2.3671 272 -2.7981 0.1078 -3.1281 -2.3301
lnGovI 540 -3.4789 0.3321 -4.5296 -2.5608 268 -3.3626 0.2646 -3.9586 -2.7548
lnGovC 540 -1.6685 0.2290 -2.3969 -1.2079 260 -1.7259 0.1966 -2.2760 -1.3323
lnGovTx 540 -0.0531 0.4193 -1.3609 0.6358 245 0.1744 0.4660 -1.3414 0.9670
SdInfl 510 1.4813 1.5134 0.0494 11.1136 264 2.0821 3.3104 0.0331 30.3308
lnX/M 525 -0.0171 0.1512 -0.5852 0.5442 280 0.0376 0.1890 -0.4304 0.5237
D92EU 540 0.3722 0.4838 0 1
D97EU 540 0.2500 0.4334 0 1
MgM 540 0.8133 0.3573 0 1
Sources: See Table A.2.1.1.
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3. An analysis of the causes of excessive deficits in the
European Union
3.1. Introduction
Since 1992 the European Union (EU) countries have been compelled to make
efforts to actively control their public accounts and to converge in nominal terms.
First, the Maastricht Treaty defined budgetary rules – in addition to criteria for
inflation reduction, interest rate convergence and exchange rate stability – that
countries had to satisfy in order to take part in the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU): the 3% of GDP deficit rule and the 60% of GDP debt rule. Then, these same
fiscal rules were reinforced in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for countries in
the EMU.
The main justification for using rules to limit the degree of fiscal policy
discretion is the fact that governments seem to have an inherent propensity to run
excessive deficits and debts. As politicians represent different groups of interest, they
tend to demand expenditures in the interest of their supporters, resulting in excessive
deficits. Moreover, policymakers are also concerned with their re-election.
Therefore, an excessive deficit can result from the tendency to opportunistically
manipulate the economy and to loosen fiscal policy before elections.
This problem can be even greater in a monetary union. In the case of the
EMU formed by the EU countries, since there is no centralization of the national
budgets to accommodate asymmetric shocks, countries would be able to pass some
of the costs of a loose fiscal policy to the other members if no fiscal rules were
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implemented. This would generate higher deficits, growing debts and an increase in
the interest rate in the Eurozone, putting pressure on the common monetary policy
framework and on price stability. In the limit, it could undermine the project of the
monetary union. Thus, if it is important to avoid excessive deficits when a country is
not integrated in a monetary union, it is even more important to avoid them when
they are forming a monetary union.
Taking into account the problems that may arise from unbalanced public
accounts for countries in an EMU, this study tries to find the reasons why EU
countries sometimes run excessive deficits. The literature provides a plethora of
interrelated economic and political causes for public deficits, but the particular
analysis of the determinants of excessive deficits remains practically unexplored.
Therefore, this study intends to contribute to the literature with a broad analysis of
the economic, political and institutional determinants of an excessive public deficit
and, in that way, help to explain why EU countries are sometimes affected by
excessive deficits and try to clarify what conditions may help them to avoid such a
situation in the future. As this study focuses its attention on a specific group of EU
countries, it defines an excessive deficit as a deficit higher than 3% of GDP, in line
with the legal concept established by the Maastricht Treaty and later reinforced by
the SGP.
The pertinence of this study comes precisely from the fact that in EU, after
Maastricht, the main reference for fiscal policy and, in particular, for the public
deficit has been the 3% rule for the deficit. With the implementation of this rule by
the EU authorities, the analysis of the conditionings of the so called “excessive
deficits” has gained a special interest, consequently motivating the analysis provided
in this chapter.
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Contrary to the traditional literature on public deficits, this study estimates a
model for a binary dependent variable (excessive deficit) instead of a model for a
continuous variable (public deficit). This kind of analysis permits us to infer more
directly the factors that may lead an EU country to break the reference value for the
public deficit. Another novelty is the inclusion of political variables in this kind of
analysis. Political variables are often used in the study of public deficits but, to our
knowledge, no other study has provided so far a detailed analysis of the political
conditionings of excessive deficits. This chapter provides such an analysis
controlling especially for opportunistic and partisan effects and political
fragmentation. Finally, this study also focuses its attention on the effects of the
constraints imposed after Maastricht over the fiscal behaviour of governments.
Using a binary choice model over a sample of 15 EU countries for the period
1970-2006, this study provides evidence that a weak fiscal stance, low economic
growth, parliamentary elections and majority left-wing governments are important
causes of excessive deficits in the EU countries. Moreover, results also indicate that
the institutional constraints imposed after Maastricht over EU countries’ fiscal policy
have been important in reducing the probability of excessive deficits in the EU,
especially in small countries and in countries traditionally affected by large fiscal
imbalances.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a
review of the literature on the causes of public deficits. Section 3.3 exposes the
theoretical framework and the empirical model. The data and the empirical results
are analysed in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 provides a conclusion with the main
findings of this study and some guidelines for future research.
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3.2. Brief review of the literature on public deficits
The literature on the determinants of public deficits is reviewed in the first
part of this section. The second part will be dedicated to the presentation of the few
existing studies on the determinants of excessive deficits.
3.2.1. Literature on the causes of public deficits
The literature on fiscal policy considers that some economic variables play an
important role in explaining public deficits. These deficits are usually characterised
by some degree of persistence and are highly affected by the amount of public debt
and by economic performance. Regarding the persistence of the deficits, there is a
consensus in the literature that the higher and more persistent is the deficit, the more
difficult will be for a country to change that tendency and to generate structural
surpluses to avoid a high debt in the future. The persistence is captured by including
the lag of the dependent variable (government budget surplus) as an additional
regressor in the equation.
The public debt is considered another important determinant of the deficit.
Balassone and Francese (2004) and Mink and de Haan (2005) argue that it may have
a negative impact on the fiscal balance. A higher debt ratio causes an automatic
increase in interest payments, which may result in a worsening of the fiscal balance.
On the contrary, Mélitz (2000) and Annett (2006) support the idea that a high debt
forces the government to take measures to reduce the deficit and, consequently, this
will generate an effective reduction of the deficit. Hence, there is no broad consensus
in the literature about the overall effect of the debt ratio on the public deficit.
In terms of macroeconomic conditions, studies are unanimous in concluding
that the public deficit decreases when the economy is growing or when the
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unemployment rate is low. These variables affect the deficit mainly via automatic
stabilizers, i.e. through changes in tax revenues and transfers related to
unemployment expenditures. Another important determinant of public deficits is the
interest rate. Several studies show that a high interest rate has a negative impact on
public deficit, a result that is justified by the increase in interest expenditure on
public debt.37
The effects of the supranational fiscal constrains imposed over the EU
countries after 1992 are also under the scope of some papers. For example, Arestis et
al. (2002), Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) and Annett (2006) find some evidence that
the run-up to EMU induced additional fiscal consolidation, but they notice that that
fiscal discipline seems to have decreased in the EU after that period.38
Political factors like elections, ideological orientation of the government,
fragmentation and type of government are considered as another important group of
determinants of public deficits. The reason for considering political factors in the
analysis of public deficits is related to the literature on political business cycles
(PBC).39 This literature followed two approaches. The first approach – introduced by
Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976) – stresses that policymakers have a natural
motivation to opportunistically manipulate the economy before elections as a way of
increasing their probability of re-election. The second approach – a ‘partisan’
approach developed by Hibbs (1977) – emphasizes that politicians, when in office,
take decisions according to their political ideology. In particular, right-wing parties
are more concerned with inflation than unemployment, whilst left-wing parties are
37 See most of the papers referenced in this section.
38 National rules were also recently considered by Debrun et al. (2008). They show that national fiscal
rules tend to affect fiscal performance positively in the EU countries.
39 For a review of the literature on the political cycles see Alesina et al. (1997) and Drazen (2000).
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more prone to promote economic growth and to fight unemployment than to stabilize
inflation.
These models were updated in the 1980s with the incorporation in their
assumptions of rational expectations. According to this reformulation, voters’
rationality limits the opportunistic behaviour making the political cycles shorter, less
intense and less regular than in the Nordhaus-Lindbeck model.40 On the partisan side,
Alesina (1987) shows that rational expectations restrict the partisan effects to the
post-electoral period. Moreover, this model confirms the traditional partisan idea that
inflation (unemployment) will be higher (lower) when a left-wing party is in office.
To detect electoral fiscal cycles in the analysis of public deficit, some authors
include in their equations a dummy for the election years as suggested by the PBC
literature. The idea behind the inclusion of this variable is that just before elections
policymakers may spend more and reduce taxes to increase their probability of re-
election. Therefore, a higher deficit is expected in the election years.41
According to the partisan theory, left-wing governments have traditionally
promoted a higher degree of public intervention in the economy. Hence, they should
also be more prone to increase expenditures and to generate deficits than right-wing
parties. Several authors present evidence supporting this view like, for example, de
Haan and Sturm (1994), Borrelli and Royed (1995), Sakamoto (2001), Perotti and
Kontopoulos (2002), Sapir and Sekkat (2002) and Mink and de Haan (2005).
Besides taking into account opportunistic and partisan effects, some studies
stress the role of political fragmentation in their analyses of the determinants of
40 One important contribution to the rational opportunist models literature was provided by Rogoff and
Sibert (1988).
41 Tujula and Wolswijk (2004), Mink and de Haan (2005) and Annett (2006) show that elections tend
to lead to higher deficits in the EU countries.
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public deficits. Economists generally claim that minority governments, governments
formed by multiple parties and governments characterized by a short tenure in office
tend to run larger fiscal deficits. In a seminal paper in the field, Roubini and Sachs
(1989) demonstrate that deficits are more common in industrial democracies when
many political parties are present in a ruling coalition. However, in their analysis,
they do not make a clear distinction between majority/minority governments and
single-party/multi-party governments. This is a problem that weakens their
conclusions, as it is noticed by, for example, Edin and Ohlsson (1991), Borrelli and
Royed (1995), Sakamoto (2001) and Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002). Therefore,
these authors try to address this problem by analysing those two aspects of the
political system separately.
The degree of political support that a government enjoys in the parliament is
important when unpopular measures like spending cuts or tax increases need to be
taken. Minority governments usually cannot take these measures without support
from other parties in the parliament. When that support is not obtained those
measures have to be postponed and high deficits arise. Deficits may also result from
concessions to the other parties to get their support. This is not the case when a
majority party is in office because it can pursue its policies without asking for
support from other parties. However, empirical evidence on the effects of a
majority/minority government on public deficits is mixed. Some authors like, for
example, Edin and Ohlsson (1991), Volkerink and de Haan (2001) and Perotti and
Kontopoulos (2002) find evidence suggesting that minority governments are more
prone to generate deficits than majority governments. Others like de Haan and Sturm
(1994), de Haan et al. (1999) and Woo (2003) find no evidence supporting this
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idea.42 Borrelli and Royed (1995), Sakamoto (2001) and Tujula and Wolswijk (2004)
show that deficits can be lower under minority governments. The justification for this
evidence rests on the same grounds as the opposite result: as majority governments
are able to take unpopular measures to reduce the deficit without needing support
from other parties in the parliament, they are also better able to increase deficits than
minority governments if they intend to do that.
De Haan et al. (1999) and Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) consider that the
distinction between minority and majority may not necessarily capture the notion of
fragmentation in decision-making. As a consequence, they emphasize the importance
of the number of decision-makers in the government. In fact, some authors believe
that the fragmentation of the government is a more important source of public
deficits. Roubini and Sachs (1989), Perotti et al. (1998), de Haan et al. (1999),
Annett (2002) and Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) show that public spending and
deficits are higher when coalition governments are in office, that is, when the number
of parties in the government is high. These authors argue that coalition governments
have a bias towards larger deficits because when multiple parties participate in a
coalition they are representing different interests, and to maintain the coalition it is
necessary to accommodate those interests by satisfying their budgetary needs.
Consequently, as coalition governments have more veto points within their structure
and each party can demand expenditures, without fully internalizing their costs, it
will be more difficult to apply spending cuts and to control the deficit when
42 In fact, de Haan and Sturm (1994) argue that “… minority governments are often able to reduce
budget deficits, as the Danish experience demonstrates.” (de Haan and Sturm, 1994, p. 164).
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necessary.43 However, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) and Sakamoto (2001) found no
evidence that the number of parties in office affects negatively governments’ ability
to reduce deficits.
Tenure in office or political instability – sometimes called fragmentation over
time – is considered by some authors as another determinant of public deficits. Grilli
et al. (1991), de Haan and Sturm (1994) and Annett (2002) find that public deficits
tend to be higher when government turnover is higher. Alesina and Tabellini (1987)
have already emphasized that when political power alternates frequently between
competing parties, the higher will be the deficit and debt bias. However, Borrelli and
Royed (1995) and Sakamoto (2001) find no evidence to support this view.
3.2.2. Literature on the determinants of excessive deficits
While the literature on public deficits and debts is abundant, the literature on
the causes of excessive deficits is relatively undeveloped. There are only a few
studies that really try to analyse some issues related to excessive deficits in the
European Union context: Bayar (2001), Hughes-Hallett and McAdam (2003) and
Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2004, 2005). These studies define an excessive deficit as
a deficit higher than 3% of GDP, in line with the legal concept established by the
Maastricht Treaty. Bayar (2001) focuses his analysis on the economic determinants
of an EU country entering into and exiting from an excessive deficit, whilst Hughes-
Hallett and Lewis (2004, 2005) are more concerned with the issue of whether the
fiscal improvements created in the run-up to EMU have lasted beyond the creation of
43 Perotti et al. (1998), Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) and Woo (2003) also consider the number of
ministers as an important conditioning of public deficits. They show that a large cabinet tends to
generate more spending, especially in situations of economic slowdown or fiscal distress.
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the Euro-zone. In a different approach, Hughes-Hallett and McAdam (2003) examine
how deficit targets can be used to reduce the probability of excessive deficits.
Using a duration analysis over the period 1970-1996 for the 15 EU member
states, Bayar (2001) concludes that government receipts and economic growth are
important determinants to the likelihood of a country exiting from the state of an
excessive deficit, whereas primary expenditures play a central role for the likelihood
of a country’s entry into a state of excessive deficit. The level of debt also affects
both likelihoods but in opposite directions: the higher is the debt, the higher (lower)
will be the likelihood of entering into (exiting from) an excessive deficit. Hughes-
Hallett and Lewis (2004, 2005) also find important positive effects from the lagged
debt and deficit (and a negative effect from the output gap) on the probability of a
country exceeding the 3% of GDP for the deficit for the 15 EU countries over the
period 1960-2002 using a simple probit model. However, the focus of their analysis
is on the fiscal discipline in the post-Maastricht period. They show that it increased
until 1997-1998, but eroded thereafter to an extent that, by 2005, there was less
discipline than before the Maastricht process has started.44 Therefore, they conclude
that fiscal discipline in the EU was just the product of the threat of a country being
excluded from taking part in the Euro-zone. As soon as that sanction was removed
(after 1998), countries seemed to relax their consolidation efforts.
Finally, Hughes-Hallett and McAdam’s (2003) stochastic simulations for the
four largest EU states (Germany, France, Italy and UK) allow them to conclude that
44 In a study of the conditionings of the public deficit in the post-Maastricht period, Annett (2006)
shows that the benefits of the fiscal rules, in terms of making fiscal policy less pro-cyclical,
evaporated after the creation of EMU. However, his results are more optimistic than those presented
by Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2004, 2005). Annett (2006) argues that the SGP was successful in
contributing to fiscal discipline in some countries like Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland,
the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden.
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fiscal targets have to be country-specific and conservative, and fiscal policy has to be
forward-looking to keep the probability of excessive deficits below acceptable limits.
A striking point to notice is the fact that none of these studies actually focus
their analyses directly on the determinants of an excessive deficit. Hughes-Hallett
and McAdam (2003) simply analyse the probability distribution of a country’s deficit
ratio under a variety of fiscal rules; Bayar (2001) is only concerned with the entry
and exit dynamics of an excessive deficit, whilst Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2004,
2005) are more interested in analysing the issue of fiscal discipline after Maastricht.
Moreover, they consider that economic factors are the only conditionings of the
likelihood of an excessive deficit. In reality, to deeply understand why excessive
deficits may arise, we may also pay attention to the political environment. This is a
fact that the few existing studies on excessive deficits have ignored but that this
study intends to analyse in detail.
This study goes even further by providing separate analyses for small and
large countries and for countries traditionally affected by large deficits. The
econometric analysis used in this study is also different from those employed in the
previous studies. Here, in contrast to the duration model used by Bayar (2001) and
the simple probit model estimated by Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2004, 2005), a
conditional logit model is estimated allowing for country-specific effects. Those
effects are not taken into account in the previous studies, which may affect their
estimates.
Finally, as the 3% rule for the public deficit has been the main reference for
the fiscal policy in the EU over the last decade, this study also intends to shed some
light on how that rule affected recent fiscal behaviour or, in other words, how EU
countries have been coping with excessive deficits after Maastricht.
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3.3. Theoretical framework and empirical estimation technique
Regarding the theoretical literature presented in the previous section, we
derived a simple theoretical model to support the analysis of the causes of excessive
deficits. The econometric technique used to estimate the model is also described in
this section.
Public deficits can be expressed by the following relation:
,11 ttttt RDEBTiEDEF   (3.1)
where DEBT is the stock of public debt, E is government primary expenditure, i is
the nominal interest rate on the debt (in the end of period t-1) and R is total
government revenues. Expressing the deficit in terms of GDP (Y) yields:
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where g is the growth rate of real GDP, and π is the inflation rate. We assume that a
part of the government expenditures to GDP is relatively constant but the other part
is highly dependent on two factors: the level of economic activity and the preferences
of the government. In fact, expenditures tend to rise when economic activity is
slowing due to the increase in unemployment transfers. On the other hand and
according to the thoughts of the PBC theory, the ideological preferences of the
government and elections may affect the level of government expenditures
significantly. The remaining part of the expenditures is assumed constant because it
is allocated to items that are necessary to assure the normal working of the public
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structure like, for example, wages. Revenues to GDP are considered to be dependent
on the growth of real GDP. Therefore, equation (3.2) can be re-written as follows:
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where c1 and c2 are constants, ideol represents the ideology of the government
(ranging from a right to a left-wing government, 0≤ideol≤1) and elect identifies an
election; lower case letters stand for the ratio of the deficit and debt to GDP.
To simplify equation (3.3), we start by linearizing the component st using a
linear Taylor series approximation around 0, which yields: st=c3+θ1debtt-1+θ2rirt-1-
α3gt+ξt, where c3 is a constant, rir represents the real interest rate (i-π) and ξt is the
remaining residual. Substituting this in equation (3.3) and rearranging, we have:
,211211 tttttttt electideolgrirdebtcdef    δz' (3.4)
where α=α1+α2+α3, z is the vector of the exogenous variables and δ is the vector of
the respective coefficients. This equation shows that the deficit-to-GDP ratio
increases with the stock of the debt-to-GDP ratio and real interest rate prevailing in t-
1, and decreases with the current real GDP growth rate. It also shows that left-wing
governments and elections contribute to increase the deficit.
As this study tries to evaluate the impact of those factors on the probability of
a country having an excessive public deficit, this model has to be defined in terms of
a probabilistic function. But first it is important to define an excessive deficit.
According to both the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP, an excessive deficit is defined
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as a deficit higher than 3% of GDP.45 This means that the new dependent variable
(Def3) will be a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when general government
budget surplus as percentage of GDP (GBS) is lower than -3% of GDP, and 0
otherwise. Therefore, the probability of an excessive deficit can then be defined as a
function of the basic factors that are conditioning the deficit. As there can be some
persistence in the elimination of an excessive deficit, the lag of the deficit (deft-1) is
also added to the model, which yields the following generic equation to be estimated:
.)(),|13(Prob 11   tt deffdefDef δz'z (3.5)
Considering that f is a monotonic increasing function, the impact of each exogenous
variable on the likelihood of an excessive deficit has the same sign as in equation
(3.4).
As the dependent variable used in this analysis is binary, the econometric
model chosen to estimate the coefficients of interest is the conditional logit model.
This model describes the probability of an event occurring given certain
conditionings. In particular, it will be used to explain the probability of a country
breaching the 3% of GDP rule for the deficit (or having an excessive deficit), given
certain economic and political determinants (x). In comparison with the traditional
linear specification for the study of the determinants of public deficits, this model has
the advantage of allowing for the analysis of an important issue not yet fully
analysed in literature but which has a great deal of importance in Europe after
45 This seems to be a good value of reference because EU countries have been compelled to meet this
target either as a convergence criterion to take part in the EMU or, after that, as a requirement of the
SGP.
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Maastricht: how to avoid excessive deficits, i.e. deficits higher than 3% of GDP. This
model can be represented as follows:46
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where β is the vector of all parameters to be estimated, x=(z,deft-1) and )'( βx is the
logistic CDF associated with the logit model. The vector of parameters β reflects the
impact of changes in x on the probability of excessive deficits.
Whilst Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2004, 2005) simply rely on the estimation
of a pooled probit model, this study implements panel data techniques. The presence
of country-specific effects should be controlled for to avoid biased estimates.47 The
structural model for a binary panel data model can then be written as follows:
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In this case, y* is an unobserved outcome and εit is an error term. Regarding the
assumptions made over the error term, we can have either a random effects model
(where iitit u and υit and ui are independent random variables, ui has mean 0
and variance equal to 2u and υit is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
12 

 ), or a fixed effects model (where itiitit d  and dit is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 for individual i in period t, and 0 otherwise). Theoretically, the
distinction between random and fixed effects relies on the relationship between ui
and xit. If they are not correlated, then we have random effects; if they are correlated,
46 For details on this and other binary choice models see, for example, Greene (2003, Ch. 21).
47 Unsurprisingly, the hypothesis of homogeneity of the individual coefficients was rejected in this
study.
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the model has fixed effects. Considering that, for the period of analysis, the entire
population of EU countries is included in the sample, and that each country has
particular economic, political and institutional characteristics, it is highly probable
that ui is correlated with the regressors. Hence, fixed effects are assumed to be
present in the model.
However, the traditional unconditional fixed effects estimator can be affected
by some statistical problems. This estimator relies on the assumption that Ti is
increasing for the constant terms to be consistent. But in this formulation Ti is fixed,
therefore, the estimators of the constant terms and subsequently the estimator of β are
not consistent. This is called the incidental parameters problem and it is more severe
when Ti is small. A way of avoiding this problem is by using a minimal sufficient
statistic for αi.
According to the literature and considering the dependent variable used in this
study,  
iT
t iti
DefS
1
3 is the suggested minimal sufficient statistic for a fixed effects
logit model.48 Hence, the conditional likelihood function can be written as follows:
.
1
'
'3
1
1

 




n
i
Sd
d
Def
c
t iit
iT
t itit
iT
t itit
e
eL
βx
βx
(3.8)
This equation is now free of the incidental parameters αi and its maximization can be
done by the conventional methods.
48 Despite sufficient statistics being available for the logit model, they are not available for the probit
model. This represents the main reason for the choice of the conditional logit model.
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3.4. Empirical results
This section starts by describing the data and the main variables used in the
empirical analysis. Then, the empirical results from the estimation of the conditional
logit model are presented and analysed.
3.4.1. Data and description of the variables
Regarding the literature on public deficits and the model presented in the
previous section, some economic and political variables will be used in the
identification of the main causes of an excessive deficit. The economic data were
collected on an annual basis from the AMECO Database of the European
Commission (May, 2007) for 15 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) over the period 1970-2006. The main
economic variables used as regressors in this study are the following:
- Primary (general) government budget surplus as a percentage of GDP lagged one
period (PrimGBS(-1)). This variable is included in the equation to account for the
persistence of past budgetary imbalances on the likelihood of an excessive
deficit.49 We expect that the higher the primary surplus (deficit) in the previous
period, the lower (higher) will be the current probability of an excessive deficit.
- General government gross public debt as a percentage of GDP lagged one period
(Debt(-1)).50 This is an important determinant of public deficits and, in the same
49 PrimGBS(-1) is used instead of GBS(-1) because this latter variable is highly correlated with
government debt (another regressor to be included in the equation). When the interest is discounted
from the computation of the deficit, there is no longer that problem. Moreover, the government has
greater immediate control over the primary budget than over interest payments.
50 Some economic variables are lagged one period to avoid any reverse causality or simultaneity bias.
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way, of excessive deficits. Regarding our theoretical framework, the higher the
public debt, the higher is the share of public expenditures that has to be dedicated
to interest payments generated by that debt and, therefore, the higher will be the
probability of an excessive deficit. But note that Mélitz (2000) and Annett’s
(2006) findings indicate that a very high public debt may also force the
government to take measures to reduce it by diminishing the deficit. In that
extreme case, the likelihood of an excessive deficit might be slightly reduced.
- Annual growth of real GDP at price levels of 2000 (GRGDP). As the economic
performance of a country greatly affects the public budget through automatic
stabilizers, we anticipate that excessive deficits in the EU will be less likely when
the economy is growing faster.
- Real long-term interest rate lagged one period (RIR(-1)).51 This variable captures
the effects of the interest rate on the real amount of debt to be paid each period.
As this amount is accounted in the current budget, the higher the interest rate last
year, the higher will be the burden of the debt to be paid this year and, therefore,
the higher the public deficit and the probability of excessive deficits arise.
The data for political variables were mainly collected from Armingeon et al.
(2005) for the period 1970-2004 and the series were updated for 2005 and 2006
using information from the internet website www.electionworld.org (Elections
Around the World).52 The political variables included in the main equation to be
estimated in this study are the following:
51 The GDP deflator is used by our source (AMECO) to obtain this variable from its nominal
counterpart.
52 There are some missing values for Greece (1970-1973), Portugal (1970-1975) and Spain (1970-
1976) because during those periods these countries were not ruled by democratic regimes.
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- Left-wing government (Left) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when
the GovParty series in Armingeon et al. (2005) is equal to 4 or 5, and 0
otherwise. This corresponds to a situation in which there is dominance or
hegemony of left-wing parties in the government. Hibbs (1977) suggests that left-
wing governments are more prone to fight unemployment and to promote
growth. In our model, this behaviour would tend to generate an increase in public
expenditures (more transfers and public investment). Hence, we expect that left-
wing governments have a higher tendency to create excessive deficits than centre
or right-wing governments.
- Election year (ElectYear) is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in years of general
(parliamentary) elections and 0 in non-election years. According to the PBC
theory, we anticipate that excessive deficits will be more likely in election years.
- Minority government (MinGov) is a dummy that takes a value 1 when a minority
government is in office and 0 if a (single-party or coalition) government has a
majority in the parliament. This variable was built using the gov_type series from
Armingeon et al. (2005). Due to the lack of consensus in the literature about the
impact of this variable on public deficits, no sign is anticipated for its
coefficient.53
Two additional variables were included in the equation to control for the
period in which the 3% rule for the deficit was implemented in the EU:
- D92 is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 in the period 1992-2006.
- D99 is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 in the period 1999-2006.
These dummies are incorporated into the model to control for the period in
which fiscal rules were established in the EU. The aim is to capture the behaviour of
53 By the same reason, we avoided to consider this variable in our theoretical framework.
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the EU countries in the post-Maastricht period and in the period following the launch
of the Euro. D92 is included to capture the post-Maastricht effect and D99 tries to
capture any additional effect from the SGP, after the run up for EU countries to
assure their place in EMU was over. This latter variable is added to test whether the
EU countries have relaxed their efforts to control the deficit after they have assured a
place in the EMU.
Besides the inclusion of all these variables in the model, other economic and
political variables – more or less related with these – will be considered in the
empirical analysis. They will be described once they are included in the equation.54
3.4.2. Main economic and political determinants of excessive deficits
The estimation results of the model described in the Section 3.3 are analysed
in this section. The first column of Table 3.1 shows the results for the main
specification, which includes the economic and political variables previously
defined. A more detailed analysis of the economic and political determinants of an
excessive deficit in the group of EU countries is presented in the remaining of Table
3.1 and in Table 3.2.55
54 See Annex 3.1 for a complete description of all variables and Annex 3.2 for the respective
descriptive statistics. In Annex 3.2, there is a figure showing the evolution of the public deficit in the
EU countries over the period 1970-2006 (Figure A.3.2.1) and two other figures with the distribution
of the excessive deficits by country (Figure A.3.2.2) and by year (Figure A.3.3.3), respectively. These
figures provide a good indication that public deficits have decreased significantly after Maastricht
(especially after the SGP has come into effect), as well as the number of countries in excessive deficit.
55 Since in the conditional logit the fixed or individual effects are not estimated, it is not possible to
compute the respective marginal effects. An alternative way of intuitively interpreting the results from
the conditional logit is using an odds-ratio analysis. As the ratio of the probability of an excessive
deficit to a not excessive deficit is given by ex’β, differentiating this expression with respect to any of
the regressors (xk), we get eβk, which means that for any unitary change in xk, the odds will change by a
factor of eβk, holding all other variables constant.
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Considering first the results presented in the first column of Table 3.1, we
find some degree of persistence in past budgetary imbalances. The results confirm
the expectation that the higher and more persistent is the primary deficit (PrimGBS(-
1)), the more difficult it will be for a country to avoid an excessive deficit. In the
second estimation presented in Table 3.1, the effects of the fiscal variables on the
probability of an excessive deficit are analysed in more detail. The variable PrimGBS
was subdivided into its two major components: the primary total expenditure as a
percentage of GDP (PrimTExp) and the total revenues as a percentage of GDP
(TRevenue). As expected, the inclusion of these variables in the model, instead of
PrimGBS, confirms the results shown by Bayar (2001), i.e. that the likelihood of an
excessive deficit increases with public expenditures and decreases with government
revenues.
The public debt (Debt(-1)) is another important determinant of the likelihood
of an excessive deficit. Results show that the probability of an excessive deficit
increases with the public debt, which confirms our theoretical prediction and is in
accord with Balassone and Francese (2004) and Mink and de Haan’s (2005) view.56
Despite this effect being lower than the effect of the primary deficit, it is sufficient to
conclude that the automatic effects of an increase in interest payments – due to a
higher debt – have an impact on the probability of an excessive deficit that outweighs
any government desire to reduce the deficit (and to avoid excessive deficits) when
the debt is high.
56 As an example, results presented in column 1 show that a percentage point increase in Debt(-1) will
increase the ratio between the probability of an excessive deficit and a not excessive deficit by a factor
of around 1.0741 (= e0.0715), holding all other variables constant.
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Table 3.1. Analysis of the main determinants of an excessive deficit I
Prob(Def3=1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PrimGBS(-1) -0.9252
(-8.64)***
-0.8481
(-8.21)***
-0.9642
(-8.16)***
-0.9289
(-8.62)***
-0.9164
(-8.61)***
-0.9434
(-8.50)***
PrimTExp(-1) 0.8267
(8.10)***
TRevenue(-1) -0.8476
(-7.46)***
Debt(-1) 0.0715
(5.64)***
0.1384
(4.00)***
0.0477
(3.92)***
0.0803
(5.79)***
0.0695
(5.45)***
0.0711
(5.64)***
0.0736
(5.68)***
Debt_sq(-1) -0.0004
(-1.84)*
GRGDP -0.3959
(-4.88)***
-0.4402
(-5.14)***
-0.3596
(-4.23)***
-0.4250
(-5.07)***
-0.3935
(-4.96)***
-0.3966
(-4.89)***
UR 0.1853
(2.20)**
RIR(-1) 0.1071
(1.73)*
0.0470
(0.74)
0.0535
(0.84)
0.0837
(1.29)
0.1409
(2.26)**
0.0982
(1.60)
0.1097
(1.82)*
D92 -1.0318
(-2.25)**
-1.4697
(-3.12)***
-0.7499
(-1.75)*
-1.3313
(-2.82)***
-1.0190
(-2.26)**
-1.1887
(-2.57)***
D9298 0.9952
(1.23)
D9298t -0.4933
(-2.91)***
D99 -1.1978
(-2.42)**
-1.4256
(-2.86)***
-1.1330
(-2.42)**
-2.0985
(-2.20)**
-0.9296
(-1.93)*
-1.2003
(-2.44)**
-1.1421
(-2.33)**
D99t -0.0786
(-0.48)
Left 0.8188
(0.035)**
1.0058
(2.51)**
0.8175
(2.18)**
0.9647
(2.37)**
0.7358
(1.92)*
0.6831
(1.79)*
%Right -0.0139
(-2.53)**
ElectYear 0.9218
(0.008)***
0.8360
(2.40)**
0.9111
(2.73)***
0.9041
(2.55)**
0.8638
(2.48)**
PolCycle -0.5514
(-1.79)*
YrAfterElect -0.5063
(-1.15)
2YrAfterElect -1.0431
(-2.31)**
3YrAfterElect -0.8030
(-1.75)*
MinGov -1.0446
(-1.91)*
-0.9854
(-1.77)*
-1.1943
(-2.20)**
-0.9256
(-1.68)*
-1.1647
(-2.13)**
-0.9597
(-1.79)*
-0.9074
(-1.69)*
Log-Likelihood -115.08 -116.41 -126.65 -110.25 -114.01 -117.06 -115.70
AIC 248.16 254.82 271.30 242.51 246.0151 252.12 253.40
SBIC 286.27 301.39 309.41 289.09 284.12 290.23 299.98
No. Observ. 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
Notes: The z-statistics for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis
is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The coefficients were estimated using a conditional logit fixed effects
estimator. AIC=2(-logL+k), where k is the number of regressors; and SBIC=2(-logL+(k/2)logN), where N is the
number of observations. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion and SBIC is the Schwartz Bayesian
Information Criterion.
Sources: See Annex 3.1.
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The square of the public debt (Debt_sq) is also added to regression 2 with the
aim of inferring whether governments’ will to reduce the deficit and to avoid
excessive deficits decreases when the public debt is very high, as suggested by
Mélitz (2000) and Annett (2002). In fact, results seem to confirm that idea, i.e. they
show that the probability of an excessive deficit increases as the debt increases, but
for high levels of debt that probability tends to decrease. This means that when the
debt reaches high values, governments’ will to control the deficit is higher than the
automatic effect of interest payments. However, the statistical evidence to support
this idea is not strong.57
The effect of the economic environment is captured by the growth of real
GDP (GRGDP). When the economy is growing faster, the probability of an
excessive deficit is reduced, which means, that a good economic environment is
essential for a country to avoid excessive deficits. As the economic cycle affects the
public budget largely through automatic stabilizers, then when there is a recession,
tax revenues decrease and unemployment benefits push up public expenditures.
Hence, the effect of a higher unemployment rate on the probability of an excessive
deficit should be significantly positive. Results presented in columns 3, where the
unemployment rate (UR) is used instead of GRGDP, confirm that assumption.58
Regarding the effects of the real interest rate (RIR(-1)), we find some
evidence of the expected negative effect of this variable on the likelihood of an
excessive deficit, a result that can be justified by the increase in interest expenditure
on public debt.
57 Additional regressions, not reported here, revealed that the coefficient on Debt_sq is not always
statistically significant when included in the remaining specifications estimated in this study.
58 Due to the well-known relation between growth and unemployment rate, we prefer not to include
both variables in the same regression. In fact, these variables present a high correlation in this study.
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On the effects of the fiscal constraints imposed by Maastricht and by the
SGP, results seem to indicate a higher fiscal discipline after Maastricht,59 and this
effect seems to be reinforced in the period after 1999. A contrary view is shared by
Tujula and Wolswijk (2004), Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2004, 2005) and Annett
(2006). They claim that fiscal discipline eroded after the run-up to EMU was over.
Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2004, 2005) show that the SGP appears to have reduced
the probability of a country violating the 3% limit, but they argue that the inclusion
of simple shift dummies in the model may not capture a possible gradual erosion of
fiscal discipline. Therefore, they also include in their study time trends for the pre-
and post-EMU periods and their results suggest that in each subsequent year under
the SGP regime (post-EMU) there was an increasing tendency for EU countries to
violate the 3% limit for the deficit. To capture this idea in more detail, we also
consider a non-overlapping dummy structure in our analysis, where the first variable
is covering the period 1992-1998, i.e. the run-up to EMU (D9298) and the other is
covering the period after 1999 (D99). Additionally, a time trend for each of these
periods was included in the specification to control for the gradual (annual) effects of
the fiscal discipline (D9298t and D99t, respectively). The estimation results of such a
specification are shown in column 4. Only the coefficients on D9298t and D99 are
significant. This means that, on average, the probability of an excessive deficit is not
significantly lower after Maastricht than before, but the efforts made by all EU
countries to take part in EMU were helpful in gradually reducing that probability
until 1998. After 1999, despite the probability of an excessive deficit being lower
than before Maastricht, we are not able to identify further significant efforts to
59 This result is in accord with the evidence provided by Arestis et al. (2002) that most EU countries
have presented statistically significant reductions in their deficits in the post-Maastricht period.
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reduce it. Nevertheless, the results do not indicate either any significant erosion of
the efforts made until 1998, in contrast to what is argued by other authors.
The political variables are another important group of determinants of the
probability of an excessive deficit. All regressions show evidence of ideological
effects, i.e. left-wing governments (Left) have a higher propensity to generate
excessive deficits than centre/right-wing governments. This result strongly supports
the ‘partisan’ argument that left-wing governments tend to promote a higher degree
of public intervention in the economy, caring more about unemployment and growth
than inflation. Hence, they are more prone to increase expenditures and to generate
deficits than right-wing parties. For the same reasons – and as the results presented in
this chapter proved – they are more prone to generate excessive deficits as well.
Results also show that the probability of an excessive deficit tends to increase
in election years (ElectYear). According to the PBC literature, this evidence indicates
that EU governments are trying to influence macroeconomic outcomes before
elections by running a loose fiscal policy (more spending and/or tax reductions) in
order to increase their probability of re-election. Consequently, this opportunistic
behaviour generates a higher propensity for excessive deficits in election years.
Finally, there is some evidence that minority governments (MinGov) have a
lower propensity to generate excessive deficits than majority governments. Some
authors have already noticed a similar result in the analysis of public deficits.60 As
majority governments do not need support from other parties in the parliament to
implement their preferred measures – contrarily to minority governments – deficits
are more able to increase under their terms in office than under minority
60 See Borrelli and Royed (1995), Sakamoto (2001) and Tujula and Wolswijk (2004). In fact, as stated
by Edin and Ohlsson (1991), some minority EU governments, like successive Danish and Swedish
governments, have been successful in avoiding excessive deficits.
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governments. As the negative effects of unpopular policies can be more easily
imputable to a majority than to a minority government, the former can try to avoid
them so as not to lose electoral support. Hence, the propensity to excessive deficits
increases when majority governments are in office. According to the results of this
study, this opportunism can be even more intense when majority governments are
under electoral pressure.
Some additional political variables are also included in the model to add more
detail to the important effect of political factors on the probability of a country
having a deficit higher than 3% of GDP. In regression 5, we consider the percentage
of right-wing parties in the cabinet (%Right), instead of Left, as a way of controlling
more directly for the effects of the relative power that a party has in the government.
Results show that the higher is the percentage of right oriented policymakers in the
government the lower will be the probability of an excessive deficit, as expected.
On the other hand, the PBC theory not only states that governments try to
manipulate the economy right before elections in order to increase their chance of re-
election, but also argues that after elections governments will try to correct the fiscal
imbalances generated by the electoral period. Therefore, we expect that the
probability of an excessive deficit is lower after elections. Results presented in
column 6 of Table 3.1 give some support to this expectation. The variable used to
control for this idea is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the first half of the
political cycle of a government (PolCycle). Results suggest that the propensity for an
excessive deficit is lower in the first half of the mandate than in the second.
Moreover, results presented in the last column of Table 3.1 show that the efforts to
control excessive deficits are especially felt in the second (and third) year(s) after the
last election. Thus, our evidence is suggesting that the correction of a substantial
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fiscal imbalance is not immediate; it takes some time before the measures taken by
the new government to control an excessive deficit have visible effects. This
evidence represents a new and interesting finding in this field.
The effects of the fragmentation of political power on the likelihood of an
excessive deficit are analysed in Table 3.2. The issue of fragmentation over time is
considered in the first regression. Some authors consider the tenure in office or
political instability as an important determinant of public deficits (Grilli et al., 1991,
de Haan and Sturm, 1994 and Annett, 2002). The variable used in this study to
capture the effect of the political instability is the number of changes in government
per year (NGovChg). As it is highly correlated with ElectYear, this last variable was
dropped from this regression. Results show that the higher instability caused by
changes in government is also a cause of excessive deficits.
To analyse in more detail the effect of the degree of government control over
the parliament, two dummies were included in the model instead of MinGov: one
takes the value of 1 when the government is formed by a single party with a majority
in the parliament (MajSPGov); and the other takes the value of 1 when the
government is formed by a coalition with a majority in the parliament (CoalGov).
Results confirm the idea that single-party majority governments have a higher
propensity for excessive deficits than minority governments. As single-party
majority governments have more power to control deficits, they also have more
power to satisfy the spending demands of their supporters. This total control over
fiscal policy by just one party and the earlier mentioned electoral motivation can
make excessive deficits more likely under this kind of government than under
minority (or coalition) governments, where there is some control by the other parties
to avoid this opportunism.
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Table 3.2. Analysis of the main determinants of an excessive deficit II
Prob(Def3=1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PrimGBS(-1) -0.9096
(-8.57)***
-0.9391
(-8.60)***
-0.9170
(-8.53)***
-0.9374
(-8.51)***
-0.9184
(-8.55)***
-0.9254
(-8.58)***
Debt(-1) 0.0707
(5.57)***
0.0734
(5.67)***
0.0742
(5.73)***
0.0715
(5.64)***
0.0687
(5.37)***
0.0703
(5.31)***
GRGDP -0.3755
(-4.64)***
-0.4043
(-4.92)***
-0.3923
(-4.79)***
-0.4203
(-4.71)***
-0.3938
(-4.87)***
-0.4113
(-4.99)***
RIR(-1) 0.1319
(2.02)**
0.0974
(1.55)
0.0848
(1.31)
0.1001
(1.56)
0.1151
(1.83)*
0.1098
(1.66)*
D92 -1.0271
(-2.27)**
-0.9688
(-2.09)**
-0.9822
(-2.14)**
-0.9873
(-2.15)**
-0.8970
(-1.93)*
-1.0887
(-2.32)**
D99 -1.0698
(-2.19)**
-1.2127
(-2.44)**
-1.2280
(-2.45)**
-1.3694
(-2.66)***
-1.2483
(-2.49)**
-1.3170
(-2.54)**
Left 0.8182
(2.09)**
0.7292
(1.83)*
0.7514
(1.92)*
0.5089
(1.23)
1.1857
(2.68)***
-.0119
(-0.02)
ElectYear 0.9497
(2.71)***
0.9429
(2.71)***
0.4907
(1.18)
0.9347
(2.65)***
0.9819
(2.78)***
NGovChg 0.6950
(2.52)**
MinGov -1.0964
(-1.99)**
-1.2241
(-2.16)**
-1.2055
(-2.16)**
-0.4453
(-0.69)
-0.8098
(-1.25)
MajSPGov 1.4687
(2.17)**
-0.3388
(-0.40)
CoalGov 0.7109
(1.13)
NPartyGov -0.3030
(-1.33)
ElectYear*Left 1.5307
(2.13)**
MinGov*Left -1.6298
(-1.80)*
MajSPGov*Left 2.1297
(2.48)**
Log-Likelihood -115.34 -114.50 -114.13 -110.30 -113.43 -111.28
AIC 248.69 249.00 248.25 240.61 246.87 244.56
SBIC 286.80 291.35 290.60 282.89 289.21 291.14
No. Observ. 510 510 510 510 510 510
Notes: See Table 3.1
The idea advanced by De Haan et al. (1999) and Perotti and Kontopoulos
(2002) that the distinction between minority and majority may not necessarily
capture the notion of fragmentation in decision-making is taken into account in
regression 3. Here we add to the model a variable that accounts for the number of
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decision-makers in the government (NPartyGov).61 However, results indicate that the
number of parties in the government coalition seems to have no significant effect on
the probability of an excessive deficit in the EU.62 But note that the distinction
between majority and minority governments remains relevant, which means that it is
the degree of government control over the parliament rather than the number of
parties in the coalition that matters to explain excessive deficits in the EU.
The remaining regressions presented in Table 3.2 attempt to provide evidence
of some additional effects from the interaction between the determinants of an
excessive deficit analysed so far. As no significant effects were detected from the
interaction between the economic and political variables – which means that political
factors matter in any economic situation – we report only the significant results for
the interaction between the political variables. Column 4 provides an interesting
result: evidence suggests that left oriented governments are the most responsible for
the opportunistic behaviour right before elections; when a left government is in
office in the election year, the probability of an excessive deficit is higher than when
the government is formed by centre and/or right parties.
Another interesting result regarding left oriented governments comes from
regression 5: excessive deficits are greatly associated to left-wing governments with
majority in the parliament, but when a left-wing government is in a minority in the
61 This variable was obtained from different sources. See Annex 3.1 for details.
62 Edin and Ohlsson (1991) have previously found no evidence that the number of parties in office
affects governments’ ability to reduce deficits. Our study also considered specifications with the
number of ministers in the government, a dummy for a single party government, the Herfindhal index
for the seat shares of all parties in the government, a government fractionalization index (respectively,
HERFGOV and GOVFRAC obtained from Keefer (2005), The Database of Political Institutions
(DPI2004)) and even a fragmentation index for the distribution of the number of parties in the
parliament, but the coefficients on those variables were not significant either, which refrained us from
reporting those results.
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parliament our results show that its propensity for excessive deficits is significantly
lower than when a right oriented minority government is in office. This means that
when left governments have total control over the parliament they have the support
they need to implement measures to promote growth and to reduce unemployment.
As a result, public expenditures will increase as well as the deficit and the probability
of an excessive deficit. Due to this propensity to generate excessive deficits, the other
(centre and right) parties will be very stringent in supporting minority-left
government initiatives. Therefore, minority-left governments have a lower
propensity for excessive deficits than right-wing governments.
An additional regression was run for the interaction between MajSPGov and
Left. Results show a significant positive coefficient on that variable (see regression
6). A similar argument to the one advanced above to explain why left-majority
governments are more prone to excessive deficits can be used to justify this result:
excessive deficits are more likely when left single-party governments with majority
in the parliament are in office because they have the power and support they need to
implement the policies that are more in accord with their ideology. This represents
another important conclusion of this study.63
3.4.3. Robustness analysis
Some robustness tests were performed to check whether results are sensitive
to the time period considered or to particular specificities of the countries included in
the sample. Table 3.3 presents the most interesting results of that robustness analysis,
63 Although this study presents only results for the conditional logit model, unconditional logit and
probit models using either random or fixed effects were also estimated, but the main conclusions were
not significantly affected. Moreover, several heteroscedastic probit models were also run considering
different patterns of heteroscedasticity, but none clearly rejected the homoscedasticity hypothesis.
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and from which are obtained some new and important contributions to the literature
on public deficits for the EU countries.
The first three regressions provide a pertinent analysis for the periods before
and after the imposition of the Maastricht constraints. The first regression considers
the period before Maastricht, whilst in regressions 2 and 3, the sample is restricted to
the period 1992-2006; regression 3 is further restricted to the countries that have
already taken part in the EMU. Results show that after Maastricht the probability of
an excessive deficit is no longer affected by public debts or real interest rates. The
overall trend to reduce the public debt to less than 60% of GDP and the required
convergence of interest rates to low and stable values during this period is possibly
behind this result. Thus, this indicates that the Maastricht criteria and the SGP fiscal
constraints may have indeed been effective in controlling the negative effects of
those variables on the likelihood of excessive deficits.
Furthermore, results also indicate that excessive deficits have become less
likely after 1999. This evidence contradicts, once again, the view shared by Tujula
and Wolswijk (2004), Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2004, 2005) and Annett (2006) that
fiscal discipline in the EU eroded after the run-up to EMU was over.
Regarding the political variables, the most interesting result comes from the
coefficient on NrPartyGov for the period after Maastricht, especially for the
Eurozone countries. Evidence suggests that countries with multi-party governments
were more successful in avoiding excessive deficits than single-party governments,
probably because the former were more successful in using the (fiscal) rules imposed
by a supranational organization to build an internal consensus around the necessity of
balancing their public accounts. Moreover, results also reinforce the idea that
partisan effects and political opportunism are still alive and well after Maastricht.
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Table 3.3. Robustness analysis for the causes of excessive deficits
Prob(Def3=1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PrimGBS(-1) -1.3034
(-5.00)***
-0.6428
(-4.32)***
-0.7758
(-3.50)***
-1.1997
(-5.07)***
-0.7944
(-6.12)***
-0.9986
(-5.61)***
-0.9460
(-5.72)***
Debt(-1) 0.0599
(3.03)***
0.0281
(0.83)
0.0664
(1.43)
0.0763
(2.76)***
0.0778
(4.60)***
0.0798
(4.12)***
0.0769
(3.19)***
GRGDP -0.5018
(-3.65)***
-0.7895
(-3.45)***
-0.8851
(-3.17)***
-0.8070
(-3.56)***
-0.3266
(-3.57)***
-0.3376
(-3.02)***
-0.6907
(-4.22)***
RIR(-1) 0.2008
(2.07)**
0.1717
(0.75)
0.3630
(1.28)
0.3122
(2.64)***
0.0252
(0.27)
0.1167
(1.26)
0.0698
(0.42)
D92 -0.6082
(-0.68)
-1.6118
(-2.62)***
-2.0526
(-2.46)**
-0.8877
(-1.34)
D99 -1.7224
(-2.17)**
-2.1307
(-2.16)**
-0.8200
(-0.90)
-2.1255
(-2.82)***
-2.4183
(-2.83)***
-1.0147
(-1.31)
Left 1.5550
(1.83)*
1.4511
(1.85)*
2.8218
(2.68)***
2.3473
(2.20)**
1.5963
(2.04)**
3.2750
(3.49)***
-0.2297
(-0.38)
ElectYear 1.2507
(2.23)**
1.0114
(1.87)*
1.7641
(2.52)**
1.2529
(1.85)*
0.9970
(2.15)**
0.6448
(1.19)
1.3693
(2.73)***
MinGov -1.4267
(-1.48)
-0.7268
(-0.65)
-2.1538
(-1.69)*
-1.0409
(-0.99)
-1.3475
(-1.78)*
-2.5472
(-2.63)***
-0.2494
(-0.24)
NPartyGov 0.1210
(0.33)
-0.5974
(-1.77)*
-1.3369
(-3.02)***
-0.8657
(-1.90)*
0.0517
(0.17)
-0.2587
(-0.70)
-0.4155
(-1.17)
Log-Likelihood -39.83 -44.08 -30.18 -34.68 -66.36 -46.30 -56.34
AIC 95.66 106.17 78.36 89.37 152.71 112.60 132.69
SBIC 123.61 134.90 105.45 120.55 191.09 147.32 168.74
No. Observ. 243 180 150 167 343 238 272
Time period 1970-1991 1992-2006 1992-2006 1970-2006 1970-2006 1970-2006 1970-2006
No. Countries 13 12 10 5 10 7 8
Notes: See Table 3.1. Regression 1 considers only the period before Maastricht (1970-1991); Finland and Italy were
automatically dropped in this regression due to lack of variability of the dependent variable (Finland never
presents an excessive deficit during this period, while Italy is always in a situation of excessive deficit).
Regression 2 considers just the period 1992-2006; Regression 3 considers the same period but only the countries
that took part in EMU. Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg were dropped in these two regressions due to lack of
variability of the dependent variable; in this case, these countries have never had excessive deficits in the period
1992-2006. Regression 4 includes only the 5 largest EU countries and regression 5 includes the remaining 10
‘small’ countries. Regression 6 includes only the countries that run excessive deficits in more than half of the
years in the period 1970-2006 (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK), whilst regression 7
presents results for the other countries.
Some authors argue that Maastricht criteria and SGP fiscal constraints are
more suited to small countries than to large countries because small countries are
more accustomed to external influences over its internal policy. Moreover, as they
tend to have less bargaining power, the loss of reputation from violating the fiscal
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rule is greater.64 Regressions presented in columns 4 and 5 intend to provide some
empirical evidence for that argument – that is, they intend to test if the fiscal
constraints have only affected the small countries or whether they have also affected
large countries. Column 4 shows the results for the group of the 5 largest EU
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK), whilst column 5 presents the
results for the other 10 ‘small’ countries. Evidence clearly supports the argument that
EU fiscal constraints are more suited for small countries: the coefficients on the
dummies for the period in which those constraints were imposed in the EU are highly
significant for the group of small countries (see column 4), but insignificant for the
group of large countries (see column 5). Therefore, the fiscal constraints were highly
effective in reducing the propensity for excessive deficits in the small EU countries
but they were ineffective for large countries. This evidence is confirmed by the
violation of the SGP criteria for the deficit by France, Germany, Italy and the UK in
2002-2004. Empirical evidence also suggests that fiscal imbalances are more
sensitive to interest rate changes in large countries than in small countries.
Next the 15 EU countries are divided into two different groups: the first
includes only the countries that run excessive deficits – higher than 3% of GDP – in
more than half of the years in the period 1970-2006 (Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain and the UK); and the other contains the remaining EU countries (see
Figure A.3.2.2 in Annex 3.2 for details). Two regressions were performed, one for
each group. Results are presented in columns 6 and 7 and show that Maastricht
64 See, for example, Buti and Pench (2004) and Annett (2006). Buti and Pench (2004, p.1027) also
argue that the costs of fiscal consolidations tend to be proportionality higher in large than in small
countries because small countries “have a stronger incentive to undertake supply-side reforms rather
than pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy, since reforms not only boost potential output directly, but
also induce inflationary pressure which allows them to gain competitiveness and increase external
demand”.
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criteria and SGP fiscal constraints were far more effective in the group of countries
that traditionally present excessive deficits (see column 6) than in the other group
(see column 7). Therefore, those fiscal constraints were very important in bringing
some discipline to the public accounts of the first group of countries.65 In addition,
partisan effects and majority governments seem to be the major political causes of
excessive deficits in the first group, whilst opportunistic behaviour before elections is
the main political cause of excessive deficits in the second group.
Other specifications – not presented here – were also rerun excluding one
country at a time. Despite the significance of Left and MinGov being sometimes
slightly affected when, respectively, Greece or the UK and Ireland or Spain were
excluded from the sample, the results and the main conclusions of this study
remained unaffected by the exclusion of any country from the sample.
3.5. Conclusions
Several previous studies have contributed to identifying the factors that
influence public deficits (and debts) in both OECD countries and EU countries over
the last decades. They all consider that a set of economic, political and institutional
factors play a very important role in the understanding of public deficits in industrial
democracies. However, the study of the determinants of excessive deficits remains
practically unexplored. For that reason, this study tries to contribute to the literature
by identifying the main causes of excessive deficits in a group of EU countries.
Estimating a conditional fixed effects logit model over a group of 15 EU
countries for the period 1970-2006, this study provides evidence that unfavourable
65 Nevertheless, this result must be analysed with a grain of salt because part of this positive effect can
be the result of some creative accounting. On this issue, see von Hagen and Wolff (2006).
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economic conditions, parliamentary elections and political instability, and majority
left-wing governments are important causes of excessive deficits in the EU countries,
where a deficit is considered excessive when it exceeds 3% of GDP.
The results also indicate that the institutional constraints imposed after
Maastricht over the EU countries’ fiscal policy have been important in reducing the
probability of excessive deficits in the EU, especially in small countries and in
countries traditionally characterised by a higher propensity to excessive deficits.
Moreover, empirical evidence does not indicate any significant erosion of the fiscal
efforts made by the EU countries after they have been accepted in the EMU.
A more detailed analysis of the results provided by this study shows that high
public debts are also linked with excessive deficits due to the increase in interest
payments, although there is some tentative evidence that huge debts can encourage
governments to take measures to correct excessive deficits. These excessive deficits
also tend to disappear when the economy is growing at a good pace.
Political variables represent another important group of determinants of the
probability of an excessive deficit. This study provides strong evidence of an
opportunistic behaviour of policymakers in election years. In fact, EU governments
try to influence macroeconomic outcomes before elections by running a loose fiscal
policy in order to increase their probability of re-election. Consequently, this
opportunistic behaviour generates a higher propensity for excessive deficits in
election years. This is the main political cause of excessive deficits in the EU area,
especially in countries that are not usually characterised by such fiscal disequilibria.
Evidence also suggests that it takes some time for new governments to control public
accounts after elections: results show that the probability of an excessive deficit is
reduced significantly only two years after the elections.
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This study also provides evidence that left oriented governments are the most
responsible for the opportunistic behaviour before elections, especially those with a
majority in parliament. However, a new result arises from our analysis: if a left
government is in a minority, its propensity for excessive deficits is significantly
reduced. This is the case because, given the spending reputation of left governments,
the other parties will be stringent in supporting minority-left government initiatives.
In sum, this chapter shows that the inclusion of political variables is important
to fully explain excessive deficits in the EU. Going a step forward relative to the
existing literature and using a different econometric approach, this study provides a
detailed analysis of the presence of political opportunism and partisan effects in that
context. Elections and majority left-wing governments are two important causes of
excessive deficits in the EU, a situation that remains well evident even after the
implementation of the EU fiscal constraints. Nevertheless, the evidence provided in
this study also emphasises that fiscal constraints are a necessary condition to avoid
excessive deficits in a monetary union without a centralized budget.
After analysing the causes of excessive deficits it would be interesting to
analyse what factors may condition their duration. Some countries are quick to
stabilize their public accounts, but others live with excessive deficits for a long time.
Is that because they have a particular preference for excessive deficits? Or, are they
unable to take the required measures to correct them? This issue remains unexplored
in the literature and represents an appealing opportunity for future research.
Finally, when more data becomes available, it might be worthwhile to extend
this study to the countries that have recently joined the EU. That task may possibly
bring some additional insights to the understanding of the efforts that they need to
make to control their public accounts towards a future adhesion to the Eurozone.
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Annex 3.1. Description of the variables and respective sources
Economic Variables:
Def3 – [dependent variable] dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the government budget
surplus (GBS) is lower than -3% of gross domestic product (GDP), and 0 otherwise. Source:
own computation from GBS.
GBS – general government budget surplus as a percentage of GDP at market prices (European
Commission excessive deficit procedure). Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO
database.
PrimGBS – primary (excluding interest) general government budget surplus as a percentage of GDP at
market prices (European Commission excessive deficit procedure). Source: European
Commission (2007), AMECO database.
PrimTExp – primary (excluding interest) general government total expenditure as percentage of GDP
at market prices (European Commission excessive deficit procedure). Source: European
Commission (2007), AMECO database.
TRevenue – general government total revenues as percentage of GDP at market prices (European
Commission excessive deficit procedure). Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO
database.
Debt – general government consolidated gross public debt as a percentage of GDP at market prices
(European Commission excessive deficit procedure). Source: European Commission
(2007), AMECO database.
Debt_sq – square of Debt (Debt2). Source: own computation from Debt.
GRGDP – annual growth of real GDP at price levels of 2000. Source: European Commission (2007),
AMECO database.
UR – unemployment rate (Eurostat definition). Source: European Commission (2007), AMECO
database.
RIR – real long-term interest rate (deflator: GDP). Source: European Commission (2007),
AMECO database.
Political variables:
GovParty – cabinet composition or political orientation of the government. GovParty = 1 (hegemony
of right-wing parties); 2 (dominance of right-wing parties); 3 (path between left and right);
4 (dominance of left-wing parties); 5 (hegemony of left-wing parties). There is hegemony
of left (right) parties in the government when the cabinet is totally composed by left (right)
wing parties; when the cabinet is not totally composed by left (right) parties but more than
66.6% are left (right) parties, then there is dominance of left (right) wing parties; finally,
when the government is composed by less than 66.6% of left (right) wing parties (but more
than 33.3%), then we are in presence of a centre government (path between left and right).
Sources: Armingeon et al (2005) for the period 1970-2004 and www.electionworld.org for
2005 and 2006.
Left – dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when GovParty is equal to 4 or 5, and 0 otherwise.
Source: own computation from GovParty.
%Right – percentage of right-wing parties in the cabinet. Sources: Armingeon et al (2005) for the
period 1970-2004 and www.electionworld.org for 2005 and 2006.
ElectYear – election year is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in years of general (parliamentary)
elections and 0 in non-election years. Sources: Armingeon et al (2005) for the period 1970-
2004 and www.electionworld.org for 2005 and 2006.
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PolCycle – dummy that takes the value of 1 in the first half of the political cycle of a government.
Source: own computation from ElectYear.
YrAfterElect, 2YrAfterElect, 3YrAfterElect – dummy variables that take the value of 1, respectively, in
the year, two years and three years after elections, and 0 otherwise. Source: own
computation from ElectYear.
NGovChg – number of changes in government per year due to elections, resignation of the Prime-
Minister, dissension within government, lack of parliamentary support, or intervention by
the head of state. Sources: Armingeon et al (2005) for the period 1970-2004 and
www.electionworld.org for 2005 and 2006.
GovType – type of government in office. GovType = 1 (majority single-party government); 2 (minimal
winning coalition); 3 (surplus coalition); 4 (single-party minority government); 5 (multi-
party minority government); 6 (caretaker government). Sources: Armingeon et al (2005) for
the period 1970-2004 and www.electionworld.org for 2005 and 2006.
MajSPGov – dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the government is formed by a single-
party with majority in the parliament (GovType=1), and 0 otherwise. Source: own
computation from GovType.
CoalGov – dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the government is formed by a coalition
with majority in the parliament (GovType equal to 2 or 3), and 0 otherwise. Source: own
computation from GovType.
MinGov – dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a minority government is in office, i.e. when
GovType is equal to 4, 5 or 6, and 0 if the (single-party or coalition) government has
majority in the parliament. Source: own computation from GovType.
NPartyGov – number of parties in the government. Sources: Woldendorp et al. (1998) for the period
1970-1995; The European Journal of Political Research (several annual issues of political
data: 1997-2006 – compiled by Richard Katz, Ruud Koole and Ingrid van Biezen) for the
period 1996-2005; The values for Greece, Portugal and Spain over the period 1973-1995
were collected from The Europa World Yearbook (1996) and The Statesman's Yearbook
(several issues from 1974 to 1997); and data for 2006 were obtained from
www.electionworld.org.
Control variables for the EU fiscal constraints:
D92 – dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the period 1992-2006, and 0 in the period 1970-
1991.
D99 – dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the period 1999-2006, and 0 in the period 1970-
1998.
D9298 – dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the period 1992-1998, and 0 over 1970-1991
and 1999-2006.
D9298t – time trend for the period 1992-1998; 0 otherwise.
D99t – time trend for the period 1999-2006; 0 otherwise.
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Annex 3.2. Descriptive statistics and the evolution of public deficits
in the EU countries
Table A.3.2.1. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimations
Variable No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Def3
GBS
PrimGBS
PrimTExp
TRevenue
Debt
Debt_sq
GRGDP
UR
RIR
Left
%Right
ElectYear
PolCycle
YrAfterElect
2YrAfterElect
3YrAfterElect
RSIndex
GovType
MajSPGov
CoalGov
MinGov
NPartyGov
D92
D99
D9298
D9298t
D99t
555
555
555
555
555
539
539
555
555
548
539
539
539
539
539
539
539
539
539
539
539
539
539
555
555
555
555
555
0.4036
-2.4665
1.4092
41.9796
43.4760
51.9280
3576.5970
2.9179
6.5052
2.6922
0.2783
30.9659
0.2876
0.4341
0.2839
0.2672
0.2319
2.5269
2.5269
0.2115
0.5584
0.2301
2.2839
0.4000
0.2162
0.1838
0.7568
0.9730
0.4911
4.2140
3.1846
7.8219
8.7091
29.6923
3769.5150
2.4555
3.7998
3.4641
0.4486
34.9878
0.4530
0.4961
0.4513
0.4429
0.4224
1.0686
1.2303
0.4088
0.4970
0.4213
1.3820
0.4903
0.4120
0.3877
1.7936
2.1389
0
-15.700
-7.400
18.400
21.300
4.100
16.810
-6.557
0.5
-10.900
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
7.800
11.600
66.700
62.800
133.400
17795.560
12.464
19.500
11.200
1
100
1
1
1
1
1
4
6
1
1
1
8
1
1
1
7
8
Sources: See Annex A.3.1.
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Figure A.3.2.1. Evolution of the government budget surplus (GBS) in the EU
countries, EU-area and the United States over the period 1970-2006
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Figure A.3.2.2. Number of times each EU country was in excessive deficit over
the period 1970-2006
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Figure A.3.2.3. Number of EU countries in excessive deficit by year: 1970-2006
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4. The duration of economic expansions and recessions:
More than duration dependence
4.1. Introduction
The notion that the economy evolves through periods of expansions and
recessions has its foundations in the works of Fisher (1925) and Burns and Mitchell
(1946). Expansions, contractions and their turning points were the central focus of
their studies: they were the first to analyse the mechanisms by which output
alternates between states of expansion and recession, and to study the effect of
duration on transition probabilities between those states. The issue of whether
business cycles are duration dependent – i.e. whether the likelihood of an expansion
or recession ending is dependent on its age – has gained special interest in the last
two decades, due to an increase in the average duration of expansions and a decrease
in the duration of recessions after World War II (WWII).
One widespread idea in the literature is that the older an expansion or a
recession is, the more likely it is to end. This is known as positive duration
dependence. Several papers using different methods – like parametric and non-
parametric duration models and Markov-switching models – have tried to provide
empirical support for this idea. Most have been successful in finding some evidence
of positive duration dependence for expansions and recessions. However, little
attention has been given to the potential effects of other factors. Even if duration
dependence is present, other underlying mechanisms can affect the likelihood of an
expansion or recession ending. Making an analogy with human beings (or the natural
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world in general), it is known that they have a higher propensity to die as they
become older (i.e. there is positive duration dependence), but we also know that
other factors may affect the likelihood of a person dying or her “duration”, like
smoking, diseases, stress, food, pollution, health care, etc. In that sense, this study
intends to shed more light on the analysis of the duration of business cycle phases by
looking at other factors that can affect the likelihood of an expansion or recession
ending, beyond its own length.
Some recent studies using Markov-switching approaches have found that
leading or coincident indices can be very useful in predicting the end of an expansion
or contraction.66 Like most studies in this field, they have focused almost exclusively
on the US business cycle. This study extends that analysis to a panel of industrial
countries, controlling not only for the effect of a composite leading indicator –
constructed by the OECD – but also for the effects of some of its components and
other potential explanatory factors. Two important components of this indicator will
be considered: the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates and the
stock market price index. A higher spread reflects the expectation of a future
improvement in economic performance, while stock prices are seen as a good
indicator of the future profitability of firms. As both contain information (or
expectations) about the future behaviour of the economy, they are potential
determinants of the duration of the business cycle phases.
Other factors, not considered in the composite leading indicator, will be taken
into account as well. For example, the idea raised by Zellner (1990) that the length of
the previous phase can have a significant impact on the duration of the next phase
will be tested. Another issue to analyse is the economic performance of the European
66 See Filardo (1994), Filardo and Gordon (1998), Kim and Nelson (1998), Di Venuto and Layton
(2005) and Layton and Smith (2007).
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Union (EU) countries after fiscal rules were imposed in Europe. Buti et al. (1997)
and Metz (2005) argue that those rules may have lengthened recessions in the EU
because countries are not allowed to run sufficiently large deficits to stimulate the
economy. This study will try to test whether this idea has any empirical support.
Additional variables, coming from different strands of the economic
literature, are also considered in this study. The economic growth literature considers
investment as an important determinant of economic growth. Both private investment
and government investment have a positive effect on GDP growth. Therefore, we
expect that these variables can help to explain the duration of business cycle phases
as well. The price of oil is another factor to be considered. Hamilton (1983, 2005)
shows that most of the US recessions after WWII were preceded by increases in its
price. This suggests that the duration of expansions can be affected by oil price
shocks. Thus, another aim of this chapter is to verify whether that conjecture is
confirmed by the data or not. External influences are also controlled for in this study,
in particular the spillover effects of the US business cycle on the other economies.
This study also analyses whether political conditionings may affect the duration of
the business cycle phases. The last issue considered in this chapter is whether the
great moderation in output volatility registered in the last two to three decades has
affected the duration of expansions and contractions.
Duration models will be used in the analysis of the determinants of the
duration of expansions and contractions. To our knowledge, this is the first time that
these models have been used to test simultaneously for duration dependence and for
the effect of the factors mentioned above on the likelihood of an expansion or
contraction ending. This kind of model has already been used to test essentially for
duration dependence in the US business cycle phases. This has been the case because
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their turning-point dates have been well documented by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) for a long time. As the Economic Cycle Research
Institute (ECRI) has recently built similar chronologies for other countries, a new
branch of research is open for exploration using duration analysis instead of
stochastic Markov-switching processes. The main aim of this chapter is to explore
that data applying, for the first time, discrete-time duration methods to analyse the
issue of duration dependence for expansions and contractions.
Using a duration analysis this study intends to find empirical answers to the
following questions: (a) Is positive duration dependence really present in expansions
and/or contractions in industrial countries? (b) Are there other factors that can affect
the likelihood of an expansion or contraction ending? (c) What are those factors?
Unveiling a little the results of this study, we can say that evidence of positive
duration dependence is found for both expansions and contractions in a group of
industrial countries. The duration of expansions in those countries is linked to the
behaviour of the variables in the OECD composite leading indicator and it is also
affected by private investment, the price of oil and peaks in the US economy. The
duration of contractions is essentially explained by the duration of the previous
phase. Regarding the recent behaviour of the EU business cycle, our evidence does
not support the idea that fiscal rules may have lengthened recessions in the EU
countries. The political factors did not prove to be important in explaining the
duration of the business cycle phases. Finally, the evidence and magnitude of the
duration dependence are not significantly affected during the period of great
moderation in output volatility, except in the US.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a
review of the literature on business cycle duration dependence. The data and main
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hypotheses to test are presented in Section 4.3, as well as the econometric model and
the empirical results. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes emphasizing the main findings
and offering some suggestions for future research.
4.2. Literature on the duration of business cycles
The literature on the duration of business cycles has largely focused on
finding an answer to the question: “Are periods of expansion or contraction in
economic activity more likely to end as they become older? More technically, do
business cycles exhibit positive duration dependence?” (Sichel, 1991, p. 254).67
Several authors have tried to answer this question using either (parametric and non-
parametric) duration models or Markov-switching models. Traditionally, far more
interest has been given to the United States business cycle because their turning dates
are well documented by the NBER. Nevertheless, other industrial countries – like,
for example, France, Germany and the United Kingdom – have also been under the
scope of some of those studies.
Non-parametric procedures to test for business cycle duration dependence
have not been very successful in finding evidence of duration dependence for
economic expansions and contractions.68 On the other hand, parametric duration
models have proved to be more reliable in detecting its presence. According to Sichel
(1991), one important advantage of the parametric approach is the fact that
parametric techniques have higher power for detecting duration dependence than
non-parametric methods. In fact, the small size of the samples for business cycles
67 This question is not entirely new. Fisher (1925) had already raised the issue of whether the
probability of exiting any phase of the cycle is constant.
68 See, for example, Diebold and Rudebusch (1990), Diebold et al. (1990), Mudambi and Taylor
(1995), Mills (2001) and Ohn et al. (2004), among others.
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may impair the power of the non-parametric tests, making it difficult to detect
duration dependence when it exists. Parametric techniques also make it possible to
compute estimates of the magnitude of the duration dependence. Another advantage
is that they permit testing for additional hypotheses by extending the basic model.
Using a continuous-time Weibull duration model and the NBER monthly
chronology for the United States from 1854 to 1990, Sichel (1991) finds significant
evidence of positive duration dependence for pre-WWII expansions and post-WWII
contractions, but not for the other phases. Diebold et al. (1990) also use a Weibull
model to test for duration dependence in France, Germany and United Kingdom in
the pre-WWII period and reach the same conclusion as Sichel (1991) for that period.
Some authors attempt to apply more flexible continuous-time parametric
methods to test for duration dependence. For example, Diebold et al. (1993) employ
an exponential-quadratic hazard model to business cycle data and essentially
reproduce the results obtained by Sichel’s (1991). Using a generalized Weibull
model, that nests the simple Weibull model, Zuehlke (2003) finds some additional
evidence of duration dependence in pre-WWII US contractions, but his model does
not improve significantly upon Sichel’s (1991) Weibull model in the other cases.
Abderrezak (1998) also uses parametric hazard models to analyse the issue of
duration dependence in eleven industrial countries. Instead of considering classical
business cycles, this author uses growth cycles.69 Results from individual-country
69 For a long period of time after WWII it was difficult to identify contractions in some European
countries, so some economists in the 1960s thought that the classical business cycles might be coming
to an end. Thus, they started to pay more attention to the increases and decreases in growth rates: so-
called growth cycles. The contractions in the 1970s and in the following decades proved that classical
business cycles are not dead and that they deserve to be deeply analysed for policy purposes. Even so,
some economists are still using growth cycles as an alternative way of studying business cycles.
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and pooled regressions show evidence of positive duration dependence in both the
whole growth cycles and growth phases (upswings and downswings).
Another strand of the literature has modelled the business cycle as the
outcome of a Markov process that switches between two discrete states: expansions
and recessions. Contrary to the approaches described above, this method regards the
business cycle as an unobserved stochastic process, so that the reference cycle
turning-point dates identified by the NBER or the ECRI are not necessary. Hamilton
(1989) was the pioneer of this kind of analysis. His model assumes that the
likelihood of a country switching from an expansion to a recession (or vice-versa) is
not affected by its own duration. However, some later studies relaxed this
assumption allowing for state transition probabilities to be duration dependent.
Durland and McCurdy (1994) were the first to apply such a refinement using real
GNP growth rate series for the US. They provide evidence of duration dependence
for recessions but not for expansions after WWII. A similar result is obtained by Kim
and Nelson (1998) applying a Bayesian approach to a dynamic factor model and
using a new coincident index for the US economy.70 Lam (2004) extends Durland
and McCurdy’s (1994) model allowing for: (i) duration dependence not only in
transition probabilities but also in mean growth rates; and (ii) heteroscedasticity in
the noise component. The main conclusion of this study is that the probability of an
expansion ending decreases gradually as the expansion ages, while the probability of
contractions ending increases rapidly as the contraction ages.71
70 Also using a Bayesian approach, Iiboshi (2007) finds evidence of positive duration dependence for
Japanese expansions and contractions.
71 Other authors use Markov-switching models to analyse the business cycle but without controlling
for duration dependence. For example, Filardo (1994) and Filardo and Gordon (1998) specify time-
varying transition probabilities only as a function of an exogenous variable: a leading of index
indicators.
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Recently, other econometric models have been applied to the study of
business cycle dynamics. Di Venuto and Layton (2005) and Layton and Smith (2007)
develop a multinomial regime switching logit model to examine the issue of duration
dependence in Australian and US business cycles, respectively. As this regime-
switching framework models the transition probabilities assuming the ex-post
observability of business cycle phases, ECRI and NBER chronologies of the business
cycle are used in this analysis. Besides controlling for duration dependence, the
model also incorporates movements in some leading indices as explanatory variables.
Their findings provide evidence of positive duration dependence for both expansions
and contractions and their indicators also show some power in predicting the
termination of either phase.
Other papers – not directly concerned with the duration dependency issue –
have tried to evaluate the predictive power of binomial models (probits and logits)
and some economic indicators in forecasting business cycles. Dueker (1997), Estrella
and Mishkin (1998), Chauvet and Potter (2005) and Moneta (2005) use probit
models to quantify the predictive power of some financial indicators such as interest
rate spreads and stock prices. They show that in some cases these variables can
perform better than leading indicators in predicting economic recessions in the US
and in the Euro-area.72 Nevertheless, none of these works undertake a duration
analysis; they simply test the effect of those variables on the probability of a
recession in order to analyse their (out-of-sample) predictive power. Contrary to
these studies, the aim of this study is not to analyse or to predict the timing of
recessions but the factors that affect the duration of expansions and recessions. In
that sense, this study tests simultaneously for the presence of duration dependence
72 Also using binomial models and some financial and leading indicators, Sensier et al. (2004) find
evidence of international influences on the prediction of recessions in some EU countries.
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and for the effect of some economic and political variables on the likelihood of an
expansion or contraction ending.
As explained above, the studies that implement duration models in the
analysis of business cycles only test for duration dependence. Hence, the inclusion of
other exogenous variables in that framework represents an extension relative to the
previous studies. As some of those variables are time-varying and available only on a
periodic basis, we decided to use – for the first time in this kind of analysis – a
discrete-time duration model instead of a continuous-time model. Finally, as the
ECRI provides business cycle turning-points for a group of market-oriented
economies we can now, not only employ duration models instead of Markov-
switching models, but also enlarge the study to a panel of industrial countries instead
of focusing the analysis exclusively on the US business cycle.
4.3. Empirical analysis
This section provides an empirical analysis of the causes of the end of
expansions and contractions. We start by describing the data and the hypotheses to
test. The econometric model is presented next. This section concludes with an
analysis of the results.
4.3.1. Data and hypotheses to test
The data used in duration analysis consist of spells. In this study, a spell
represents the number of periods during which a country is in either an expansion or
a contraction. An expansionary spell ends when a business cycle peak is reached
whilst a trough in the business cycle indicates the end of a contraction. Therefore, to
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identify the sequence of these spells over time for a particular country we need to
find the peaks and troughs in economic activity. There are several ways of
identifying those turning points, like the – already mentioned – NBER and ECRI
approaches and Markov-switching models or even the Bry and Boschan (1971)
algorithm and GDP growth rules.
In this study, we use the monthly business cycle phase chronology elaborated
by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee for the US economy and a similar
chronology elaborated recently by the ECRI for 20 market-oriented economies for
the period 1948-2006.73 From those 20 countries, we selected for this analysis all the
EU countries for which this institute reports data on the business cycle turning
points: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Additionally, we also collected data for the other OECD countries (but non-EU
members) for which the ECRI reports data: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand,
Switzerland and the US. Therefore, this study will analyse a sample of 13 industrial
countries.
The ECRI uses the same methodology as the NBER to establish the business
cycle dates for these countries. These chronologies represent a set of reference dates
– peaks or ends of expansions and troughs or end of contractions – which is agreed
upon by a group of experts at either the NBER or the ECRI and based on a system of
monthly indicators measuring economic performance. The most important are: real
73 NBER chronology has been widely used in the literature to examine duration dependence for
United States expansions and recessions. On the contrary, due to its recent conception, ECRI
chronology provides a new field of data to explore.
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personal income, employment, industrial production, sales and monthly estimates of
real GDP.74
This study considers that a chronology determined by a committee of experts,
using a large range of macroeconomic indicators and employing a consistent
methodology, is likely to be superior to a method that regards the business cycle as
an unobserved stochastic process and that uses a single cycle variable such as GDP,
GNP or industrial production to infer the state of the business cycle at a particular
moment in time – as is the case when Markov-switching models are used. In the
words of Di Venuto and Layton (2005, p. 292), “adopting a single measure of the
business cycle fails to capture the many activities that constitute the complex
phenomena that is the business cycle.”75 Moreover, using a Markov-switching model
over a unique series is more like studying growth cycles than classical business
cycles. Thus, the results from a Markov-switching model seem to be better suited to
forecast output growth rates than to detect effective business cycles or to evaluate the
causes of an expansion or contraction ending. Finally, authors employing Markov-
switching models measure the ability and quality of their approach in predicting
business cycles turning points (and duration dependence) by comparing their results
with the NBER chronology. Since they make such comparisons, they are giving
74 For more details on the methodologies and chronologies see http://www.nber.org/cycles/main.html
and http://www.businesscycle.com/resources/cycles/. The business cycle chronologies for the
countries considered in this analysis are presented in Annex (see Table A.4.1.1), which also reports a
complete description of the business cycle variables that can be extracted from those chronologies (see
Table A.4.1.2).
75 As already mentioned, besides Markov-switching models, other methodologies could be used to
identify the business cycle chronology, such as the rule that considers a recession when the growth of
real GDP is negative for two consecutive quarters or more, or the chronology resulting from the
application of Bry and Boschan (1971) algorithm to this series. But, these methodologies also rely
exclusively on the analysis of a single economic indicator, which may not be enough to provide all the
necessary information to capture an effective economic cycle or the real swings in economic activity.
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credibility to the work of the NBER Committee. Hence, this study assumes that the
dates provided by the NBER for the US and by the ECRI – employing the same
methodology as the NBER for other countries – are very reliable.
Given those reasons, we opt for studying the duration of business cycle
phases using NBER and ECRI chronologies. In fact, the aim of this study is not to fit
a model for predicting turning points but to find real causes for the duration of an
expansion or a contraction. Thus, beyond testing just for duration dependence, this
study also tests for the impact of other factors on the likelihood of an expansion and
contraction ending.
A complete description of the variables used in this study and their respective
sources is provided in Annex (see Table A.4.1.2). Due to the unavailability or weak
quality of monthly data for some exogenous variables, quarterly data were collected
for the 13 countries indicated above covering the period from the first quarter of
1965 to the fourth quarter of 2006. The dependent variables (Peak – for the analysis
of the duration of expansions – and Trough – for the analysis of duration of
contractions) take the value of 1 in the quarter that includes the month for which the
ECRI has identified a turning point (peak or trough), and 0 otherwise.76 The variable
that measures the duration (Dur) of any of the spells (expansions or contractions) is
also measured in quarters and plays an important role in detecting the presence of
duration dependence. According to the literature, we expect to find empirical
evidence of positive duration dependence for both expansions and contractions.
However, not only evidence of positive duration dependence is expected.
Some economic indicators are believed to lead economic activity and hence provide
a good indication of the future phases of the business cycle. Composite indices that
76 Note that a peak corresponds to the final quarter of expansion and a trough corresponds to the final
quarter of contraction.
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incorporate information from a number of different leading indicators and variables
have been recently used in some studies to predict phase changes in the business
cycle. Some examples are the studies by Filardo (1994), Filardo and Gordon (1998)
and Kim and Nelson (1998) for the US using a Markov-switching model and the
studies by Di Venuto and Layton (2005) and Layton and Smith (2007) for Australia
and the US using a multinomial regime-switching model. They find that leading
indicators are important in explaining the transition probabilities between expansions
and contractions and that those indicators tend to improve the quality and predictive
power of the model. Thus, the first economic variable to be included in our model is
a leading indicator, or more precisely a composite leading indicator. As this variable
contains information on the expected future behaviour of the economy, we can
regard this as the component vt in our analytical framework. Therefore, we expect
that an improvement in this indicator affects negatively (positively) the likelihood of
an expansion (contraction) ending. The annualized 6-month rate of change in the
composite leading indicator (CLI) provided by the OECD Main Economic Indicators
is used in this study to capture the effects of a composite of economic variables on
the likelihood of a phase change.77
77 Some of the series used by the OECD to compute the composite leading indicator for the majority
of countries are: the spread of interest rates, share prices, consumer and business confidence
indicators, order books, stocks and labour market indicators. The component series for each country
are selected based on the following criteria: economic significance, cyclical behaviour, data quality,
timeliness and availability. For further details on the components of this composite indicator for each
country and on the methodology used to compute it check the OECD at www.oecd.org/std/cli. We use
the annualized 6-month rate of this indicator because, according to the OECD, it is less volatile and
tends to provide earlier and clearer signals for future economic performance than the composite
leading indicator itself.
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Regarding the good performance presented by two of its components –
interest rate spreads and stock prices – in predicting economic recessions,78 we also
analyse their effects on the duration of expansions and contractions. The interest rate
spread reflects expectations about the economic impact of movements in interest
rates, whilst stock price indices reflect the expected discounted values of future
dividend payments. To collect their effects, we use the interest rate spread between
long-term interest rate on government bonds and short-term interest rates (Spread)
and the quarterly growth rate of the stock price index (Stock). We expect them to be
positively (negatively) correlated with the duration of an expansion (contraction).
Other factors, not considered in the composite leading indicator, will be also
taken into account. The next hypothesis to test is whether the duration of the previous
business cycle phase (DurPrev) affects the length of the current phase. This issue
was already raised and analysed by Zellner (1990), Sichel (1991) and Abderrezak
(1998). Zellner (1990) theorizes that the solid fundamentals resulting from longer
expansions may affect the duration of the following contraction. The evidence
provided by this author shows that shorter contractions tend to follow longer
expansions in the pre-WWII business cycle data for the US. However, neither Sichel
(1991) nor Abderrezak (1998) were able to find any significant evidence for this link.
Given this mixed evidence, we hope to provide further evidence on this issue.
The economic growth literature shows that private investment, in particular,
has a significant positive effect on economic growth. This is the case because
investment is affected by ‘animal spirits’, i.e. if economic agents expect economic
activity to slow, investment may indeed slowdown fulfilling that expectation.
Regarding this evidence, we expect that when private investment is boosted,
78 See Dueker (1997), Estrella and Mishkin (1998), Chauvet and Potter (2005) and Moneta (2005).
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expansions tend to last longer and recessions tend to be shorter. To investigate this
effect we use the growth rate of real private total fixed capital formation (GPInv).
Traditionally, Keynesian economists consider that government expenditures
are important to stimulate the economy. However, recent studies on economic
growth have shown that not all components of government expenditures have that
positive effect. In Chapter 2 we show that while public investment is able to
stimulate economic activity, unproductive public expenditures like current
government consumption are negatively related to output growth (see also Kneller et
al., 1999 and Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001). Hence, we conjecture that the higher
public investment is relative to public consumption, the lower (higher) will be the
probability of an expansion (contraction) ending. The ratio between government
fixed capital formation and government final consumption expenditure (GovI/C) is
used in this study to account for that effect.79
On the supply side, the price of oil is another variable to be taken into
account. Hamilton (1983, 2005) shows that most of the US recessions after WWII
were preceded by increases in its price and Barsky and Kilian (2004) provide some
reasons for a negative relation between the price of oil and output growth. The RBC
literature also recognizes that energy price increases have a negative impact on
economic activity (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1996 and Finn, 2000). Regarding the
arguments advanced by these studies, we expect that the likelihood of an expansion
ending may increase with an increase in the price of oil. The oil import price deflated
79 The ratio of government investment to GDP could instead be used, but the fact that this variable is
divided by a variable that reflects greatly the business cycle itself could bias the results. Another
alternative would be to divide it by total expenditure, but the lack of quarterly data for that series for
some of the countries impeded us from proceeding in that way.
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to real values by the GDP deflators of each country (OilPr) is used in this study to
test for this conjecture.80
Sensier et al. (2004) have shown that international influences can affect the
predictions of recessions in some EU countries. To control for those potential
influences, we add to our equation a variable (or proxy for the international business
cycle) that takes the value of 1 when the US economy reaches a peak (PeakUS) – in
the case of expansions – or a trough (TroughUS) – in the case of contractions.
Another different issue to analyse is whether there is any relation between the
political conditionings and the business cycle. According to the political business
cycles literature (see Alesina et al., 1997), policymakers tend to stimulate the
economy before elections as a way of affecting the electoral outcome. This literature
also emphasizes the idea that left-wing governments are more concerned in
promoting economic growth than right-wing parties. In a study for the US economy,
Klein (1996) analyses whether these political factors can also be useful in explaining
the occurrence of a business cycle turning point. His analysis provides some
evidence of political opportunism and ideological effects. To control for those
effects, we add the following variables to our equation: a political cycle indicator
(PolCycle), which measures the proportion of the government term in office that
elapses at each quarter; and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a left-
wing government is in office during the last year (GovLeft). Our expectation is that
the probability of an expansion (contraction) ending decreases (increases) as an
election is approaching or when a left-wing party is in office.
80 The base year is 2000. The oil price was first converted to each national currency using period
average nominal exchange rates with the US dollar and then divided by the respective GDP deflators.
To make these values comparable between countries, the real oil price is converted again to US
dollars at the average exchange rate of 2000. This is equivalent to divide the oil price by the GDP
deflator in dollars.
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To complete the group of hypotheses to test, this study checks whether the
fiscal rules imposed by the Maastricht and Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have
affected the economic performance of the European Union (EU) countries. Buti et al.
(1997) and Metz (2005) argue that there is a risk that those rules generate longer
recessions in the EU because those countries are not allowed to run sufficiently large
deficits to stimulate the economy. A simple way of controlling for the effects of
those rules on the duration of expansions and contractions in the EU is by including a
dummy variable that takes value 1 in the Maastricht and/or SGP periods for the
group of EU countries.
4.3.2. Duration models
Duration analysis has been widely used in labour economics to study the
duration of periods of unemployment.81 Due to its properties, this kind of analysis is
also suitable for studying the duration of expansions and contractions.82
The duration variable is defined as the number of periods – quarters in this
study – that a country is in a state of expansion or contraction, depending on which
phase is being analysed. If we define T as the discrete random variable that measures
the time span between the beginning of an expansion (contraction) and its transition
to the other state, the series of data at our disposal (t1, t2,…, tn) will represent the
observed durations of each episode of expansion (contraction). The probability
distribution of the duration variable T can be specified by the cumulative distribution
function: F(t)=Pr(T<t), which measures the probability of the random variable T
being smaller than a certain value t. The corresponding density function is then:
81 See Allison (1982) and Kiefer (1988) for a review of the literature on duration analysis. The
description of the duration models used in this study follows the works of those authors.
82 For more details, see Section 4.2.
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f(t)=dF(t)/dt. An alternative function to specify the distribution of T is the survivor
function, which is obtained as: S(t)=Pr(T≥t)=1-F(t). This function gives the
probability that the duration of an expansion (contraction) is greater than or equal to
t. A particularly useful function for duration analysis is the hazard function,
h(t)=f(t)/S(t), which measures the rate at which expansion (contraction) spells will be
completed at duration t, given that they last until that moment. Or in other words, it
measures the probability of exiting from a state in moment t conditional on the length
of time in that state. From the hazard function we can derive the integrated hazard
function, duuhtH
t
)()( 0 , and then compute the survivor function as follows:
S(t)=e-H(t).
The hazard function is very useful to characterize the dependence path of
duration. If dh(t)/dt>0 when t=t*, then there is positive duration dependence in t*.
This means that the probability of an expansion (contraction) ending in moment t,
given that it has reached t, increases with its age. Thus, the longer the expansion
(contraction) is, the higher will be the conditional probability of it ending or reaching
a peak (trough). An opposite conclusion is reached if the derivative is negative.
There will be no duration dependence if the derivative is equal to zero.
The hazard function can be estimated by parametric and non-parametric
methods. However, the non-parametric analysis is very limited because: on the one
hand, it is not able to provide estimates of the magnitude of the duration dependence
when it really exists; and, on the other hand, it does not take into account other
variables that can influence the duration of an expansion or recession. In order to
avoid this problem, parametric models are proposed to measure the degree of
duration dependence and the impact of other variables on the likelihood of an
expansion or recession ending.
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Some parametric continuous-time duration models have been employed in
previous studies on this issue.83 The functional form that has been used to
characterize and parameterize the hazard function is the so-called proportional
hazards model:84
xβx '0 )(),( ethth  , (4.1)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function that captures the dependency of the data to
duration, β is a K×1 vector of parameters to be estimated and x is a vector of
covariates. The baseline hazard also represents an unknown parameter to be
estimated. This model can be estimated without imposing any specific functional
form to the baseline hazard function, which results in the so-called Cox Model.
However, this procedure is not adequate when we study duration dependence. An
alternative estimation imposes one specific parametric form for the function h0(t).
The most popular model in the study of the duration of expansions and recessions is
the Weibull model, where h0(t)=γptp-1, with γ>0 and p>0. In this hazard function, γ is
essentially a constant term and p parameterizes duration dependence. If p>1, the
conditional probability of a turning point occurring increases as the phase gets older,
i.e. there is positive duration dependence; if p<1 there is negative duration
dependence; finally, there is no duration dependence if p=1. In this last case, the
Weibull model is equal to an Exponential model. Therefore, by estimating p, we can
test for duration dependence in expansions or contractions. This model can be
83 See Sichel (1991), Diebold et al. (1990), Diebold et al. (1993), Abderrezak (1998) and Zuehlke
(2003).
84 This means that the ratio of the hazard rates for any two observations is constant over time.
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estimated by Maximum Likelihood and the corresponding log-likelihood function for
a sample of i=1,…,n spells (expansions or contractions) can be written as follows:85
 


n
i
iiiii tSthcL
1
),(ln),(lnln xx , (4.2)
where ci indicates when observations are censored. They are censored (ci=0) if the
sample period under analysis ends before we observe the turning point; when the
turning points are observed in the sample period they are not censored (ci=1).
This is the kind of continuous-time duration model that is usually employed
in the parametric analysis of duration dependence for expansions and recessions.
Nevertheless, these may not be the most adequate models to use in this context.
Although the life of an expansion or recession is a continuous-time process, available
data are inherently discrete (months or quarters). Allison (1982, p.70) states that
when those “discrete units are very small, relative to the rate of event occurrence, it
is usually acceptable to ignore the discreteness and treat time as if it was measured
continuously. [However,] when the time units are very large – months, quarters,
years, or decades – this treatment becomes problematic.”86 Therefore, discrete-time
methods are more adequate for the analysis of the duration of expansions and
contractions because the available data are always grouped in large discrete-time
intervals.87 Finally, discrete-time duration models have also the advantage of making
very easy the inclusion of time-varying covariates in their framework to test for
additional hypotheses. For those reasons, this study employs, for the first time,
85 See Allison (1982) and Kiefer (1988) for details.
86 Allison (1982, p. 70).
87 In their non-parametric analysis for duration dependence, Mudambi and Taylor (1995) and Ohn et
al. (2004) have already emphasized their preference for a discrete-time approach because the turning
points for economic cycles are usually collected and reported at discrete-time intervals.
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parametric discrete-time duration models in the study of duration of expansions and
contractions for some industrial countries.
To implement discrete-time methods, we can start with a continuous-time
model – the proportional hazards model is a sensible choice – and then derive
appropriate estimators for data grouped in intervals. A discrete-time (grouped data)
version of the proportional hazards model was developed by Prentice and Gloeckler
(1978).88 First, it is assumed that time can only take integer values (t=1, 2, 3,…) and
that we observe n independent expansions or contractions (i=1, 2,…,n) beginning at a
starting point t=1. The observation continues until time ti, at which point either an
event occurs or the observation is censored. Censoring means that the event is
observed at ti but not at ti+1. A vector of explanatory variables xit is also observed
and can take different values at different moments in time. The discrete-time hazard
rate can then be defined as follows:
 itiiit tTtTP x,|Pr  , (4.3)
where T is the discrete random variable representing the uncensored time at which
the end of an expansion (contraction) occurs. This measures the conditional
probability of expansion (contraction) i ending at time t, given that it has not ended
yet. Assuming that the data are really generated by the continuous-time proportional
hazard model (4.1), Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) show that the corresponding
discrete-time proportional hazard function can be given by:
  ittit
eeh
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

, (4.4)
88 These models are analysed in detail by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), Allison (1982), Kiefer (1988)
and Jenkins (1995), upon which this part is based.
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which is equivalent to the so-called complementary log-log (or cloglog) function,
where θt (=lnht) represents the logarithm of an unspecified (baseline hazard) function
of time and the coefficient vector (β) is identical to the one in the continuous-time
proportional hazards model (4.1). This means that the estimated discrete-time
coefficients based on (4.4) are also the estimates of the underlying continuous-time
model and the coefficient vector is invariant to the length of the time intervals.
The last thing to do before proceeding to the estimation of the model is to
specify θt. There are several alternative specifications but, given the purpose of this
study and to facilitate comparisons with the previous studies, we will consider the
discrete-time analogue to the Weibull model for the hazard function (ht), which
yields: tqhtt lnln   , where q, in this discrete-time case, corresponds
(approximately) to p-1 in the continuous-time Weibull model.89
Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Allison (1982) show that discrete-time
log-likelihood function for a sample of i=1,…,n spells can be written as follows:
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where the dummy variable yit is equal to 1 if spell i (expansion or contraction) ends at
time t and 0 otherwise. Hence, this function is the log-likelihood for the regression
analysis of binary dependent variables. Substituting Pij by (4.4) and using the
adequate specification for the baseline hazard function, the model can be estimated.
89 Note that lnht=α+qlnt ≈ ln(γptp-1), where α≈ln(γp) and q≈p-1; the higher is the frequency of the
discrete-time series, the closer is q from p-1. Note also that other specifications could be considered:
(i) linear in time (θt=α0+ α1t); (ii) polynomial in time (θt=α0+ α1t+α22t+…); (iii) piece-wise dummies
– one for each particular sub-period of time – where the hazard rate is assumed to be the same within
each time-group but different between those groups (θt=α0+ α1d1+α2d2+…); (iv) or, when possible, a
fully non-parametric specification with one dummy for each value of t for which an event is reported.
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4.3.3. Empirical results
The empirical results obtained from the duration analysis of the expansion
and contraction episodes that have taken place in a group of industrial countries over
the last fifty years are presented in this section. Some descriptive statistics for the
duration of expansions and contractions in the sample of 13 industrial countries over
the period 1948-2006 are reported in Table 4.1.
The number of spells of expansions and contractions is presented first,
followed by the respective mean durations (in quarters). In general, expansions last
four to five times longer than contractions. A more detailed analysis shows that the
duration of expansions is higher, on average, in the group of EU countries than in the
group of non-EU countries, but recessions also tend to last longer in the first group
than in the second. This finding is also evident in Figure 4.1, where the distribution
of the duration of expansions and contractions in the EU and non-EU countries is
depicted. The flatter distribution of the duration of contractions for the EU countries
in comparison with the one for non-EU countries is a good indicator of that fact.
Nevertheless, Table 4.1 also shows that after 1992 and, especially, after 1997
the average duration of contractions in the EU countries has decreased substantially,
being even lower than in the group of non-EU countries. This simple analysis seems
to indicate that the idea advanced by Buti et al. (1997) and Metz (2005) that
Maastricht and more particularly the SGP may have lengthened recessions in the EU
– because countries cannot run sufficiently large deficits to stimulate the economy –
may not have any empirical support.90
90 Further empirical evidence on this idea is given below in the parametric duration analysis.
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Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics by country, 1948-2006
Duration of Expansions Duration of Contractions
Country No. Exp. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. No. Cont. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Austria 6 25.8 15.4 8 51 5 5.0 3.9 3 12
France 7 26.4 17.9 8 61 6 5.2 2.8 3 10
Germany 6 31.5 21.5 13 73 5 9.4 3.0 5 13
Italy 6 29.0 14.3 11 52 5 6.0 3.7 3 12
Spain 3 42.3 11.2 30 52 2 12.5 6.4 8 17
Sweden 5 22.6 18.8 8 53 4 9.8 4.3 4 13
United Kingdom 4 49.5 31.3 15 88 4 6.5 1.7 4 8
EU countries 37 30.8 19.4 8 88 31 7.2 3.9 3 17
EU (<1992) 23 29.8 21.1 8 88 20 7.3 4.1 3 17
EU (≥1992) 14 32.5 16.6 8 59 11 7.0 3.7 3 13
EU (≥1997) 10 34.6 18.0 13 59 3 5.3 4.0 3 10
Australia 7 30.3 18.5 13 60 6 4.0 1.3 3 6
Canada 5 42.6 33.5 10 93 4 5.8 1.7 4 8
Japan 5 35.2 34.4 4 76 5 8.0 2.1 5 10
New Zealand 8 17.0 11.1 2 34 7 6.3 5.8 2 19
Switzerland 6 27.0 23.9 5 73 5 8.4 3.4 5 14
United States 11 19.1 11.6 4 40 10 3.4 1.1 2 5
non-EU countries 42 26.4 21.8 2 93 37 5.6 3.5 2 19
non-EU (<1992) 29 25.2 22.0 2 93 28 4.9 3.2 2 19
non-EU (≥1992) 13 29.0 21.8 4 69 9 7.7 3.6 2 14
non-EU (≥1997) 11 27.5 18.7 4 60 5 6.6 3.8 2 10
All countries 79 28.5 20.7 2 93 68 6.3 3.7 2 19
Notes: See Table A.4.1.1 in Annex. The duration of expansions and contractions is measured in quarters.
Sources: NBER website at http://www.nber.org/cycles/main.html, updated in April 2007;
ECRI website at http://www.businesscycle.com/resources/cycles/, updated in April 2007.
Figure 4.1. Distribution of the duration of expansions and
contractions: EU and non-EU countries
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Sources: See Table 4.1.
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Table 4.2 presents the results of some basic parametric estimations for
duration dependence for each of the EU countries and a pooled regression with all
EU countries. These regressions do not control for any other exogenous variables.
Table 4.3 does the same for non-EU countries and includes an additional pooled
regression with all EU and non-EU countries. Two types of duration models are
considered in this first parametric analysis: a continuous-time Weibull model and a
discrete-time complementary log-log (cloglog) model. The results from the Weibull
model are reported to make possible the comparison with the previous studies on
duration dependence, especially with the studies for the US. To our knowledge, no
other study has yet provided an analysis of duration dependence for other industrial
countries over the period after WWII using parametric duration models and classical
business cycles. Moreover, this is the first study that uses discrete-time duration
methods to analyse the issue of duration dependence for expansions and
contractions.91
As noticed in the previous section, in the discrete-time model we assume the
following specification for the log of the baseline hazard function: tqt ln ,
where the estimate of q will correspond (approximately) to the estimate of p-1 in the
continuous-time Weibull model. For comparative purposes, it is the estimate of p that
is reported for both models. This will measure the magnitude of the duration
dependence.
91 The reasons why this study uses discrete-time duration models were explained in the previous
section.
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Table 4.2. Basic parametric estimations for duration dependence by country:
EU countries
Expansions Contractions
Constant p Constant p
Austria Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-6.953
(2.317)
2.002
(0.574)
[0.814]
-2.776
(0.393)
1.602
(0.148)
[1.146]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-6.258
(2.188)
2.001
(0.688)
[1.418]
-2.143
(0.744)
1.506
(0.426)
[0.429]
France Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-6.476
(1.687)
1.850
(0.429)
[0.654]
-3.884
(0.936)
2.194+,c
(0.403)
[0.601]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-5.858
(1.616)
1.849
(0.495)
[0.578]
-3.048
(0.951)
2.167
(0.568)
[0.712]
Germany Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-7.499
(0.968)
2.023
(0.266)
[1.399]
-9.579
(4.237)
4.091+,i
(1.645)
[1.706]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-6.801
(3.651)
2.024+,c
(0.422)
[0.553]
-8.175
(3.651)
4.097+,c
(1.642)
[2.296]
Italy Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-7.021
(2.293)
1.978
(0.346)
[0.948]
-3.807
(0.868)
1.982
(0.316)
[0.977]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-6.282
(1.583)
1.957
(0.498)
[0.608]
-3.059
(0.996)
1.948
(0.542)
[0.728]
Spain Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-15.07
(7.836)
3.855
(2.059)
[2.082]
-8.412
(5.941)
3.183
(1.844)
[n.a.]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-13.43
(5.701)
3.771
(1.572)
[3.030]
-7.255
(4.551)
2.184
(1.816)
[1.104]
Sweden Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-3.891
(0.934)
1.162
(0.357)
[0.737]
-7.401
(4.972)
3.094
(1.849)
[1.772]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-3.585
(0.838)
1.104
(0.261)
[0.414]
-6.267
(3.857)
3.093
(1.740)
[2.709]
United
Kingdom
Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-6.876
(3.145)
1.650
(0.649)
[0.694]
-11.46
(8.142)
5.860
(3.904)
[3.163]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-6.352
(2.923)
1.642
(0.798)
[0.855]
-9.605
(6.123)
5.831+,i
(3.274)
[1.619]
Pooling:
EU countries
Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
-7.182
(0.868)
1.800+,c
(0.190)
-4.508
(0.534)
2.365+,i
(0.232)
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
-6.752
(0.915)
1.791+,c
(0.215)
-5.280
(0.969)
2.356+,c
(0.313)
Notes: Robust standard errors (Rob. S.E.) are presented for each estimated coefficient (Coeff.). Bootstrap standard
errors (Boot. S.E.) are also calculated for the duration dependence parameter p to take account of the small
sample problem in the country-by-country estimations. These standard errors were obtained from 100
bootstrapped samples of the data for durations. Country dummy variables are used in the pooled estimations.
+ indicates that p is significantly higher than 1 using 5% one-sided test with bootstrap standard errors (robust
standard errors are used for pooling). d, c, and i indicate, respectively, decreasing, constant and increasing
positive duration dependence at a 5% significance level.
n.a. – not available; impossible to compute bootstrap standard errors because only 2 contractions are observed.
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Table 4.3. Basic parametric estimations for duration dependence by country:
non-EU countries
Expansions Contractions
Constant p Constant p
Australia Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-5.634
(1.299)
1.634
(0.381)
[0.446]
-5.520
(1.147)
3.705+,i
(0.598)
[0.990]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-5.339
(1.141)
1.617
(0.344)
[0.405]
-4.258
(1.200)
3.771+,c
(0.861)
[1.126]
Canada Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-5.145
(1.513)
1.289
(0.290)
[0.506]
-7.789
(0.987)
4.221+,i
(0.987)
[1.858]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-4.828
(1.607)
1.270
(0.460)
[0.568]
-6.402
(2.250)
4.268+,c
(1.283)
[1.659]
Japan Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-4.207
(2.100)
1.106
(0.421)
[0.710]
-11.10
(4.579)
5.119+,i
(1.908)
[1.923]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-3.983
(1.805)
1.068
(0.558)
[4.793]
-9.475
(4.033)
5.133
(1.933)
[2.623]
New
Zealand
Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-4.078
(1.557)
1.359
(0.472)
[0.491]
-2.616
(0.447)
1.350
(0.219)
[0.709]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-3.635
(1.247)
1.304
(0.496)
[0.747]
-2.103
(0.633)
1.237
(0.324)
(0.349)
Switzerland Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-4.940
(1.510)
1.398
(0.366)
[0.771]
-6.590
(1.221)
2.937
(0.506)
[1.626]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-4.559
(1.414)
1.383
(0.440)
[0.510]
-5.517
(1.521)
2.942+,c
(0.714)
[0.868]
United
States
Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-5.546
(1.234)
1.779+,c
(0.325)
(0.368)
-4.889
(1.052)
3.680+,i
(0.628)
[0.678]
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
Boot. S.E.
-4.808
(1.228)
1.725
(0.433)
[0.596]
-3.622
(0.963)
3.757+,i
(0.778)
[0.763]
Pooling:
Non-EU
Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
-5.630
(0.976)
1.455+,d
(0.165)
-5.697
(0.854)
2.564+,i
(0.318)
countries Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
-3.918
(0.633)
1.420+,d
(0.200)
-3.633
(0.695)
2.544+,c
(0.376)
Pooling:
All countries
Weibull
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
-6.653
(0.785)
1.596+,d
(0.130)
-6.445
(0.777)
2.468+,i
(0.197)
Cloglog
model
Coeff.
Rob. S.E.
-5.879
(0.811)
1.575+,d
(0.151)
-2.629
(0.461)
2.453+,i
(0.244)
Notes: See Table 4.2.
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Robust and bootstrap standard errors are also reported for each individual
estimate of that coefficient. Bootstrap standard errors are calculated to take into
account the small sample size problem.92 A one-sided test with bootstrap standard
errors is used to infer the presence of positive duration dependence. However, in
general, the qualitative conclusions are not significantly affected if robust standard
errors are used instead.
Evidence of positive duration dependence in expansions is found only for
Germany and the United States, which means that in these countries the likelihood of
an expansion ending increases with its age. These results support the recent evidence
provided by Zuehlke (2003), Lam (2004) and Layton and Smith (2007) for the US
economy. Contractions also exhibit positive duration dependence in Germany and
the United States as well as in France, the UK, Australia, Canada, Japan and
Switzerland. In the particular case of the US economy, this study confirms the results
obtained by Sichel (1991) and Zuehlke (2003) and by the Markov-switching
approaches.
The lack of evidence of duration dependence for the other countries might be
due to the small sample size of expansions and contractions, which may impair the
power of the t-test. Notice that the standard errors tend to be very high in some cases,
making difficult to detect duration dependence when it may really exist. A way of
circumventing this problem is to pool all the countries in a single regression. This
will increase the power of the test and provide more consistent estimates for duration
dependence. Three separate pooled-estimations were performed: one for the group of
92 These standard errors were obtained from 100 bootstrapped samples of the data for durations. More
replications were attempted, but either the results are not significantly affected or, for some countries,
it was not possible to compute them due to lack of variability (note that we are considering no more
than 4 to 6 observations for most of the countries in the case of the Weibull specification).
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EU countries, other for the non-EU countries and another for all countries.93 As
expected, results provide evidence of significant positive duration dependence in all
cases. This means that, in general, expansions and contractions in industrial countries
are indeed more likely to end as they become older.
Another striking result is the fact that when positive duration dependence is
detected, the estimated parameter p tends to be higher for contractions than for
expansions. This may indicate that the probability of expansions and contractions
ending evolves at different rates as their age increases. The analysis of the second
derivative of the (baseline) hazard function (h0(t)=γptp-1) shows that, in presence of
duration dependence (p>1), this function increases at a decreasing, constant or
increasing rate if, respectively, p<2, p=2 or p>2. This means that we can detect the
presence of decreasing, constant or increasing positive duration dependence by
testing if p is lower, equal or higher than 2. We start by testing for the presence of
constant positive duration dependence using a 10% two-sided test.94 The symbol c
next to the estimated parameter indicates when this hypothesis is not rejected.
Otherwise, we perform 5% one-sided tests to detect if we are in presence of
decreasing (d) or increasing (i) positive duration dependence. Results provide some
evidence that the probability of expansions and contractions ending evolves at
different rates when positive duration dependence is detected in both phases. As
expansions become older the probability of ending increases at a decreasing or
constant rate, while for contractions it increases, in most of the cases, at an increasing
rate. This is an interesting finding that complements the evidence provided by Lam
(2004) for the US economy using a Markov-switching approach and that helps to
93 Country dummies are included in all pooled estimations to control for individual country effects.
94 Bootstrap standard errors are used for the individual-country estimations (when positive duration
dependence is detected); robust standard errors are used in the pooled regressions.
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explain the observed tendency for longer expansions and shorter contractions during
the last half century.
Analysing the duration of business cycles phases based exclusively on their
age can generate an omitted variables problem because we might be ignoring the
effects of other variables that may also help to explain business cycles phase
changes. Thus, in addition to the length of a phase, we will include in the model
some variables that are expected, according to some literature, to affect the business
cycle behaviour as well. As the available data is grouped in discrete-time intervals
and most of those covariates are time-varying, only results from the estimation of the
cloglog model are presented. The fact that the cloglog model has greater flexibility to
include discrete time-varying covariates is an important advantage of this model over
the continuous-time Weibull specification and one reason for being used in this
study. Finally, the inclusion of more variables will consume degrees of freedom
making the individual-country estimations unfeasible in some cases. Due to this and
the small sample problem mentioned above, we opted to pool all countries in a single
regression. To provide a comparative analysis, some estimation results will also be
presented for the samples of EU and non-EU countries.
The estimation results for a specification including additional exogenous
variables are presented in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. Results are presented first for the
panel of all countries and then for the samples of EU and non-EU countries,
respectively. Before proceeding with the analysis of those results, it is important to
clarify two points. First, the estimated coefficient reported for the variable on the
logarithm of the duration of an expansion or contraction (LnDur) now corresponds to
the parameter q (≈p-1) in the specification for the log of the baseline hazard function.
Therefore, testing for the null hypothesis (H0: q=0) on this coefficient is the same as
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testing for duration dependence: a significantly positive coefficient indicates the
presence of positive duration dependence. Second, all economic variables are lagged
one period to take into account for simultaneity problems, delays in reporting some
economic data and to better identify their impact on the likelihood of a phase
ending.95
The first aspect to emphasize is the fact that despite the inclusion of other
exogenous variables in the model, positive duration dependence remains an
important factor to explain the duration of expansions and contractions in industrial
countries. Moreover, contractions still present evidence of increasing positive
duration dependence, whilst constant positive duration dependence is found for
expansions.
The first additional variable to be included in the model is the annualized 6-
month rate of change of the composite leading indicator (CLI). The coefficient
associated with this variable shows the expected sign and has a strong predictive
power in anticipating the end of expansions but it is not very important in explaining
the end of contractions. Results show that an improvement in this indicator (or in its
components) – that reflects current expectations about the future economic behaviour
– has a positive impact on the duration of expansions. This result reinforces the
findings of Di Venuto and Layton (2005) and Layton and Smith (2007) for Australia
and the US.96
95 The Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) is also reported to provide a comparative
indication of the quality of each specification in describing the reality. A lower value is associated
with a better description of the reality.
96 This result is also consistent with some recent RBC literature that uses multiple equilibrium models.
As in these models beliefs (or expectations) are regarded as self-fulfilling, the economy can enter into
recession simply because economic agents have become pessimistic (see, for example, Jaimovich,
2007).
145
Table 4.4. Main determinants of the duration of expansions and contractions I
Expansions . All countries . . EU countries . . Non-EU countries .
LnDur 0.583***
(3.13)d
0.709***
(3.02)c
0.714***
(3.03)c
0.796***
(3.17)c
0.877***
(3.57)c
1.201***
(3.79)c
1.453***
(5.06)c
0.830**
(2.20)c
0.720*
(1.68)c
CLI(-1) -0.235***
(-7.34)
-0.233***
(-6.44)
-0.227***
(-6.42)
-0.219***
(-6.32)
-0.189***
(-5.33)
-0.170***
(-4.89)
-0.161***
(-4.26)
-0.316***
(-4.43)
-0.287***
(-3.61)
DurPrev -0.038
(-0.46)
-0.039
(-0.50)
-0.052
(-0.65)
-0.104
(-1.10)
-0.184***
(-2.64)
-0.255***
(-2.77)
0.253
(1.42)
0.188
(1.37)
GPInv(-1) -0.126*
(-1.86)
-0.199**
(-2.17)
0.007
(0.06)
GovI/C(-1) -0.045
(-0.88)
-0.143**
(-2.00)
0.027
(0.48)
D_EU92 -0.571
(-1.10)
D_EU97 -1.422**
(-1.99)
-1.771**
(-2.38)
-1.737***
(-2.16)
-2.725***
(-2.75)
-0.153
(-0.20)
Log-L -184.7 -167.2 -166.4 -164.0 -140.1 -85.80 -76.76 -71.34 -56.31
SBIC 480.9 452.1 457.9 453.1 409.7 245.6 239.8 202.0 182.4
N. Obs. 1698 1567 1567 1567 1327 838 761 729 566
N. Peaks 49 44 44 44 38 24 23 20 15
Contractions
LnDur 1.410***
(4.69)c
1.688***
(4.65)i
1.720***
(4.80)i
1.781***
(4.67)i
1.812***
(4.02)i
1.551***
(3.66)c
1.483***
(3.36)c
2.364**
(2.53)c
2.813*
(1.71)c
CLI(-1) 0.044
(1.11)
0.059*
(1.66)
0.053
(1.54)
0.051
(1.40)
0.041
(1.05)
0.072
(1.31)
0.076
(1.28)
0.020
(0.42)
0.003
(0.05)
DurPrev 0.030***
(3.15)
0.028***
(2.84)
0.030***
(3.10)
0.030**
(2.30)
0.036**
(2.10)
0.028
(1.49)
0.027**
(2.28)
0.029*
(1.73)
GPInv(-1) -0.067
(-0.99)
-0.050
(-0.44)
-0.061
(-0.89)
GovI/C(-1) 0.015
(0.20)
0.025
(0.23)
0.030
(0.27)
D_EU92 0.483
(0.85)
D_EU97 0.984
(1.22)
1.320
(1.44)
0.806
(1.00)
1.073
(1.15)
Log-L -120.2 -114.9 -114.3 -114.1 -97.96 -66.62 -64.49 -46.45 -32.02
SBIC 328.2 323.3 328.1 327.6 298.5 191.8 197.9 137.5 110.3
N. Obs. 348 348 348 348 298 206 200 142 98
N. Troughs 50 50 50 50 44 28 27 22 17
Notes: The coefficients were estimated using the complementary log-log model, where the coefficient on the duration
dependence variable LnDur (q) is identical to p-1. A constant and individual country dummies are included in all
regressions and the presence of any pattern of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation is controlled for by using robust
standard errors; the z-statistics for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses; significance level at which the null
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. d, c, and i indicate, respectively, decreasing, constant and
increasing positive duration dependence at a 5% significance level. The Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion is
computed as follows: SBIC=2(-logL+(k/2)logN), where k is the number of regressors and N is the number of
observations. Due to lack of quarterly data for private and government investment, Switzerland is excluded from the
sample of non-EU countries when GPInv and GovI/C are included.
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Table 4.5. Main determinants of the duration of expansions and contractions II
Expansions . All countries . . EU countries . . Non-EU countries .
LnDur 0.886***
(3.63)c
0.860***
(3.22)c
0.888***
(3.04)c
0.414***
(3.32)
0.618**
(2.26)c
1.384***
(3.88)c
1.508***
(3.38)c
0.987**
(2.05)c
0.322
(0.93)
CLI(-1) -0.143***
(-3.85)
-0.131***
(-3.39)
-0.129***
(-3.27)
-0.072***
(-4.18)
-0.127**
(-2.40)
-0.250***
(-3.21)
Spread(-1) -0.447***
(-3.87)
-0.366***
(-2.58)
-0.745***
(-5.95)
Stock(-1) -0.043**
(-2.36)
-0.042
(-1.76)
-0.075***
(-2.87)
DurPrev 0.011
(0.11)
0.019
(0.20)
0.022
(0.22)
0.009
(0.24)
0.015
(0.18)
-0.146
(-1.45)
-0.191*
(-1.74)
0.330**
(2.50)
0.161**
(2.05)
GPInv(-1) -0.154**
(-2.60)
-0.129*
(-1.72)
-0.131*
(-1.72)
-0.055
(-1.43)
-0.022
(-0.32)
-0.209**
(-2.06)
-0.304**
(-2.12)
GovI/C(-1) -0.008
(-0.18)
0.004
(0.12)
-0.003
(-0.09)
-0.005
(-0.32)
-0.011
(-0.30)
-0.123
(-1.25)
-0.176*
(-1.73)
OilPr(-1) 0.018***
(2.62)
0.017**
(2.39)
0.017**
(2.31)
0.007***
(2.60)
0.013***
(3.32)
0.012
(1.46)
0.015*
(1.78)
0.020**
(2.19)
0.011*
(1.74)
PeakUS 1.546***
(3.03)
1.549***
(3.00)
0.859***
(3.02)
0.978*
(1.89)
1.773***
(2.83)
1.402**
(2.16)
PolCycle -0.854
(-1.36)
-0.499
(-1.61)
-0.828
(-1.40)
-0.378
(-0.47)
-0.180
(-0.21)
-0.950
(-1.13)
-1.085
(-1.40)
GovLeft 0.395
(0.70)
0.054
(0.23)
0.563
(1.30)
0.589
(0.79)
1.191*
(1.77)
2.351*
(1.94)
1.848
(1.34)
D_EU97 -1.021
(-1.42)
-0.971
(-1.41)
-1.034*
(-1.47)
-0.593**
(-2.10)
-0.849
(-1.17)
-1.992*
(-1.79)
-2.338*
(-1.77)
Log-L -133.1 -112.6 -111.6 -4408.2 -121.7 -69.35 -62.51 -65.26 -72.17
SBIC 402.8 360.0 372.0 9142.1 399.4 251.5 243.8 108.4 229.3
N. Obs. 1327 1200 1200 1188 1206 761 733 658 692
N. Peaks 38 33 33 33 36 23 21 19 24
H0: Exogen. 0.6123
Contractions
LnDur 1.817***
(3.93)i
1.627***
(4.28)i
1.775***
(4.12)i
1.934***
(4.47)i
1.697***
(4.66)i
1.595***
(3.20)c
1.661***
(3.34)c
2.240**
(2.18)c
1.319***
(2.83)c
CLI(-1) 0.042
(1.02)
0.080**
(2.10)
0.084**
(2.23)
0.056
(1.56)
0.072
(1.10)
0.058
(1.02)
Spread(-1) 0.266*
(1.76)
0.380*
(1.86)
0.087
(0.72)
Stock(-1) 0.025*
(1.76)
0.016
(0.98)
0.018
(0.92)
DurPrev 0.030**
(2.26)
0.030**
(2.96)
0.027***
(2.73)
0.028***
(2.92)
0.020**
(2.11)
0.023
(1.07)
0.029
(1.25)
0.029**
(2.55)
0.022**
(2.06)
GPInv(-1) -0.067
(-0.98)
GovI/C(-1) 0.015
(0.20)
OilPr(-1) 0.001
(0.07)
-0.002
(-0.23)
0.009
(0.51)
TroughUS 0.660
(1.28)
0.619
(1.22)
-0.164
(-0.20)
PolCycle -0.299
(-0.58)
-0.064
(-0.07)
-0.838
(-1.20)
GovLeft -1.139*
(-1.83)
-1.197*
(-1.90)
-1.880***
(-3.21)
-0.734
(-0.94)
-1.719
(-1.36)
D_EU97 1.321
(1.44)
0.824
(1.06)
0.875
(1.22)
1.150
(1.60)
0.984
(1.39)
0.953
(1.12)
0.909
(1.07)
Log-L -97.96 -103.8 -100.9 -111.1 -105.1 -63.79 -52.84 -43.41 -58.88
SBIC 304.2 306.0 311.7 327.5 320.2 207.1 167.1 146.2 168.5
N. Obs. 298 327 327 348 326 201 167 141 159
N. Troughs 44 44 44 50 51 27 25 22 26
Notes: See Table 4.4. Results presented in column 3 for expansions were obtained from an instrumental variables probit
model where OilPr(-1) was instrumented with its 2nd, 3rd and 4th lags. The p-value of the Wald test for exogeneity is
also reported. This test is described in Wooldridge (2002, pp. 472-477) and it simply asks whether the error terms in
the structural equation and the reduced-form equation for the endogenous variable are correlated. The US is excluded
from the sample when PeakUS or TroughUS are included in the model.
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Next we test whether the duration of the previous phase (DurPrev) affects the
length of the current phase. The results show that shorter contractions tend to be
preceded by longer expansions in the period after WWII.97 This is a result that
complements the findings of Zellner (1990) for the pre-war period and that
contradicts the lack of evidence found by Sichel (1991) and Abderrezak (1998) on
this matter. In economic terms, this means that the vigorous economic activity and
the solid fundamentals that characterize longer expansions tend to have significant
vestiges in subsequent contractions, making their durations shorter. On the other
hand, no solid evidence is found in the opposite direction. The sample of EU
countries presents some indication of a positive relation between the duration of
previous contractions and the duration of current expansions, but the sample of non-
EU countries presents a negative relation.98 However, the coefficient of interest is not
always statistically significant. This lack of significant statistical evidence is well
reflected in the estimations for the sample of all countries. Therefore, this study
concludes that the impact of the duration of previous contractions on the duration of
current expansions is not significant.
Regarding the effects of private and public investment on the likelihood of an
expansion or contraction ending, only private investment presents some significant
power in explaining the duration of expansions, especially in the group of EU
countries. Results show that when private investment is boosted the likelihood of an
97 For example, considering the regressions for the group of all countries, when the duration of the
previous contraction increases by a quarter the hazard rate of an expansion ending increases by a
factor of approximately e0.030=1.0305, i.e. by about 3.05%, ceteris paribus.
98 This means that longer recessions leave a long way for EU countries to run before they reach their
full potential again; on the contrary, the deterioration they cause in the economic fundamentals in the
non-EU countries makes the subsequent expansion shorter.
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expansion ending decreases. Government investment does not present any significant
impact on the duration of expansions or contractions; only the duration of EU
expansions seems to be affected by this variable, but the sensitivity analysis provided
below will confirm the lack of strong statistical significance of this variable in any
case.99
Results presented in Table 4.5 show that the price of oil is an important
variable in explaining the duration of expansions in the industrial countries. As
expected, when the price of oil increases the likelihood of an expansion ending
increases significantly. As some recent literature suggests that the price of oil can be
endogenously determined along with the state of the economy,100 we also estimate an
instrumental variables probit model (ivprobit) where the lag of the oil price is
instrumented with its second, third and fourth lags.101 Nevertheless, the test for
exogeneity does not reject the hypothesis that the lag of the oil price is exogenously
determined. Moreover, the statistical significance of the main variables is not
affected and the oil price remains an important factor for an expansion ending. This
means that using the lag of the oil price, we are already avoiding simultaneity
problems and, consequently, we can rely on the results from the simple cloglog
model, which is the best model to employ for a discrete-time duration analysis.
99 GPinv and GovI/C are excluded in some regressions for the sample of non-EU countries due to the
clear lack of significance demonstrated by those variables in that sample. In fact, the RBC theory has
already pointed out that fiscal shocks, in particular, tend to be too small to be a significant source of
fluctuations to the business cycle (see Rebelo, 2005).
100 See, for example, Barsky and Kilian (2004) and Chen et al. (2007).
101 Other lag combinations were tried, but results were not significantly affected. As there is no
available procedure to include instrumental variables in a cloglog model, we opted to use an
alternative specification for the discrete-time hazard rate given by the normal distribution density
function (probit) for which there is a ready procedure to deal with instrumental variables.
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that, despite several attempts, the price of oil has
never proved important to explain the end of contractions.
There is also some evidence that when the US economy reaches a peak (and
enters into recession), the likelihood of an expansion elsewhere ending increases.
Thus, this study provides evidence sustaining the idea that international spillovers, in
particular from the US economy, affect the probability of other industrial countries
entering into recession.102 Nevertheless, the end of a contraction in the US does not
seem to affect the propensity of a contraction ending in the other industrial countries.
Contrary to expectations and to the results provided by Klein (1996) for the
US economy, no clear evidence of political effects was found in this study: the
political cycle does not affect the business cycle; only contractions seem to be
marginally affected by the ideology of the party in the government, but this result is
not robust, as will be demonstrated in the sensitivity analysis provided below.
Therefore, these results indicate that the political environment has not proved to be
very important to explain the duration of expansions or contractions in industrial
countries.
To control for the argument advanced by Buti et al. (1997) and Metz (2005)
that the Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules may have lengthened recessions, two
dummy variables are used. The first takes the value of 1 in the period after
Maastricht, i.e. after 1992, for the sample of EU countries (D_EU92) and the other
takes the value of 1 for the same group of countries in the SGP period, i.e. in the
period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the public deficit is to be
officially assessed (D_EU97). This period started in 1997 with the assessment of the
102 As the coefficient on PeakUS or TroughUS is never significant in the sample of non-EU countries,
they are excluded from the regressions presented for this group to avoid the loss of US data in the
sample.
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countries that would take part in the Economic and Monetary Union. Thus, this
dummy takes into account the impact of the SGP rules since they really came into
effect, i.e. since the 3% fiscal rule had to be really accomplished, otherwise sanctions
can be imposed. Results indicate that recessions in the group of EU countries are not
significantly longer in the period in which the Maastricht and SGP fiscal constraints
are imposed. Moreover, we find some evidence that the likelihood of an expansion
ending is lower after 1997 in that group of countries.103 Given these results and the
fact that no significant differences are found for the group of non-EU countries in the
same periods, this study concludes that Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules were not
harmful for economic activity in the EU, contrary to the concerns raised by Buti et
al. (1997) and Metz (2005).104
The composite leading indicator (CLI) has been used to collect the effects of
current expectations about the future behaviour of the economy. However, following
the suggestion of Dueker (1997), Estrella and Mishkin (1998), Chauvet and Potter
(2005) and Moneta (2005) that some financial components of the leading indicators,
like the interest rate spreads and the stock prices, can perform as well as those
indicators in predicting recessions, we include those variables instead of CLI in the
last regression presented in Table 4.5 for each group of countries. Results show that
the interest rate spread (Spread) is, as expected, negatively (positively) related to the
likelihood of an expansion (contraction) ending. A higher spread signals that
103 However, we must analyse these results with a grain of salt because they can be partially
influenced by the fact that some countries, like France and Germany, have decided to breach the 3%
of GDP rule for the deficit, to avoid a deeper economic slowdown, when they were hit by the 2001-
2003 recession. On the other hand, the number of cycles for the period after Maastricht is yet small –
in comparison with the number of cycles we find in the time span used for the period before
Maastricht – which hinders a more balanced analysis.
104 This conclusion is in accord with the findings presented in Chapter 2.
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economic agents expect a better economic performance in the future, therefore, the
likelihood of an expansion (contraction) ending decreases (increases). Central banks
can play an important role on this matter by trying to make the necessary interest rate
adjustments to keep the economy out of a recession. Despite not being evident in the
sample of EU countries, the influences of the stock market on the economic
behaviour are important as well, especially in periods of expansion. A decrease in
stock market capitalization – which may reflect a future decrease in the profits of the
companies and the expectation of an economic slowdown – increases the hazard rate
of an expansion ending. In general, the conclusions of this study are not affected by
the use of these variables instead of CLI.105
Although these components of the CLI have proved to be important in
explaining the duration of business cycle phases, an important problem arises when
they are used instead of CLI: an omitted variables problem. The CLI is collecting the
effects of more variables than simply the interest rate spreads and the share prices,
like consumer and producer confidence indicators, order books, stocks and labour
market indicators. To avoid the loss of important information that is provided by all
these variables, we prefer to rely on the results obtained with CLI in the equation.
4.3.4. Robustness analysis
A robustness analysis is provided in this section for the three groups of
countries. The effects of duration dependence, CLI and duration of the previous
phase are controlled for in any case, because these variables have proved to be the
most important determinants of the duration of both expansions and contractions.
105 Several experimental ivprobit regressions, not reported here, were also run controlling for possible
simultaneity problems, where these variables – and even CLI, GPInv and GovI/C – were instrumented
with some of their lags, but the exogeneity hypothesis was never clearly rejected in any of the cases.
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The effects of the variables that have proved significant in explaining the duration of
expansions or contractions in the three samples are also controlled for. Using these
parsimonious specifications, we analyse the robustness of the results obtained so far
to changes in some assumptions. The results of the robustness analysis are presented
in Table 4.6.
So far we have assumed that expansions and contractions can hypothetically
have a length from one quarter to the maximum observable in our sample. However,
the NBER and ECRI usually do not consider a phase of expansion or contraction
with less than five months. Therefore, studies that use monthly data to analyse
duration dependence truncate expansions and contractions to a minimum duration.
This means that the hazard rate must be identically zero for months one to five and
some non-zero value thereafter.
As this study uses quarterly data we would be tempted to truncate the
duration of expansions and contractions for the first two quarters (the equivalent to
six months). However, there are some examples in our sample in which the phases
have a length of 2 quarters: two recessions in the US (2/1980-7/1980 and 8/1990-
3/1991); one recession in New Zealand (11/1997-5/1998); and one expansion in New
Zealand (4/1986-9/1986). As a result, a minimum duration of three (or more)
quarters cannot be considered when quarterly data is being used. The alternative is to
consider a minimum phase of at least two quarters. Columns 1, 4 and 7 in Table 4.6
present the results of a regression where the duration of expansions and contractions
were truncated to a minimum of two quarters, i.e. assuming that the hazard rate is
zero in the first quarter of each phase.
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Table 4.6. Robustness analysis for the duration of expansions and contractions
Expansions . All countries . . EU countries . . Non-EU countries .
LnDur 0.811***
(2.74)
1.264***
(4.32)
0.666
(1.21)
D_Dur1 -2.072***
(-2.69)
-3.379***
(-4.09)
-1.788*
(-1.73)
D_Dur2 -1.538**
(-2.06)
-2.746***
(-3.06)
-2.193*
(-1.65)
D_Dur3 -0.746
(-1.07)
-1.242
(-1.45)
-1.649
(-1.42)
D_Dur4 0.277
(0.47)
-0.212
(-0.26)
0.554
(0.57)
Dur -0.028**
(-2.35)
-0.038**
(-2.47)
-0.044**
(-2.08)
CLI(-1) -0.133***
(-3.33)
-0.137***
(-3.56)
0.151***
(4.02)
-0.128**
(-2.48)
-0.132**
(-2.55)
0.143***
(3.21)
-0.290***
(-3.63)
-0.273***
(-4.20)
0.278***
(4.13)
DurPrev -0.021
(-0.22)
-0.024
(-0.19)
-0.043
(-0.53)
-0.134
(-1.34)
-0.216**
(-1.99)
0.086
(0.97)
0.236*
(1.78)
0.329**
(2.15)
-0.297*
(-1.82)
GPInv(-1) -0.129*
(-1.71)
-0.126*
(-1.68)
0.104
(1.33)
-0.217**
(-2.08)
-0.210**
(-2.11)
0.199*
(1.76)
GovI/C(-1) -0.006
(-0.16)
-0.007
(-0.15)
-0.007
(-0.22)
-0.075
(-0.97)
-0.091
(-1.16)
0.058
(0.85)
OilPr(-1) 0.017**
(2.36)
0.017***
(2.49)
-0.017***
(-2.79)
0.012
(1.59)
0.013
(1.57)
-0.013**
(-1.96)
0.017*
(1.78)
0.022**
(2.08)
-0.020**
(-1.96)
PeakUS 1.548***
(3.03)
1.418***
(2.75)
-1.785***
(-3.22)
1.787***
(2.89)
1.642***
(2.65)
-2.181***
(-3.11)
D_EU97 -0.953
(-1.39)
-1.170*
(-1.66)
0.833
(1.28)
-1.679*
(-1.70)
-1.981**
(-2.04)
1.402*
(1.69)
Log-L -112.4 -111.1 -69.70 -67.38 -67.06 -64.20
SBIC 359.6 378.2 238.9 254.2 199.0 194.9
N. Obs. 1200 1200 761 761 658 658
N. Peaks 33 33 23 23 19 19
Contractions
LnDur 1.682***
(3.34)
1.309***
(2.56)
2.122*
(1.92)
D_Dur1 -5.161***
(-2.70)
-3.477***
(-2.79)
-4.508**
(-2.10)
D_Dur2 -3.820**
(-2.12)
-3.004**
(-2.46)
-2.201
(-1.19)
D_Dur3 -3.583**
(-2.04)
-2.384**
(-2.34)
-1.984
(-1.17)
D_Dur4 -2.251
(-1.48)
-1.56
(-1.07)
Dur -0.330***
(-3.23)
-0.288***
(-3.39)
-0.380**
(-1.96)
CLI(-1) 0.063*
(1.71)
0.073*
(1.76)
-0.055
(-1.23)
0.082
(1.44)
0.060
(0.99)
-0.068
(-1.10)
0.026
(0.52)
0.037
(0.72)
-0.042
(-0.76)
DurPrev 0.027***
(2.84)
0.021**
(2.29)
-0.027**
(-2.44)
0.034**
(2.03)
0.019
(1.20)
-0.023
(-1.34)
0.026**
(2.23)
0.021**
(2.03)
-0.026**
(-2.05)
GovLeft -1.175*
(-1.89)
-0.873
(-1.65)
0.840
(1.31)
D_EU97 1.062
(1.45)
0.432
(0.57)
-0.953
(-1.14)
0.745
(0.92)
0.451
(0.59)
-0.860
(-1.02)
Log-L -109.7 -119.2 -206.3 -65.76 -70.01 -140.4 -46.03 -48.65 -116.4
SBIC 324.7 361.3 668.1 190.1 209.3 459.3 136.7 156.8 359.8
N. Obs. 348 348 1479 206 206 961 142 142 799
N. Troughs 50 50 28 28 22 22
Notes: See Table 4.4. In columns 1, 4 and 7 the duration of expansions and contractions is truncated assuming that
transitions to these states are observed only if the new state survives at least 1 quarter. In columns 2, 5 and 8 piece-
wise specifications are used to characterize the baseline hazard function. The estimates presented in columns 3, 6 and
9 are from a multinomial regime-switching logit specification à la Layton and Smith (2007).
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Our main results are not significantly or qualitatively affected. In practice,
results in this kind of study have not proved sensitive to the choice of this minimum
observable duration and the qualitative conclusions tend to be identical in any
case.106 Therefore, there is no practical advantage in complicating the analysis with
such a small truncation, especially in a study in which quarterly data has been used.
Next we relax the specification for the baseline hazard function. We have
considered a specification that corresponds to the discrete-time analogue of the
Weibull model to facilitate the comparisons with the previous studies. However, a
piece-wise specification can also perform well in detecting duration dependence. In
this case, a group of dummies that account for the passage of the time during each
phase is created – one for each particular sub-period of time – where the hazard rate
is assumed to be the same within each time-group but different between those
groups. Five time dummies were created for both expansions and contractions and
the first four were included in the list of independent variables instead of LnDur.107
The main conclusions of this study are not affected with the inclusion of those
dummies: the significance of the economic variables remains generally unaffected as
well as the evidence of positive duration dependence for expansions and
contractions. Most of the dummies are significant and their magnitude (in absolute
106 On this aspect, see Sichel (1991) and Layton and Smith (2007).
107 Those dummies were created as follows: (i) For expansions, we have to create four two-year
dummies (D_Dur1, D_Dur2, D_Dur3, and D_Dur4) and an additional fifth dummy (D_Dur5) that
takes the value of 1 when the length of an expansion is higher than 8 years. The creation of yearly or
quarterly dummies was not possible in this case because these would totally predict the value of the
dependent variable given that there are some years or quarters for which no expansion has ended. (ii)
For contractions, four similar year dummies were created and the fifth dummy takes the value of 1
when the length of a contraction is higher than 4 years. As in the case of expansions, quarterly
dummies are not appropriate. In the group of EU countries D_Dur4 for the duration of contractions
was automatically excluded from the sample because they totally predict the value of the dependent
variable. For more details on the creation of these kind of piece-wise dummies, see Allison (1982).
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terms) decreases with the passage of time, which confirms that both expansions and
contractions in industrial countries are more likely to end as they become older. In
the case of non-EU countries that trend is less clear but, even so, we still cannot
ignore that evidence of positive duration dependence exists.108
The last estimations presented in Table 4.6 were obtained using a version of
the multinomial regime-switching logit model (MRS logit) recently implemented by
Layton and Smith (2007). In this model the log-likelihood function is defined as
follows:
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where t is the time, htA is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the economy is
in an expansion and 0 otherwise, htB is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the
quarter in which the economy reaches a peak (transition from an expansion to a
recession) and 0 otherwise, htC is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the
quarter in which the economy reaches a trough (transition from a recession to an
expansion) and 0 otherwise, htD is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the
economy is in a recession and 0 otherwise. This means that only one element of the
vector ht takes value 1 at each point in time, while all the other three are zero.
Moreover,
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108 Other specifications for the baseline hazard function were considered, but, in any case, the main
conclusions of this study were not significantly affected by the choice of that function.
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where j=1 for expansions and j=2 for contractions. Given this logistical functional
form, the estimated coefficients will have a symmetric sign relative to the ones
obtained with a cloglog model. For example, if the coefficient on the duration
variable (Dur) is negative (positive) then the phase exhibits positive (negative)
duration dependence. This is due to the fact that we are now focusing the analysis on
the probability of remaining in a particular business cycle phase instead of the
probability of that phase ending.
Results from the MRS logit reinforce the evidence of positive duration
dependence for expansions and contractions in the group of industrial countries and
in any of its sub-samples. Those results also confirm that the transition probabilities
for expansions and contractions are driven not only by duration dependence but also
by changes in some economic fundamentals of the economy.
4.3.5. Duration dependence and the “Great Moderation”
A final analysis considers whether the coefficient on duration dependence has
changed during the sample period considered in this study. According to Summers
(2005), the volatility in economic activity in most industrial countries has decreased
significantly over the last two to three decades. This phenomenon is known in the
literature as “the Great Moderation”. Thus, our final task is to analyse whether the
coefficient on duration dependence was affected by that phenomenon.
We follow Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Summers (2005) to establish the
periods of “Great Moderation” (GM) for each of the countries used in our sample.
First, we compute the rolling standard deviation of quarterly real output growth
(measured at a quarterly rate) for each country. The measure of output is chain-
weighted GDP obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook statistics for the period
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1966Q1-2006Q4. As in Blanchard and Simons (2001), we use a window of 20
quarters so that the standard deviation in quarter t is the estimated standard deviation
over quarters t-19 to t. Therefore, the first observations for the standard deviation
start in the beginning of the 1970s. Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 present the volatility of
real GDP growth for the group of EU and non-EU countries, respectively.
The GM period is identified next as the period during which the standard
deviation of real GDP growth is consistently below its average for the period
analysed, which resulted in the following threshold dates or starting dates for the GM
period for each country: Austria (1984Q3), France (1980Q1), Germany (1976Q3),
Italy (1984Q4), Spain (1979Q3), Sweden (1988Q1), United Kingdom (1985Q2),
Australia (1987Q4), Canada (1987Q4), Japan (1975Q2), New Zealand (1991Q2),
Switzerland (1980Q2) and United States (1987Q1). In fact, as we can observe in
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, after these dates all countries present a significant and
clear decrease in output volatility.
A dummy variable is then built to separate the pre-GM and GM periods for
each country (D_GM): it takes the value of 1 in the GM period (i.e. in the period of
low-volatility in output) and 0 otherwise. To check whether there were any
significant changes in the duration dependence coefficient between those two
periods, we multiply this dummy with the duration dependence variable (LnDur*GM)
and include it in the model. We expect that a decrease in output volatility should
correspond to a decrease (increase) in the likelihood of an expansion (contraction)
ending as it gets older.
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Figure 4.2. Volatility of real GDP growth: EU countries
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Notes: The series correspond to the standard deviation of real GDP growth over the previous 20
quarters. The vertical line indicates the threshold between high-volatility and low-volatility in
output growth. The GM periods are identified as the periods of low-volatility in output growth
that stand on the right-hand side of the vertical line for each country. Those periods are
characterized by a volatility of real GDP growth below its period-average.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook.
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Figure 4.3. Volatility of real GDP growth: non-EU countries
Australia
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
19
71
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
Canada
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
19
71
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
Japan
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
19
71
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
New Zealand
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
19
71
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
Switzerland
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
19
71
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
United States
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
19
71
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
Notes and Source: See Figure 4.2.
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 4.7 for the groups of EU, non-EU
and all countries show that the mean duration of both expansions and contractions
has increased slightly during the GM period. The differences between the pre-GM
and GM periods are not very large, but, in the case of the duration of contractions,
they suggest the possibility of an effect contrary to the one expected. To see whether
that is really the case, we proceed with an econometric analysis identical to the one
implemented in the previous sections, but where we consider the possibility of a
change in the duration dependence coefficient between the Pre-GM and GM periods.
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Table 4.7. Descriptive statistics for the Pre-GM and GM periods
Duration of Expansions Duration of Contractions
Exp. Mean Std Dev Min Max Cont. Mean Std Dev Min Max
All countries(before GM) 40 27.0 24.2 2 93 40 5.3 2.7 2 13
All countries (GM period) 39 30.0 16.5 4 69 28 7.8 4.5 2 19
EU (before GM) 16 30.5 24.4 8 88 16 6.6 3.4 3 13
EU (GM period) 21 31.1 15.1 8 59 15 7.9 4.4 3 17
Non-EU (before GM) 24 24.7 24.2 2 93 24 4.4 1.6 2 8
Non-EU (GM period) 18 28.7 18.4 4 69 13 7.8 4.8 2 19
US (before GM) 8 14.9 9.4 4 35 8 3.6 1.1 2 5
US (GM period) 3 30.3 10.0 20 40 2 2.5 0.7 2 3
Notes: See Table 4.1 and Table A.4.1.1 in Annex. The duration of expansions and contractions is measured in quarters.
Estimation results for the panels of all countries, EU countries and non-EU
countries are presented in Table 4.8. The first regressions for each group report the
results from a simple specification where we only compare if the coefficient on
duration dependence has significantly changed during the period of low-volatility in
economic activity. Results indicate no significant changes for both expansions and
contractions, for which identical evidence of positive duration dependence is again
found in both the pre-GM and GM periods. In fact, the coefficient on LnDur (for the
pre-GM period) is statistically identical to the duration dependence coefficient for the
GM period (q1+q2). This evidence remains valid even when we add the variables that
have proved to be consistently significant and important in explaining the duration of
expansions and contractions. The inclusion of the dummy D_GM in the model (see
column 3 for each group) has also confirmed the lack of significant differences in the
duration of expansions and contractions between the pre-GM and GM periods.109
109 The variables LnDur*GM and D_GM are not included together in the same regression because they
are highly correlated.
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Table 4.8. Duration dependence and the “Great Moderation”
Expansions . All countries . . EU countries . . Non-EU countries .
LnDur 0.608***
(3.92)
0.664***
(2.89)
0.627***
(2.80)
0.794***
(3.76)
0.725***
(2.69)
0.705**
(2.57)
0.482**
(2.22)
0.862**
(1.96)
0.805**
(1.99)
LnDur*GM -0.077
(-0.82)
-0.078
(-0.62)
-0.014
(-0.10)
-0.011
(-0.07)
-0.123
(-0.96)
-0.090
(-0.53)
CLI(-1) -0.157***
(-4.68)
-0.157***
(-4.74)
-0.149***
(-3.04)
-0.148***
(-3.70)
-0.271***
(-3.89)
-0.270***
(-3.89)
DurPrev 0.292
(1.62)
0.295
(1.61)
GPInv(-1) -0.119*
(-1.72)
-0.118*
(-1.71)
-0.227**
(-2.41)
-0.225**
(-2.36)
OilPr(-1) 0.011***
(2.76)
0.011***
(2.70)
0.011***
(2.68)
0.011***
(2.53)
0.033*
(1.91)
0.035**
(2.03)
PeakUS 1.661***
(3.61)
1.663***
(3.62)
1.912***
(3.75)
1.910***
(3.71)
D_GM -0.295
(-0.73)
-0.233
(-0.46)
-0.128
(-0.24)
,q1+q2 0.532***
(3.36)
0.587**
(2.40)
0.780***
(3.09)
0.715**
(2.20)
0.358*
(1.72)
0.772**
(2.03)
Log-L -297.7 -163.2 -126.8 -138.7 -85.10 -84.96 -158.5 -66.58 -66.67
SBIC 686.1 375.0 374.9 326.3 257.3 257.0 361.9 204.5 204.7
N. Obs. 2242 1252 1252 1141 813 813 1101 658 658
N. Peaks 66 36 36 30 26 26 36 19 19
Contractions
LnDur 1.446***
(4.99)
1.640***
(3.99)
1.698***
(4.77)
1.347***
(3.80)
1.501***
(3.30)
1.414***
(3.68)
1.545***
(3.27)
2.070**
(1.96)
2.453***
(2.70)
LnDur*GM 0.012
(0.05)
0.114
(0.35)
0.017
(0.05)
-0.149
(-0.44)
-0.001
(-0.01)
0.569
(1.20)
CLI(-1) 0.052
(1.28)
0.055*
(1.67)
0.097*
(1.76)
0.097*
(1.77)
-0.006
(-0.12)
-0.005
(-0.09)
DurPrev 0.031***
(3.09)
0.030***
(3.07)
0.034**
(2.24)
0.033**
(2.12)
0.033***
(2.74)
0.031***
(2.62)
D_GM 0.133
(0.25)
-0.283
(-0.45)
0.792
(1.03)
,q1+q2 1.458***
(5.83)
1.754***
(4.68)
1.365***
(3.96)
1.351***
(3.30)
1.544***
(4.25)
2.639**
(3.10)
Log-L -158.3 -114.7 -114.8 -77.67 -67.00 -67.00 -80.56 -46.43 -45.72
SBIC 407.6 328.9 329.1 204.0 192.6 192.6 203.8 140.4 141.0
N. Obs. 430 348 348 223 206 206 207 142 142
N. Troughs 68 50 50 31 28 28 37 22 22
Notes: See Table 4.4. The z-statistics for the estimated coefficients are in parentheses; robust standard errors are used to
compute the z-statistics. q1+q2 is the coefficient that results from the sum of the estimated coefficients for LnDur and
LnDur*GM and represents the duration dependence coefficient for the GM period.
Regarding these results, we conclude that the general decrease in output
volatility in the industrial countries over the last 20 to 30 years has not affected
significantly the duration of their contractions and expansions or, more precisely, the
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duration dependence coefficient.110 In general, the expansions and contractions
observed in group of the industrial countries analysed in this study are still showing
evidence of positive duration dependence during the GM period, i.e. they remain as
likely to end as they become older as before the GM period.
However, a particular country deserves a special analysis: the United States.
First, it is the country that has received more attention in the literature regarding the
decrease in output volatility. Second, this is the only country in our sample that
reports a reasonable number of business cycle turning points (ten) for proceeding
with a basic comparative analysis for the GM period.
Looking simply at the duration of expansions and contractions for the period
after WWII in the US (see Table 4.7), we observe an (expected) increase in the
duration of expansions and a decrease in the duration of contractions in the GM
period. Thus, the decrease in output volatility seems effectively to correspond to
longer expansions and shorter contractions in this country, contrary to what was
found in the analysis for the panel of industrial countries.
The results from the estimation of a basic specification for the US including
the variables LnDur*GM and D_GM are reported in Table 4.9. The evidence
confirms our expectations for this country: first, expansions are no longer duration
dependent (q1+q2 is not significant) during the GM period; moreover, the likelihood
that they end has decreased significantly during that period (see coefficient on
110 Additional experimental regressions (not reported here) considering the pre-GM and GM periods
separately have not shown any substantial differences in the duration dependence coefficient between
the two periods either. Moreover, results were not sensitive to small changes in the threshold dates. In
one of our experiments we even used the dates of GDP volatility reduction or switch to low volatility
considered by Summers (2005) for: Australia (1984Q3), Canada (1988Q1), France (1976Q3),
Germany (1971Q3), Italy (1980Q2), Japan (1975Q2), United Kingdom (1982Q2) and United States
(1984Q4). Results are shown in Table A.4.1.3 in Annex, but they remain quite similar to the ones
presented in Table 4.8.
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D_GM); second, contractions now present a higher duration dependence coefficient
(q1+q2), meaning that the GM period has contributed to increase the propensity of a
contraction ending as its gets older; at the same time, the coefficient on D_GM shows
that contractions are shorter now than before the GM.111
Table 4.9. Duration dependence and the “Great Moderation” in the U.S.
. Expansions . . Contractions .
LnDur (q1) 1.083**
(2.28)
1.056**
(2.21)
3.281***
(3.34)
3.490***
(3.55)
LnDur*GM (q2) -0.409*
(-1.65)
2.595*
(1.68)
D_GM -1.459**
(-1.98)
1.934**
(2.03)
,q1+q2 0.674
(1.23)
5.877***
(2.62)
Log-L -36.79 -36.33 -12.63 -12.81
SBIC 89.50 88.60 35.84 36.20
N. Obs. 202 202 34 34
N. Peaks 10 10 - -
N. Troughs - - 10 10
Notes: See Table 4.4 and Table 4.8. The z-statistics computed from robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Thus, for the particular case of the US, we have evidence that the decrease in
output volatility has indeed contributed to smooth the fluctuations in economic
activity, making expansions longer and contractions shorter in this country. But, that
does not seem to be the case for the other countries, which may indicate that the
“moderation” in their output volatility was not, in general, as “great”, sharp and
stabilising as in the US.
111 These results should be analysed with a small grain of salt due to the small number of business
cycle turning points available. This is also the reason for estimating a basic specification only, i.e. a
specification without additional regressors. Nevertheless, results were not sensitive to small changes
in the threshold date. For example, considering the threshold reported by Summers (2005) for the US
(1984Q4), no significant changes are found in the results (see Table A.4.1.4 in Annex).
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4.4. Conclusions
The study of the duration of business cycle phases has essentially
concentrated on testing for the presence of positive duration dependence, i.e. whether
expansions and contractions are more likely to end as they become older. Duration
analysis and Markov-switching models have been the most common approaches used
in literature to test for duration dependence. The majority of studies have analysed
this issue for the US business cycle and most of them have been successful in finding
some evidence of positive duration dependence for expansions and contractions.
However, little attention has been given to the potential effects of other
economic processes. In fact, even if duration dependence is present, other underlying
mechanisms can affect the likelihood of an expansion or recession ending. As a way
of filling that gap in the literature, this study considers a leading indicator and some
economic and political variables in the analysis of the duration of business cycle
phases.
Using for the first time a discrete-time duration model in the analysis of the
duration of expansions and contractions, this chapter shows that duration dependence
is not the only factor that can explain the duration of a business cycle phase. Positive
duration dependence is found for both expansions and contractions, but the duration
of expansions is also significantly lengthened by a positive behaviour of the variables
in the OECD composite leading indicator. Two of its components (the interest rate
spread and the stock market price index) contribute greatly to this outcome. The
duration of contractions is essentially explained by the duration of the previous
expansion, which indicates that the vigorous economic activity and the solid
fundamentals that characterize longer expansions tend to have significant vestiges in
subsequent contractions, making them shorter.
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The likelihood of an expansion ending is also affected by the behaviour of
private investment, the price of oil and by external influences. The evidence provided
by this study shows that the duration of expansions tends to increase when private
investment accelerates, reflecting the idea that when economic agents are confident
about the future path of the economy, they end up fulfilling that expectation by
investing more. The price of oil is another variable that is commonly related to the
occurrence of important recessions after WWII, especially in the 1970s. This study
finds empirical evidence regarding this relation and shows that when the price of oil
increases the likelihood of an expansion ending also increases significantly. As the
energy resources that firms need to operate become more expensive – and oil is an
important one – their profits tend to decrease, generating an economic slowdown
and, subsequently, a recession.
There is also some evidence that when the US economy reaches a peak (and
enters into recession), the likelihood of an expansion ending increases substantially
in the other industrial countries. No evidence of a similar effect is found when the
US economy exits from a contraction. Political conditionings have not proved to be
as important as economic factors to explain the duration of the business cycle phases
and no support was found to the idea that fiscal rules have lengthened recessions in
the EU. Finally, the “Great Moderation” in output volatility corresponds to a period
in which evidence of positive duration dependence disappears for expansions and
increases for contractions in the US economy. However, evidence also shows that
such result cannot be generalized to the panel of countries analysed in this study.
Summarizing all these results, we conclude that the duration of expansions
and contractions is not only affected by their actual age, but also by the behaviour of
other economic factors, some of which encompass the expectations of the economic
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agents about the future trend of the economy. Moreover, contractions tend to present
evidence of increasing positive duration dependence, whilst constant positive
duration dependence is found for expansions, which means that the probability of a
contraction ending increases more rapidly with its age than an expansion.
In this study we analyse the determinants of the duration of the classical
business cycle phases. As the ECRI also provides data for growth cycles for the
countries analysed in this study, an interesting extension would be to test whether the
conclusions obtained for the classical business cycles can also be obtained using
growth cycles.
Finally, instead of using ECRI classical business cycles or growth cycles, we
could implement an algorithm to identify the business cycle turning points using, for
example, a GDP, GNP or industrial production series. Such a procedure would allow
us to study the behaviour of the business cycle phases in other countries, especially
in the EU countries for which the ECRI does not provide data on the business cycle
turning points. This would provide a more complete analysis for the group of EU
countries. A drawback of this procedure is the fact that as we have to rely on a single
series to identify the turning points, we may not be doing an effective analysis of the
duration of classical expansions and contractions.
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Annex 4.1. Business cycle chronologies, description of the variables
and robustness checks
Table A.4.1.1. Business cycle chronologies, 1948-2006
EU countries Non-EU countries
Peak Trough Peak Through
Austria August 1974
February 1980
April 1992
May 1995
January 2001
June 1975
January 1983
June 1993
March 1996
December 2001
Australia June 1951
December 1955
December 1960
June 1974
June 1982
June 1990
September 1952
August 1956
September 1961
January 1975
May 1983
December 1991
France November 1957
July 1974
August 1979
April 1982
February 1992
August 2002
April 1959
June 1975
June 1980
December 1984
August 1993
May 2003
Canada May 1953
October 1956
April 1981
March 1990
June 1954
February 1958
November 1982
March 1992
Germany March 1966
August 1973
January 1980
January 1991
January 2001
May 1967
July 1975
October 1982
March 1994
August 2003
Japan -
November 1973
April 1992
March 1997
August 2000
December 1954
February 1975
February 1994
July 1999
April 2003
Italy January 1964
October 1970
April 1974
May 1980
February 1992
March 1965
August 1971
April 1975
May 1983
October 1993
New
Zealand
June 1966
April 1974
March 1977
April 1982
November 1984
September 1986
October 1997
March 1968
March 1975
March 1978
May 1983
March 1986
June 1991
May 1998
Spain March 1980
November 1991
May 1984
December 1993
Switzerland April 1974
September 1981
March 1990
December 1994
March 2001
March 1976
November 1982
September 1993
September 1996
March 2003
Sweden October 1970
July 1975
February 1980
June 1990
November 1971
November 1977
June 1983
July 1993
United
States
November 1948
July 1953
August 1957
April 1960
December 1969
November 1973
January 1980
July 1981
July 1990
March 2001
October 1949
May 1954
April 1958
February 1961
November 1970
March 1975
July 1980
November 1982
March 1991
November 2001
United
Kingdom
-
September 1974
June 1979
May 1990
August 1952
August 1975
May 1981
March 1992
Notes: Chronologies for the United States, Canada, Australia and Germany start in 1948, but for the other
countries (and due to lack of data) the ECRI could not identify peaks and troughs for some years after
1948. The time periods considered by the ECRI for each of the other countries are the following: Austria
(1962-2006), France (1953-2006), Italy (1956-2006), Spain (1969-2006), Sweden (1969-2006), United
Kingdom (1951-2006), Japan (1953-2006), New Zealand (1962-2006), and Switzerland (1956-2006).
Sources: NBER website at http://www.nber.org/cycles/main.html, updated in April 2007;
ECRI website at http://www.businesscycle.com/resources/cycles/, updated in April 2007.
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Table A.4.1.2. Description of the variables and respective sources
Business cycle variables
Peak Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the quarter in which a business cycle peak is
reached, and 0 otherwise (dependent variable).
Trough Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the quarter in which a business cycle trough is
reached, and 0 otherwise (dependent variable).
BCExpan Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a country is in expansion and 0 when the
country is in contraction.
BCContr Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a country is in contraction and 0 when the
country is in expansion.
Dur Variable that measures the duration of the event (expansion or contraction), in quarters.
LnDur Logarithm of the variable Dur.
DurPrev Duration of the previous phase, in quarters.
PeakUS Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the quarter in which a peak in the US business
cycle is reached, and 0 otherwise.
TroughUS Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the quarter in which a trough in the US business
cycle is reached, and 0 otherwise.
Sources: ECRI (April, 2007) and NBER (April, 2007).
Economic variables
CLI OECD composite leading indicator: 6-months rate of change at annual rate.
Spread Interest rate spread which is equal to long-term interest rate on government bonds (10-year
government bonds) minus short-term interest rate (3-month inter-bank rates).
Stock Quarterly growth rate of the stock price index (in percentage).
GPInv Quarterly growth rate of real private total fixed capital formation (in percentage).
GovI/C Government fixed capital formation divided by government final consumption expenditure.
OilPr Crude oil import price deflated to real values using the GDP deflators of each country (base
year: 2000), in USD per barrel. The oil price was first converted to each national currency
using period average nominal exchange rates with the US dollar and then divided by the
respective GDP deflators. To make these values comparable between countries, the real oil
price is converted again to US dollars at the average nominal exchange rate of 2000.
Sources: OECD Main Economic Indicators (data obtained from the International Statistical Yearbook database,
update: May 2007) and OECD Economic Outlook (data obtained from the OECD Statistical
Compendium database, update: May 2007).
Political variables
PolCycle Political cycle indicator: it measures the phase of the political cycle, i.e. the proportion of the
government term in office that elapsed at each quarter; the required dates of elections to
compute this variable were collected from Armingeon et al. (2005) for the period 1960-2004
and updated for 2005 and 2006 with data from http://www.electionworld.org.
GovLeft Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a left-wing government is in office during the
last year, and 0 otherwise; this variable was computed from the variable GovParty in
Armingeon et al. (2005); a government is labelled as left-wing when GovParty is equal to 4
or 5; data from the site http://www.electionworld.org was also used to update this variable.
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Table A.4.1.3. Estimates for the Great Moderation using Summers’ (2005) thresholds
Expansions . All countries . . EU countries . . Non-EU countries .
LnDur 0.584***
(3.76)
0.639***
(2.70)
0.632***
(2.59)
0.777***
(3.46)
0.697**
(2.38)
0.748**
(2.30)
0.467**
(2.17)
0.881**
(2.14)
0.791**
(2.06)
LnDur*GM -0.021
(-0.22)
0.001
(0.01)
0.083
(0.55)
0.133
(0.77)
-0.098
(-0.78)
-0.142
(-0.90)
CLI(-1) -0.158***
(-4.56)
-0.158***
(-4.60)
-0.154***
(-3.52)
-0.151***
(-3.53)
-0.272***
(-3.89)
-0.271***
(-3.91)
DurPrev 0.290
(1.60)
0.293
(1.58)
GPInv(-1) -0.117*
(-1.68)
-0.117*
(-1.69)
-0.234**
(-2.38)
-0.232**
(-2.36)
OilPr(-1) 0.012***
(2.85)
0.011***
(2.73)
0.013***
(2.82)
0.012***
(2.64)
0.031*
(1.84)
0.035*
(1.89)
PeakUS 1.664***
(3.65)
1.661***
(3.65)
1.940***
(3.89)
1.927***
(3.85)
D_GM -0.074
(-0.16)
0.207
(0.34)
-0.422
(-0.88)
,q1+q2 0.563***
(3.53)
0.640**
(2.41)
0.860***
(3.14)
0.830**
(2.24)
0.368*
(1.80)
0.739**
(1.96)
Log-L -285.6 -127.1 -127.1 -131.3 -84.72 -85.00 -153.1 -66.38 -66.43
SBIC 686.9 375.4 375.4 325.9 256.5 257.1 362.3 204.1 204.2
N. Obs. 2242 1252 1252 1141 813 813 1101 658 658
N. Peaks 66 36 36 30 26 26 36 19 19
Contractions
LnDur 1.954***
(5.57)
1.874***
(4.24)
1.678***
(4.59)
1.551***
(3.29)
1.665***
(3.10)
1.426***
(3.60)
2.342***
(5.16)
2.514***
(2.62)
2.363**
(2.56)
LnDur*GM -0.580**
(-2.33)
-0.322
(-0.93)
-0.266
(-0.64)
-0.367
(-0.81)
-0.816***
(-3.24)
-0.293
(-0.58)
CLI(-1) 0.075*
(1.95)
0.074*
(1.86)
0.106*
(1.86)
0.112*
(1.86)
0.034
(0.64)
0.021
(0.38)
DurPrev 0.027***
(2.87)
0.027***
(2.71)
0.033**
(2.31)
0.029*
(1.91)
0.023*
(1.66)
0.026**
(2.13)
D_GM -0.489
(-0.77)
-0.797
(-0.86)
-0.022
(-0.03)
,q1+q2 1.374***
(5.21)
1.552***
(4.10)
1.286***
(3.80)
1.298***
(3.18)
1.526***
(3.78)
2.281**
(2.29)
Log-L -154.0 -114.1 -114.3 -77.26 -66.50 -66.29 -75.55 -46.26 -46.45
SBIC 398.9 327.7 328.1 203.2 191.6 191.2 193.8 142.1 142.5
N. Obs. 430 348 348 223 206 206 207 142 142
N. Troughs 68 50 50 31 28 28 37 22 22
Notes: See Table 4.4, Table 4.8 and footnote 110.
Table A.4.1.4. Estimates for the GM in the U.S. using Summers’(2005) threshold
. Expansions . . Contractions .
LnDur (q1) 1.090**
(2.40)
1.052**
(2.33)
3.281***
(3.34)
3.490***
(3.55)
LnDur*GM (q2) -0.460*
(-1.81)
2.595*
(1.68)
D_GM -1.618**
(-2.20)
1.934**
(2.03)
,q1+q2 0.629
(1.14)
5.877***
(2.62)
Log-L -36.36 -35.78 -12.63 -12.81
SBIC 88.64 87.49 35.84 36.20
N. Obs. 202 202 34 34
N. Peaks 10 10 - -
N. Troughs - - 10 10
Notes: See Table 4.4, Table 4.8, Table 4.9 and footnote 111.
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5. Can central banks’ monetary policy be described by a
linear (augmented) Taylor rule or by a nonlinear rule?
5.1. Introduction
Since the establishment, by Taylor (1993), of the linear algebraic interest rate
rule that specifies how the Federal Reserve (Fed) of the United States (US) adjusts its
Federal Funds rate to inflation and the output gap, several papers have emerged to
test the validity of that rule for other countries and time periods.
Some studies have recently extended the Taylor rule by considering the
effects of other variables in the conduct of monetary policy. One important extension
is related to the inclusion of asset prices and financial variables in the rule.112 This
issue has caused a huge discussion in the literature: while some authors consider it
important that central banks target asset prices, others disagree. To contribute to this
discussion, we ask whether the basic Taylor rule could instead be augmented with an
alternative variable that collects and synthesises the information from the asset and
financial markets, i.e. whether central banks are targeting the relevant economic
information contained in a group of financial variables and not simply targeting each
financial variable per se. Thus, the first aim of this chapter is to estimate a linear
Taylor rule for the Eurozone, US and United Kingdom (UK) augmented with a
financial conditions index that captures the relevant economic information contained
in some financial variables. The main innovation is that instead of relying on
112 See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), Cecchetti et al. (2000), Chadha et al. (2004)
and Driffill et al. (2006).
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particular asset prices or financial variables, like other studies do, the index built in
this chapter synthesises the relevant information provided by those variables in a
single variable where the weight of each asset and financial variable is allowed to
vary over time. In fact, the central bank may not be targeting a particular asset or
financial variable all the time, but it is possible that it may target it in some
occasions, i.e. when, for some reason, it acquires particular economic relevance.
Thus, synthesising the information from several assets and financial variables in a
weighted index permits to extract the particular economic relevance of each variable
at each point in time and, therefore, to put together an amount of information that is
more likely to be targeted by the central bank at any time.
The results from the estimation of a linear Taylor rule indicate that the
European Central Bank (ECB) targets the information contained in the financial
conditions index developed in this study, but the Fed and Bank of England (BOE) are
not doing so; they only take into account one or two financial variables and clearly
do not target asset prices. This is an interesting result that might help us to
understand part of the story behind the recent credit crunch.
The traditional Taylor rule is an optimal policy rule that is derived from the
minimization of a symmetric quadratic central bank’s loss function assuming that the
aggregate supply function is linear. However, in reality, this may not be the case and
the central bank can have asymmetric preferences – i.e. it might assign different
weights to negative and positive inflation and output gaps in its loss function –
therefore, following not a linear but a nonlinear Taylor rule. Only very recently some
studies started to consider these asymmetries or nonlinearities in the analysis of
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monetary policy.113 This dissertation extends the analysis into two areas not yet
explored by those studies. First, it applies, for the first time, a nonlinear model to the
study of the ECB’s monetary policy, where the presence of asymmetries is taken into
account directly in the structure of the model. This procedure will permit an answer
to the following questions: Can the ECB’s monetary policy be characterized by a
nonlinear Taylor rule, or more precisely, is the ECB reacting differently to levels of
inflation above and below the target? Does the ECB attempt to hit the inflation target
precisely or keep inflation within a certain range? Second, this study also extends the
nonlinear specification of the Taylor rule with the financial conditions index used in
the linear estimations to check whether, after controlling for nonlinearities, the ECB
and the other two central banks are still (or not) reacting to the information contained
in that index.
The results of the estimation of the nonlinear smooth transition regression
model are very interesting. First, they show that the ECB’s monetary policy is best
described by a nonlinear monetary rule than by a linear Taylor rule: it only reacts
actively to inflation when it is above 2.5%; and it only starts to react to the business
cycle when inflation is stabilised, i.e. well below 2.5%. Although this estimated
threshold is slightly higher than the official target of 2%, this is an empirical result
that confirms quite remarkably the main principles of the ECB’s monetary policy.
Second, the results also show that the ECB – contrary to the other central banks –
continues to consider the information contained in the financial index even after
nonlinearities are controlled for. Third, we find weak evidence to reject the linear
model for the US. However, we find enough evidence to reject it for the UK, where
113 See Martin and Milas (2004), Taylor and Davradakis (2006), Assenmacher-Wesche (2006), Surico
(2007a, 2007b) and Petersen (2007).
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the BOE seems to be pursuing a target range of 1.8%-2.4% for inflation rather than
the current official point target of 2%.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents a
brief review of the literature on the Taylor rule. The specification used to estimate
the linear Taylor rule is described in Section 5.3; this section also presents the data
and analyses the empirical results of the estimation of that specification. The model
used to estimate the nonlinear Taylor rule is presented and analysed in Section 5.4, as
well as the results of its estimation. Section 5.5 emphasises the main findings of this
chapter and concludes.
5.2. A brief review of the literature on the Taylor rule
This section intends to provide a brief review of the literature on the Taylor
rule, emphasizing the main contributions that motivate the analysis presented in this
chapter.
In its original form, the Taylor rule assumes that central banks use past or
current values of inflation and output gap to set up the interest rate. However, in
practice, they tend to rely on all available information – concerning the expected
evolution of prices – when defining the interest rate. For that reason, Clarida et al.
(1998, 2000) suggest the use of a forward-looking version of the Taylor rule where
central banks target expected inflation and the output gap instead of past or current
values of these variables. That practice allows the central bank to take various
relevant variables into account when forming its forecasts.114 They demonstrate its
advantages in the analysis of the policy behaviour of the Fed and other influential
114 Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) also suggest to include an interest rate smoothing in the estimation of
the Taylor rule. The reasons for its inclusion are discussed below in the description of the model.
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central banks. Fourçans and Vranceanu (2004) and Sauer and Sturm (2007) also
stress the importance of considering a forward-looking Taylor rule in the analysis of
the ECB’s monetary policy.115
Some studies extend this linear rule by considering the effect of other
variables in the conduct of monetary policy. For example, Fourçans and Vranceanu
(2004) present some evidence of an ECB response to the exchange rate deviations
from its average. A similar result is found by Chadha et al. (2004) for the Fed, Bank
of England and Bank of Japan and by Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) for the central
banks of Canada and England. Considering the role of money supply in the ECB
reaction function, Fendel and Frenkel (2006) and Surico (2007b) conclude that it
does not affect the ECB’s behaviour directly but it is a good instrument to predict
future inflation.
The role of asset prices is an important issue considered in some studies.
However, no consensus was reached about whether the central bank should or should
not target this kind of variables. Cecchetti et al. (2000), Borio and Lowe (2002),
Goodhart and Hofmann (2002), Chadha et al. (2004) and Rotondi and Vaciago
(2005) consider it important that central banks target asset prices and provide strong
support and evidence in that direction. On the contrary, Bernanke and Gertler (1999,
2001) and Bullard and Schaling (2002) do not agree with an ex-ante control over
asset prices. They consider that once the predictive content of asset prices for
inflation has been accounted for, monetary authorities should not respond to
movements in asset prices. Instead, central banks should act only if it is expected that
115 However, on the other hand, Arestis and Chortareas (2006) are sceptical about characterizing the
ECB’s monetary policy in terms of a linear Taylor rule, mainly because the ECB’s perception about
the equilibrium real interest rate may have changed over its (short) life.
175
they affect inflation forecast or after the burst of a financial bubble in order to avoid
damages to the real economy.
On the other hand, Driffill et al. (2006) analyse the interactions between
monetary policy and the futures market in the context of a linear reaction function.
They find evidence supporting the inclusion of futures prices in the central bank’s
reaction function as a proxy for financial stability. The issue of financial stability is
also investigated by Montagnoli and Napolitano (2005). They build and use a
financial conditional indicator that includes the exchange rate, share prices and house
prices in the estimation of a Taylor rule for some central banks. Their results show
that this indicator can be helpful in modelling the conduct of monetary policy.
Considering these developments, our first aim is simply to estimate a linear Taylor
rule for the Eurozone, US and UK, where the information from some financial
variables is accounted for to shed some more light on its (un)importance.
In all the studies mentioned so far, the Taylor rule is considered as a simple
linear interest rate rule that represents an optimal policy-rule under the condition that
the central bank is minimising a symmetric quadratic loss function and that the
aggregate supply function is linear. However, in reality, this may not be the case and
the central bank can have asymmetric preferences and, therefore, follow a nonlinear
Taylor rule. If the central bank is indeed assigning different weights to negative and
positive inflation and output gaps in its loss function, then a nonlinear Taylor rule
seems to be more adequate to explain the behaviour of monetary policy.116 However,
only recently the literature has started to consider nonlinear models or asymmetries
in the analysis of monetary policy. Asymmetries in monetary policy can result from a
nonlinear macroeconomic model (Dolado et al., 2005), nonlinear central bank
116 Additional reasons to consider a nonlinear reaction function are provided by Bordo and Jeanne
(2002) and Chadha et al. (2004).
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preferences (Dolado et al., 2000, Nobay and Peel, 2003, Ruge-Murcia, 2003 and
Surico, 2007a) or both (Surico, 2007b). In particular, Surico (2007b) studies the
presence of nonlinearities in the ECB monetary policy for the period January 1999-
December 2004, estimating a linear GMM model resulting from the derivation of a
loss function with asymmetric preferences and considering a convex aggregate
supply curve. He finds that output contractions imply larger monetary policy
responses than output expansions of the same size, but no asymmetric response is
found for inflation. With more data available and using a different model – more
precisely, a nonlinear model – we expect to find evidence of an asymmetric response
of the ECB to inflation as well.
The nonlinear monetary policy rule used in our analysis takes into account the
asymmetries in the macroeconomic model and in the central bank preferences
implicitly and generalizes the Taylor rule in the tradition of Clarida et al. (1998,
2000). Instead of simply relying on a linear model, à la Surico (2007b), where the
asymmetries are accounted for by using products and cross products of inflation and
output gap or by a separate analysis for inflation above or below the target, this study
estimates a nonlinear model for monetary policy where the presence of asymmetries
is taken into account directly in the structure of the model. Besides analysing
monetary policy asymmetries, this procedure will permit an answer to the question of
whether a central bank follows a point target or a target range for inflation.
Some studies have applied Markov-switching models to the study of
monetary policy asymmetries or nonlinearities (Kaufmann, 2002, Altavilla and
Landolfo, 2005, Assenmacher-Wesche, 2006). All find evidence of asymmetries,
especially regarding the phases of the business cycle. In other words, they find that
monetary authorities tend to have a different behaviour during recessions and
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expansions. Only Assenmacher-Wesche (2006) presents evidence of an asymmetric
behaviour of monetary authorities (Fed, Bundesbank and BOE) to inflation above or
below their targets. However, as these models assume that the regime switches are
exogenous and driven by an unobservable process, it is not able to account for the
intuition behind the nonlinear central bank behaviour. Like the linear models referred
to above and used to capture asymmetries in the monetary policy, Markov-switching
models are not able to establish whether a central bank follows a point target or a
target range for inflation. Finally, it does not allow for a smooth transition between
regimes, which is an important drawback and a considerable departure from reality
especially when inflation-regimes are considered. In that case, regime transitions are
not generally sudden but smooth.
Bec et al. (2000) use a smooth transition autoregressive specification to
model monetary policy in the US, Germany and France allowing for monetary policy
to vary between periods of booms and slumps. They find relevant evidence of a
nonlinear behaviour of monetary authorities regarding the phases of the business
cycle. Our study adopts a different perspective. Instead of focusing on nonlinearities
from the output gap, we allow for monetary policy changes between periods of high
and low inflation. Note that inflation is actually the most important variable targeted
by the central banks analysed in this study, especially for the ECB and UK whose
main objective is precisely to promote price stability. Furthermore, contrary to Bec et
al. (2000), we allow for the possibility of interest rate smoothing.
To our knowledge, only Martin and Milas (2004) and Petersen (2007) have
deeply focused their attention on models that allow for a smooth transition from a
state of high inflation to a state of low inflation (and vice-versa) in the context of the
Taylor rule. These models seem to provide a better framework to explain nonlinear
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policy behaviours because as they allow for endogenous regime switches – in
contrast to the Markov-switching model – they offer economic intuition to
understand the nonlinear policy behaviour of a central bank. Furthermore, they have
the advantage of being capable of explaining why and when a central bank has
changed its policy rule.
Martin and Milas (2004) apply a nonlinear quadratic logistic smooth
transition model to the BOE’s monetary policy. They concentrate their analysis on
the policy of inflation targeting set up in 1992 and find evidence of nonlinearities in
the conduct of monetary policy over the period 1992-2000.117 They show that the UK
monetary authorities attempt to keep inflation within a range rather than pursuing a
point target and tend to react more actively to upward than to downward deviations
of inflation away from the target range. The only shortcoming of the paper is that
they do not provide a test for the adequacy of the model, i.e. the authors do not test
the validity of their nonlinear model against a linear one or against other nonlinear
alternatives. This is a key issue that we will cover in this study.
More recently, Petersen (2007) applies a simple logistic smooth transition
regression model to the monetary policy of the Fed over the period 1985-2005 using
a basic Taylor rule and finds the presence of nonlinearities: once inflation approaches
a certain threshold, the Fed begins to respond more forcefully to inflation. However,
Petersen (2007) does not take into account the degree of interest rate smoothing or
the possibility of the Taylor rule being forward-looking. Therefore, a nonlinear
117 Using a simple threshold autoregressive model, i.e. without allowing a smooth transition between
high and low inflation regimes, Taylor and Davradakis (2006) also find evidence of nonlinearities in
the conduct of monetary policy by the BOE over the period 1992-2003. In particular, they find that
UK monetary authorities tend to react more actively to inflation when it is above target.
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analysis considering those aspects in the Fed behaviour is needed.118 We will provide
such an analysis and extend the nonlinear monetary rule with other variables, like the
ones that provide information on the financial conditions. Furthermore, using data for
the Eurozone, this study will be, to our knowledge, the first to apply a nonlinear
model with smooth regime transition to the study of the ECB’s monetary policy.
5.3. Specification and estimation of the linear Taylor rule
A basic linear Taylor rule is specified and estimated in this section. We start
by describing the rule in its contemporaneous and forward-looking versions. Then
we proceed with its estimation for the Eurozone, the US and the UK. In Section 5.4
we will consider the case of a nonlinear rule.
5.3.1. The linear Taylor rule
The following rule was proposed by Taylor (1993) to characterise the
monetary policy in the US over the period 1987-1992:
).()( **** tttt yyri   (5.1)
This rule regards the nominal short-term interest rate (i*) as the monetary
policy instrument and assumes that it should rise if inflation (π) rises above its target
(π*) or if output (y) increases above its trend or potential value (y*). Therefore, β
indicates the sensitivity of interest rate policy to deviations in inflation from the
118 Qin and Enders (2008) also consider such a model among the several (linear) models that they
estimate for the Fed and where they allow for interest rate smoothing and forward-looking behaviour.
Their aim is simply to examine the in-sample and out-of-sample properties of linear and nonlinear
Taylor rules for the US economy. However, unlike Petersen (2007), they did not find evidence of
significant nonlinearities in the Fed’s behaviour during the period 1987-2005.
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target and γ indicates the sensitivity of interest rate to the output gap. In equilibrium,
the deviation of inflation and output from their target values is zero and, therefore,
the desired interest rate (i*) is the sum of the equilibrium real rate ( r ) plus the target
value of inflation.119
Taylor’s (1993) original rule considers the deviation of inflation over the last
four quarters from its target. However, in practice, central banks do not tend to target
past or current inflation but expected inflation. For that reason, Clarida et al. (1998)
suggest the use of a forward-looking version of the Taylor rule. This version allows
the central bank to take various relevant variables into account when forming its
inflation forecasts. Therefore, according to Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), the central
bank’s desired level for interest rate (i*) depends on the deviation of expected
inflation k periods ahead (in annual rates) from its target value and the expected
output gap p periods ahead, which yields the following forward-looking Taylor
rule:120
],|)[(])|([ **** tptptttkttt yyEEri    (5.2)
where E is the expectations operator and Ωt is a vector including all the available
information for the central bank at the time it sets the interest rate.
According to the ‘Taylor principle’, for the monetary policy to be stabilizing
the coefficient on the inflation gap (β) should exceed unity and the coefficient on the
output gap (γ) should be positive. A coefficient greater than unity on the inflation gap
means that the central bank increases the real rate in response to higher inflation,
119 According to Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), both the equilibrium real rate and the inflation target are
assumed to be constant.
120 Although empirically motivated, this rule can also be obtained from the central bank’s loss
function under the assumption that the evolution of the economy is described by the New-Keynesian
model. Annex 5.1 shows how the monetary rule can be derived in such a framework.
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which exerts a stabilizing effect on inflation; on the other hand, β<1 indicates an
accommodative behaviour of interest rates to inflation, which may generate self-
fulfilling bursts of inflation and output. A positive coefficient on the output gap
means that in situations in which output is below its potential a decrease in the
interest rate will have a stabilizing effect on the economy.
A common procedure when estimating monetary policy reaction functions is
to control for the observed autocorrelation in interest rates. This is usually done by
assuming that the central bank does not adjust the interest rate immediately to its
desired level but is concerned about interest rate smoothing. Several theoretical
justifications are advanced in the literature for the inclusion of interest rate
smoothing in the Taylor rule, like the fear of disruptions in the financial markets, the
existence of transaction frictions, the existence of a zero nominal interest rate lower
bound or even uncertainty about the effects of economic shocks. Thus, if the central
bank adjusts interest rates gradually towards the desired level, the dynamics of
adjustment of the current level of the interest rate to its target is generically given by:
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where the sum of ρj captures the degree of interest rate smoothing and j represents
the number of lags. The number of lags in this equation is generally chosen on
empirical grounds so that autocorrelation in the residuals is absent.
Defining *)1(   r , *~ ptptpt yyy   and inserting equation (5.3) into
(5.2), assuming that the central bank is able to control interest rates only up to an
independent and identically distributed stochastic error (u), yields the following
equation:
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which is the specification that is usually estimated in the literature. This rule can be
easily extended to include an additional vector of other m explanatory variables (x)
that may potentially influence interest rate setting. To do that we just need to add
)|(' tqtt xE  to the terms in square brackets in (5.4), where θ is a vector of
coefficients associated with the additional variables.121 Eliminating the unobserved
forecast variables from this equation, the policy rule can be rewritten in terms of
realized variables:
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where the error term εt is a linear combination of the forecast errors of inflation,
output, the vector of additional exogenous variables and the disturbance ut.122
Equation (5.5) will be estimated by the generalized method of moments
(GMM). According to Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), this method is well suited for the
econometric analysis of interest rate rules when the regressions are run on variables
that are not known by the central bank at the decision-making moment. To
implement this method, the following set of orthogonality conditions is imposed:
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121 Note that q can be zero, positive or negative depending on the kind of additional variable(s)
considered.
122 For further details, see Clarida et al. (1998, 2000).
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where vt is a vector of (instrumental) variables within the central bank’s information
set at the time it chooses the interest rate and that are orthogonal with regard to εt.
Among them we may have a set of lagged variables that help to predict inflation, the
output gap and the additional exogenous variables, together with other contemporary
variables that should not be correlated to the current disturbance ut. An optimal
weighting matrix that accounts for possible heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
in εt is used in the estimation. Considering that the dimension of the instrument
vector vt exceeds the number of parameters being estimated, some overidentifying
restrictions must be tested in order to assess the validity of the specification and the
set of instruments used. In that context, Hansen’s (1982) overidentification test is
implemented: under the null hypothesis the set of instruments is considered valid; the
rejection of orthogonality implies that the central bank does not adjust its behaviour
to the information about future inflation and output contained in the instrumental
variables. Since in that case some instruments are correlated with vt, the set of
orthogonality conditions will be violated, which leads to a rejection of the model.
In practice, to proceed with the estimation of equation (5.5), we consider the
following reduced form:
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where the new vector of parameters is related to the former as follows:
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i
j . Therefore, given the estimates of the
parameters obtained from (5.7), we can recover the implied estimates of α, β, γ, and θ
and the respective standard errors by using the delta method. Following Clarida et al.
(1998), we consider the average of the observed real interest rate over the period in
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analysis as the equilibrium real interest rate. Hence, we can obtain an estimate of the
implicit inflation target pursued by the central bank as follows: )1ˆ/()ˆ(ˆ*   r .
5.3.2. Data, variables and additional hypotheses to test
The data used in this study are monthly123 and mostly obtained from the
statistics published by the three central banks analysed here: ECB Statistics, Fred II
for the Fed and BOE Statistics. Other sources are used, especially for data on the
additional exogenous variables that we will consider in this study. A detailed
description of all variables used in this analysis and respective sources is provided in
Annex (see Table A.5.2.1). Figures 5.1 to 5.3 show the evolution of the main
variables considered in this study for the analysis of the monetary policy followed by
each central bank.
The sample covers the following periods: January 1999-December 2007 for
the Eurozone, which corresponds to the period during which the ECB has been
operating; October 1982-December 2007 for the US, a period that starts after what is
considered in the literature as the ‘Volcker’s disinflation’; and October 1992-
December 2007 for the UK, the period during which the BOE has been operating
under inflation targeting.
123 The data are monthly because very few years of observations are available so far for the ECB. We
could try to use quarterly data, but in that case we would end up with a small number of observations.
As the GMM estimator tends to generate biased estimates in small samples, we prefer to use the more
abundant monthly frequencies.
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Figure 5.1. Evolution of the main variables used in the estimation of
the monetary rule: Eurozone (Jan. 1999 – Dec. 2007)
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Figure 5.2. Evolution of the main variables used in the estimation of
the monetary rule: US (Oct. 1983 – Dec. 2007)
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Figure 5.3. Evolution of the main variables used in the estimation of
the monetary rule: UK (Oct. 1992 – Dec. 2007)
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We consider several measures of interest rates and inflation. However, in the
estimations we decided to choose the ones that have been followed more closely by
each central bank and that permit an easy comparison of the estimation results
between the three economies. For the Eurozone we use the Euro overnight index
average lending rate (Eonia) as the policy instrument, which is the interest rate more
directly related to the key interest rate (KeyIR) and that does not suffer from the
discrete oscillations observed in the later (see Figure 5.1). The inflation rate is the
annual rate of change of the harmonized index of consumer prices (Inflation), which
is the main reference for the ECB monetary policy. The effective Federal Reserve
funds rate (FedRate) is used in the estimation of the Taylor rule for the US. The
inflation variable is the core inflation rate (CoreInfl), which excludes food and
energy and that is considered as the definition of inflation that the Fed has been
closely following (see Petersen, 2007). For the UK we use the three-month Treasury
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bill rate (TreasRate) as the nominal interest rate, which according to Martin and
Milas (2004) and Figure 5.3 has a close relationship with the (various) official
interest rate instruments used in the period analysed. The inflation rate variable is the
annual rate of change of the consumer price index (CPI), which is the main current
reference for the BOE’s monetary policy.124 Independently of the measures used for
the interest rate or inflation, Figures 5.1 to 5.3 show that both variables have
remained relatively stable and at low levels during almost all the period considered
for each of the three economies analysed in this study. In all three cases, the output
gap (OutpGap) is constructed by calculating the percentage deviation of the (log)
industrial production index from its Hodrick-Prescott trend.125 Figures 5.1 to 5.3 also
illustrate its evolution over time.
For the estimation of the ECB monetary rule, we also consider the role of
money supply. The primary objective of the ECB is price stability or, more precisely,
to keep inflation below but close 2% over the medium term. However, its mandate is
also based on an analytical framework based on two pillars: economic analysis and
monetary analysis.126 The output gap is used in our model to capture the behaviour of
the economy; to control for the role of money we include in the model the growth
rate of the monetary aggregate M3 (M3). In theory, we expect the ECB to increase
the interest rate when M3 is higher than the reference value of 4.5% defined by this
124 The former measure of inflation targeted by the BOE, i.e. the inflation rate computed from the
retail price index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX inflation), will also be considered in
the robustness analysis for the BOE’s monetary policy.
125 Industrial production is used as proxy for output because monthly data for GDP are not available,
in particular, for the ECB. For the Fed and BOE we can find some monthly estimates for real GDP.
Even so and regarding the unavailability of monthly GDP series for the ECB, we prefer to use, not
estimates, but the data effectively observed and provided by the industrial production index (as a
proxy for output) for comparative purposes.
126 For details on the two-pillar approach see, for example, Arestis and Chortareas (2006).
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institution for the growth of money. Whether this variable has indeed been targeted
by the ECB or not is not clear and has been a matter of huge discussion to which this
analysis tries to contribute.127
Financial variables and asset prices represent another group of variables that
have recently been considered in the specification of the Taylor rule for the analysis
of the behaviour of central banks. In this study we consider the effects of those
variables not per se but including them in an index in which each of them will have a
different weight. The weight depends on the relative economic importance of each
variable at each particular moment in time. Thus, the next step is devoted to the
construction of a financial conditions index (FCI) designed to capture misalignments
in the financial markets. Some monetary and financial indices have been used in the
literature as a measure of the stance of monetary policy and aggregate demand
conditions. Therefore, it is expected that such indices can be able to capture current
developments in the financial markets and give a good indication of future economic
activity. Those indices may also contain some useful information about future
inflationary pressures, which can then be taken into account by central banks in their
reaction functions. Usually, the FCI is obtained from the weighted average of short-
term real interest rate, real effective exchange rate, real share prices and real property
prices.128 The first two variables measure the effects of changes in the monetary
policy stance on domestic and external demand conditions, whilst the other two
collect wealth effects on aggregate demand.
In this analysis, besides computing the FCI we also construct a new and
extended FCI (EFCI) from the weighted average of the real effective exchange rate,
real share prices and real property prices plus credit spread and futures interest rate
127 On this discussion see, for example, Fendel and Frenkel (2006) and Surico (2007b).
128 See Goodhart and Hoofmann (2001).
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spread.129 Following Montagnoli and Napolitano (2005), we use a Kalman Filter
algorithm to determine the weight of each asset. This procedure allows those weights
to vary over time. Goodhart and Hoofmann (2001) propose other methodologies to
compute financial indices – like the estimation of a structural VAR system or the
simple estimation of a reduced-form aggregate demand equation – in which they
assume that the weight associated with each variable is fixed. However, in reality, it
is more likely that the economic agents’ portfolios change with the business cycles.
Hence, this study relaxes the assumption of fixed weights and allows for the
possibility of structural changes over time. Moreover, we extend the FCI proposed in
those two studies by considering the two additional financial variables indicated
above. From the central bank’s point of view, those variables may contain further
relevant information regarding markets stability and expectations. The credit spread
is considered as a good leading indicator of the business cycle and of financial stress;
and the changes in futures interest rate spread provide an indication of the degree of
volatility in economic agents’ expectations that the central bank aims to reduce.130
To consider the importance of financial variables in the conduct of monetary
policy, we extend Rudebusch and Svensson’s (1999) model by adding those
variables to the intertemporal equilibrium condition (which yields equation (5.9)
below).131 The general result is a simple backward-looking version of the model in
which the economy is defined by the following two equations:
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129 As the real interest rate is already incorporated in the monetary rule discussed above, it is not
included in the construction of our EFCI.
130 See Driffill et al. (2006) for the use of these two variables in the estimation of a Taylor rule for the
US.
131 For further details, see Goodhart and Hoofmann (2001) and Montagnoli and Napolitano (2005).
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where rir is the de-trended real interest rate132 and the financial variables (x) are the
deviation from the long run equilibrium of, respectively:133 the real exchange rate
(REER_gap), where the foreign currency is in the denominator; real stock prices
(RStock_gap); real house prices (RHPI_gap); the credit spread (CredSprd),
computed as the spread between the 10-year government benchmark bond yield
(Yield10yr) and the interest rate return on commercial corporate bonds; and the
change in the spread (ΔFutSprd) between the 3-month interest rate futures contracts
in the previous quarter (FutIR) and the current short-term interest rate. All these
variables produce valuable financial information that can be compressed into a
simple indicator and then included in the central banks’ monetary rule to test whether
and how they react to this information when they are setting up the interest rate.134
Allowing for the possibility that the parameters are evolving over time, this
means that an unobservable change in any coefficient bijt can be estimated employing
the Kalman filter over the state-space form of equation (5.9):
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where the error terms are assumed to be independent white noises with variance-
covariance matrices given by QVar t )( and RVar t )( , and with
,0)( stVar  for all t and s. X is the matrix of explanatory variables plus a
132 The real interest rate is obtained by subtracting the inflation rate from the nominal short-term
interest rate.
133 The long run equilibrium values are computed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
134 Unit root and stationarity tests reported below in Table 5.1 show that all these variables are
stationary, as required, for the three economies.
191
constant; all variables are lagged one period. The state vector βt contains all the slope
coefficients that are now varying over time. As it is assumed that they follow a
random walk process, the matrix F is equal to the identity matrix. The Kalman filter
allows us to recover the dynamics of the relationship between the output gap and its
explanatory variables. This recursive algorithm estimates the state vector βt as
follows:
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 tttttt ZHQXHXXHHP (which is the
mean square error of βt) and βt|t-1 is the forecast of the state vector at period t, given
the information available at the previous period (t-1). Using this filter we can now
recover the unobservable vector of time-varying coefficients. The weights attached to
each variable are then obtained as follows: ,||||
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estimated coefficient of variable xi in period t. Hence, the extended financial
conditions index at time t is computed as the internal product of the vector of weights
and the vector of the five financial variables described above, i.e. .' txt xwEFCI t 
The EFCI is then included in the monetary rule defined for each central bank.
As this variable contains valuable information about the financial health of the
economy, as well as information about future economic activity and future
inflationary pressures, we expect a reaction of the central bank to changes in this
variable. In particular, we expect an increase in interest rates when this indicator
improves; on the contrary, more restrictive financial conditions would require an
interest rate cut. Using such an index we are avoiding the critique formulated by
some authors that central banks should not target asset prices. Central banks may not
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do that directly and at any time for each asset, but this study intends to show that
they can extract some additional information from the evolution of those assets, as
well as from other financial variables, when setting interest rates. Finally, as the
economic relevance of these variables changes over time, we are also allowing for
the possibility of central banks giving different importance to them over time.135
A final note regarding the data goes to the kind of data used: we use ex-post
revised data. Orphanides (2001) claims that estimated policy reactions based on ex-
post revised data can provide misleading descriptions of monetary policy. For that
reason, he suggests the use of real-time data in the analysis of monetary policy rules,
i.e. data that are available at the time the central bank takes its decision on the
interest rate. However, Sauer and Sturm (2007) show that the use of real-time data
for the Eurozone instead of ex-post data does not lead to substantially different
results. In fact, as the quality of predictions for output and inflation has increased in
the last few years, it is natural that those differences are less significant and less
problematic nowadays, especially in the case of the Eurozone, which represents here
the main object of study. For that reason we rely essentially on ex-post data in this
analysis. However, in the robustness analysis we will provide some results with real-
time inflation and output gap data for the Eurozone obtained from the ECB Monthly
Bulletins.136 As industrial production is the variable that is more frequently revised,
we also try to overcome the revised-data problem in the three economies by
including in the model an alternative variable that provides good information
regarding the state of the economy but that does not suffer from revisions: the
economic sentiment indicator (EcoSent). This variable is obtained from surveys on
135 For a picture of the evolution of the FCI and EFCI over time, see Figures 5.1 to 5.3.
136 See Sauer and Sturm (2007) for details on the construction of real-time data for the Eurozone.
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consumers and firms designed to collect their opinion about the general economic
situation (output, unemployment, prices, etc) for next year.
5.3.3. Empirical results
Before proceeding with the estimation of the model it is important to consider
some issues. First, the sample period must be sufficiently long to contain enough
variation in inflation, output and EFCI to identify the slope coefficients. Analysing
Figures 5.1 to 5.3 and the descriptive statistics provided in Annex (Tables A.5.2.2 to
A.5.2.4), we conclude that the output gap presents sufficient volatility in the three
economies, but the low volatility of inflation for the Eurozone and UK suggests that
the interest rate response to inflation must be carefully analysed since it may only
represent the behaviour of the ECB and BOE in a period of relative inflation
stability. The low volatility of EFCI in the three economies analysed also requires
that we consider the results for this variable with a grain of salt.
Second, it is necessary that the variables included in the estimated model are
stationary. Unit root and stationarity tests for the variables considered in this study
are presented in Table 5.1.
Due to the low power and poor performance of these tests in small samples,
we report the results of two different unit root tests (Dickey-Fuller, 1979 and Ng-
Perron, 2001) and the results of the KPSS (1992) stationarity test to see whether the
power is an issue. For the Eurozone, the power of unit root tests seems to be an issue.
Due to the small sample period, they are unable to reject the unit root in some of the
variables. However, the KPSS test is able to provide some evidence of stationarity
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for all variables (except M3) for the Eurozone. Most variables have also proved to be
stationary for the UK and US.137
Table 5.1. Unit root and stationarity tests
Eurozone United States United Kingdom
DF NP KPSS DF NP KPSS DF NP KPSS
Eonia -0.604 -1.425 0.321+
Euribor3m 0.215 -0.868 0.295+
FedRate -1.887 -0.547 1.450
TreasRate -4.425* -0.864 0.730+
Inflation -2.723* 0.117 0.432+ -2.718* -1.246 0.482+
CoreInfl -2.277 -0.250 1.990
OutpGap -4.881* -3.869* 0.095+ -3.599* -1.141 0.035+ -6.210* -5.136* 0.044+
M3 1.593 0.529 0.927
FCI -4.236* -3.512* 0.160+ -4.711* -1.640* 0.043+ -4.430* -3.346* 0.109+
EFCI -4.754* -2.700* 0.048+ -5.346* -1.876* 0.033+ -4.923* -4.141* 0.214+
REER_gap -2.901* -1.439 0.142+ -4.509* -2.429* 0.032+ -3.579* -2.006* 0.156+
RStock_gap -2.219 -2.457* 0.156+ -4.791* -2.460* 0.038+ -3.989* -3.305* 0.071+
RHPI_gap -2.368 -1.992* 0.087+ -2.822* -1.877* 0.031+ -2.959* -2.441* 0.050+
CredSprd -1.452 -1.175 0.157+ -2.808* -0.800 0.187+ -1.227 -1.204 0.169+
ΔFutSprd -7.352* -4.707* 0.229+ -14.22* -1.159 0.165+ -9.625* -0.812 0.195+
EcoSent_gap -1.678 -2.236* 0.067+ -5.605* -3.337* 0.062+ -2.705* -1.750* 0.027+
RT_Inflation -2.647* -0.264 0.208+
RT_OutpGap -3.951* -2.475* 0.076+
1% crit.value -3.507 -2.580 0.739 -3.456 -2.580 0.739 -3.482 -2.580 0.739
5% crit.value -2.889 -1.980 0.463 -2.878 -1.980 0.463 -2.884 -1.980 0.463
10%crit.value -2.579 -1.620 0.347 -2.570 -1.620 0.347 -2.574 -1.620 0.347
Sources: See Table A.5.2.1.
Notes: DF=Dickey-Fuller (1979) unit root test; NP=Ng-Perron (2001) unit root MZt test (the MZa, MSB and MPT
tests yield similar results); KPSS=Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992) stationarity test. The automatic
Newey-West bandwidth selection procedure is used in the NP and KPSS tests and, in both cases, the
autocovariances are weighted by the Bartlett kernel.
* unit root is rejected at a significance level of 10% => stationarity.
+ stationarity is not rejected at a significance level of 10%.
The results of the estimation of the Taylor rule for the Eurozone for the
period January 1999-December 2007 are reported in Table 5.2. The t-statistics are
presented in parentheses and for each regression we compute the estimate of the
implicit inflation target pursued by the ECB (π*). The adjusted R2, Durbin-Watson
137 The evidence is very weak to support the stationarity hypothesis for the interest rate and inflation
for the US. Nevertheless, considering a longer time period we are able to find evidence of stationarity
for those two variables. On this issue, see also Petersen (2007).
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(DW) statistic for autocorrelation and the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion
(SBIC) are also reported for each regression. The first column presents the results of
a Taylor rule in the spirit of Taylor (1993), i.e. without allowing for either a forward-
looking behaviour of the central bank or interest rate smoothing. Despite the
estimates for OutpGap and π* being reasonable, the results indicate that this simple
model is unable to capture the reaction of the ECB to the inflation rate. This means
that the ECB’s monetary policy is not characterized by a basic linear Taylor rule. But
it can be described by a monetary rule that takes into account future expectations –
besides past and current information. Hence, we proceed with the estimation of a
forward-looking Taylor rule for the Eurozone.
A generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is used to estimate the
forward-looking Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing. One lag of the interest rate
is sufficient to eliminate any serial correlation in the error term (see DW statistic).
The horizons of the inflation and output gap forecasts were chosen to be,
respectively, one year (k=12) and 3 months (p=3). These horizons were selected
using the SBIC and they seem to represent a sensible description of the actual way
the ECB operates.138
138 Results were not substantially different when other (shorter and longer) horizons were used.
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Table 5.2. Results from the estimation of the linear monetary rule: Eurozone (January 1999-December 2007)
Main estimation results Robustness analysis
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Inflation -0.045
(-0.19)
2.774***
(2.85)
2.624***
(2.76)
2.322***
(3.37)
2.430***
(3.37)
1.179***
(4.58)
2.598***
(3.89)
1.337***
(2.92)
3.281***
(3.64)
1.651***
(3.45)
OutpGap 0.541***
(6.03)
1.991***
(5.84)
1.860***
(5.32)
1.717***
(6.92)
1.798***
(7.34)
1.153***
(9.01)
1.074***
(3.78)
1.099***
(8.79)
1.507***
(8.21)
Eonia(-1) 0.948***
(101.3)
0.944***
(87.7)
0.947***
(125.0)
0.939***
(101.6)
0.953***
(175.5)
0.958***
(141.6)
0.953***
(93.2)
0.938***
(108.7)
0.950***
(84.3)
0.958***
(127.1)
Euribor3m(-1) 0.947***
(116.5)
M3 -0.083
(-0.93)
FCI 0.534***
(3.73)
EFCI 0.706**
(2.44)
1.561***
(4.55)
1.222***
(5.44)
0.911***
(3.87)
0.634***
(4.30)
1.758***
(4.31)
REER_gap 0.122***
(3.37)
RStock_gap 0.041***
(3.88)
RHPI_gap 1.096***
(4.86)
CredSprd -0.271
(-1.27)
ΔFutSprd 3.186***
(4.15)
US_OutpGap 1.161***
(4.59)
0.648***
(3.67)
1.230***
(4.14)
EcoSent_gap 0.347***
(5.04)
0.096***
(4.00)
RT_Inflation 3.005***
(3.17)
2.018***
(4.64)
RT_OutpGap 1.319***
(5.82)
0.632***
(3.34)
π* 2.05***
(16.7)
2.32***
(23.5)
2.22***
(17.5)
2.32***
(20.9)
2.42***
(18.6)
4.41
(1.35)
2.45***
(17.6)
2.68**
(3.80)
2.27***
(31.1)
2.65***
(7.68)
2.35***
(26.4)
2.62***
(11.6)
Hansen J-stat. 17.5[0.953] 17.6[0.935] 16.5[0.985] 18.2[0.956] 22.1[0.999] 19.6[0.983] 19.8[0.987] 18.4[0.934] 19.1[0.981] 17.7[0.951] 20.3[0.978]
Adj. R2 0.347 0.977 0.977 0.979 0.978 0.981 0.983 0.985 0.979 0.980 0.977 0.982
DW 0.37 2.21 2.20 2.34 2.32 2.51 2.57 1.50 1.96 2.40 2.10 2.51
SBIC 447.8 70.54 74.8 68.2 69.0 70.9 49.4 33.7 62.8 64.5 70.4 52.3
Notes: See Table A.5.2.1 in Annex for the sources. Column 1 presents the least square estimates of the following basic Taylor rule: Eoniat=α+β*Inflationt-1+γ*OutpGapt-1+ut. A GMM estimator is used in the other
regressions, where the horizons of the inflation and output gap forecasts are, respectively, 12 and 3 months (even when real time data is used); the other variables (except US_OutpGap) are all lagged one period
to avoid simultaneity problems, i.e. Eoniat=(1-ρ)*[α+β*Inflationt+12+γ*OutpGapt+3+θ’xt-1]+ρ*Eoniat-1+εt, where α, β, γ, and the vector θ represent the estimated parameters; the respective standard errors are
recovered from the estimated reduced form using the delta method. The set of instruments includes always a constant, 1-6, 9, 12 lagged values of the Inflation, OutpGap, Yield10yr and M3; identical lags of the
other exogenous variables are also used when those variables are added to the equation. Robust standard errors (heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent) with Newey-West/Bartlett window and 3 lags
were computed and the respective t-statistics are presented in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The estimate of π* (=(r-α)/(β-1)) assumes that
the long-run equilibrium real interest rate is equal to its sample average (here, r=1.02). The p-value of the Hansen’s overidentification test is reported in square brackets. The Schwartz Bayesian Information
Criterion is computed as follows: SBIC=N*ln(RSS)+k*ln(N), where k is the number of regressors, N is the number of observations and RSS is the residual sum of squares. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic.
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The set of instruments includes a constant and lags 1 to 6, 9 and 12 for
Inflation, OutpGap, Yield10yr and M3.139 To infer the validity of the instruments, we
report the results from Hansen’s (1982) overidentification test, i.e. the Hansen’s J-
statistic and the respective p-value. The validity of the instruments used is confirmed
in any of the regressions presented in Table 5.2. Heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are employed in all estimations.
Results for the baseline forward-looking estimation presented in column 2
show a significant reaction of the ECB to inflation: a one percentage point (p.p.) rise
in expected annual inflation induces the ECB to raise the interest rate by substantially
more than one p.p. Therefore, as the coefficient on inflation is greater than unity, the
real interest rate increases as well in response to higher inflation and this will exert
the desired stabilizing effect on inflation. Independently of its main concern about
inflation, the ECB is also responding to the business cycle: a one p.p. increase in the
output gap generates an interest rate increase of about two p.p.
We also obtain an interesting estimate of π*=2.32, which indicates that the
ECB’s effective target for inflation is in practice only slightly higher than the 2%
target announced in its definition of price stability. In fact, the data shown in Figure
5.1 for the evolution of inflation is consistent with this result: inflation is below (but
close) to 2.3%-2.4% for most of the time, but generally above the 2% formal target.
This means that the ECB was tough in setting the formal target for inflation to
transmit the idea that it is highly concerned in controlling inflation (as the former
139 We will see below that our results reject the hypothesis of M3 being targeted by the ECB, but it has
proved to be a good instrument for the forward-looking monetary rule for the ECB. In fact,
movements in the monetary aggregates can be informative about future changes in prices, although
their stabilization may not represent an independent policy goal. The 10-year government benchmark
bond yield (Yield10yr) also contains good and useful past information about the future evolution of
the interest rate to be included in the set of instruments.
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German Bundesbank). But despite this toughness, its policy has allowed for some
flexibility which permits to accommodate differences among the economies that
constitute the Eurozone.140
Next we extend the baseline model by considering other factors that the
central bank can take into account when setting the interest rate. According to the
monetary pillar, the ECB should be considering the growth of M3 in its reaction
function. However, no significant effect is detected from the inclusion of M3 in the
model (see column 3).141 This result confirms the evidence provided by Fendel and
Frankel (2006) and Surico (2007b) that the monetary aggregate is indeed not targeted
by the ECB and should be excluded from the equation. But as this variable
traditionally provides valuable information to forecast inflation, it constitutes an
important variable to be considered in the set of instruments.
The inclusion of the financial conditions indices into the ECB’s monetary rule
provides a remarkable outcome: results indicate that the ECB is targeting not only
inflation and the economic conditions but also financial conditions when defining the
interest rate. The evidence provided in columns 4 and 5 of Table 5.2 shows that
expansive financial conditions in the Eurozone are stabilized by an increase in the
140 Alternatively, if we assume that the target is really 2%, we can use it to estimate the equilibrium
real rate (for different ways of estimating the natural equilibrium real interest rate see the discussion in
Arestis and Chortareas, 2007). Our experiments provided estimates of around 0.5% for the regressions
presented here, which can be considered a low value for the equilibrium real rate (see, for example,
Fendel and Frenkel, 2006). This evidence reinforces the idea that the ECB may in fact be targeting a
slightly higher value for inflation to accommodate asymmetric shocks that may affect the Eurozone
countries differently. Another justification for this result can be the fact that the ECB may not be
effective in communicating the idea to the economic agents that it is deeply interested in keeping
inflation below 2%.
141 In this case we are including in the estimation the variable M3 minus the reference value of 4.5%, which
is defined as the target for M3 by the ECB. Results did not change even when we included in the regression
the difference of (log) of M3 relative to its Hodrick-Prescott trend instead of M3-4.5%.
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interest rate. For example, a unitary increase in the financial indicator developed in
this study – EFCI – leads to an increase of about three quarters of a percentage point
in the interest rate. As this index contains additional and valuable information
concerning the evolution of future economic activity and about future inflationary
pressures, targeting financial conditions is a way of the ECB also targeting inflation
indirectly and avoiding financial imbalances that can be prejudicial for economic
stability. This is a striking result and represents the first analysis providing evidence
that the ECB is not only trying to promote monetary stability but, in doing so, it is
also trying to promote the required financial stability. This means that the ECB’s
monetary policy can be explained by a Taylor rule augmented with information from
financial conditions.
As mentioned in Section 5.2, there is a huge discussion in the literature about
whether central banks should target financial variables and, in particular, asset prices.
This chapter provides some evidence favouring the inclusion of the information
contained in those variables in the monetary rule.142 In general, existing studies deal
with this issue by including each single asset price or financial variable
independently in the model without taking into account the relative importance of
each one at each particular moment in time. With the index used in this study, we
overcome that problem and summarise all the information provided by those
variables in a single indicator. This also avoids possible multicollinearity problems
that may result from the inclusion of all those variables at the same time in a single
regression. Nevertheless, to allow a direct comparison with other studies, column 6
142 This evidence is in line with other works in the field, like Cecchetti et al. (2000), Borio and Lowe
(2002), Goodhart and Hofmann (2002), Chadha et al. (2004), Rotondi and Vaciago (2005) and Driffill
et al. (2006), for which asset prices and indicators of financial stress should be targeted by central
banks.
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provides the results of a regression that includes the components of EFCI. With the
exception of the CredSprd, they all present a coefficient with the expected sign and
are statistically significant.143 However, the implicit target for inflation is very high
and not significant, which can be a consequence of a multicollinearity problem.
Another interesting issue raised by this study is whether, besides the ECB is
reacting to the Eurozone economic cycle, it is also responding to international
economic conditions. To capture this effect, the US output gap is used as a proxy for
the world economic cycle. The results indicate that the ECB takes into consideration
the current state of the global economy when deciding on interest rates. In an open
global economy, fears of imported inflation (or recession) resulting from a higher
(lower) global economic growth above (below) the trend are counteracted by a
higher (lower) interest rate in the Eurozone.
The next group of regressions was devised to analyse the robustness of the
results presented so far. The first robustness test is related to the definition of the
interest rate. We have been considering the Eonia interest rate as the policy
instrument, but the main results are not substantially affected when we use the three
months Euribor instead (see column 8). Only the implicit inflation target is higher
than the expected, which confirms the use of Eonia as a sensible choice.
As industrial production is a variable that usually suffers from revisions, we
include an alternative variable in the model to capture the reaction of the ECB to
expected economic conditions (EcoSent_gap).144 This variable is not affected by
143 Note that a depreciation of the Euro above its trend, an increase in share and house prices above
their trends and a higher departure of futures interest rate from the current interest rate all contribute to
a significant reaction of the ECB to an increase in the interest rate.
144 The variable EcoSent_gap is computed from the EcoSent variable in the same way as the output
gap is computed from the industrial production. While EcoSent has a unit root, EcoSent_gap is
stationary, as required.
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revisions and provides good information regarding the expectations of economic
agents about the state of economy at the time the central bank takes its decision on
the interest rate. Results are presented in column 9 of Table 5.2 and show that the
coefficient on the lag of this variable is positive and highly significant, as expected,
and the other results are not substantially affected. Moreover, no major differences
can be noticed even when we assume that the central bank is considering the
economic information from both the OutpGap and EcoSent_gap simultaneously (see
column 10). Results show that information from these two variables can be easily
combined to take policy actions.
Finally, in columns 11 and 12 we use real-time data for inflation and output
gap instead of ex-post revised data. However, as already shown by Sauer and Sturm
(2007), the use of real-time data for the Eurozone, instead of ex-post data, does not
lead to substantially different results.
In the next table, Table 5.3, we reproduce some of the main results obtained
for the other two economies: US and UK. The sequence in which the results are
presented is quite similar to the one used for the Eurozone. The estimates in columns
US1 and UK1 were obtained from a basic Taylor rule. Such a rule produces quite
good results for the US but not so impressive for the UK. While the coefficient on
inflation is higher than 1 for the US, as expected, it is lower than 1 for the UK. In
addition, note that both regressions suffer from a problem of autocorrelation (see
DW). Moreover, it is expected that these central banks also tend to rely on all
available information, which requires a GMM estimation of a forward-looking
Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing.
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Table 5.3. Results from the estimation of the linear monetary rule: US and UK
United States (October 1982-December 2007) United Kingdom (October 1992-December 2007)
US1 US2 US3 US4 US5 US6 US7 UK1 UK2 UK3 UK4 UK5 UK6 UK7 UK8 UK9
Inflation 0.532***
(3.27)
1.872***
(4.89)
1.971***
(4.59)
1.791***
(4.02)
1.377***
(3.60)
1.563***
(6.62)
1.809***
(5.81)
2.971***
(2.73)
0.610
(1.43)
CoreInfl 1.632***
(11.5)
1.530***
(5.18)
1.462***
(4.71)
1.542***
(5.53)
1.556***
(5.80)
1.369**
(2.12)
2.759***
(3.00)
OutpGap 0.356***
(2.59)
1.404***
(2.77)
1.314***
(2.61)
1.039***
(2.71)
1.203***
(2.96)
0.967**
(2.15)
0.264***
(2.85)
0.912***
(2.80)
0.839**
(2.43)
0.882**
(2.10)
0.865***
(2.94)
0.648***
(3.01)
1.727***
(2.97)
0.725***
(3.02)
FedRate(-1) 1.430***
(14.2)
1.448***
(14.9)
1.471***
(13.4)
1.291***
(13.1)
1.739***
(15.3)
1.755***
(21.7)
FedRate(-2) -0.467***
(-4.73)
-0.484***
(-5.09)
-0.508***
(-4.73)
-0.325***
(-3.37)
-0.756***
(-6.85)
-0.776***
(-10.1)
TreasRate(-1) 1.388***
(13.9)
1.396***
(13.3)
1.447***
(15.5)
1.456***
(19.5)
1.377***
(19.4)
1.318***
(9.74)
1.349***
(13.6)
1.577***
(36.4)
TreasRate(-2) -0.433***
(-4.78)
-0.440***
(-4.69)
-0.484***
(-5.75)
-0.492***
(-6.96)
-0.433***
(-6.95)
-0.403***
(-3.29)
-0.383***
(-4.03)
-0.605***
(-15.3)
FCI 0.125
(0.56)
0.089
(0.63)
EFCI 1.658
(1.29)
0.160
(0.39)
CredSprd 1.242**
(2.56)
1.878***
(3.57)
ΔFutSprd 4.734**
(2.14)
US_OutpGap 0.135*
(1.82)
EcoSent_gap 0.272
(0.79)
0.448***
(2.80)
π* 3.23***
(11.9)
3.52***
(6.18)
3.54***
(5.29)
3.56***
(6.26)
-1.36
(-0.44)
3.54**
(2.27)
2.11***
(10.5)
1.80***
(6.48)
1.93***
(7.80)
1.93***
(8.17)
1.97***
(6.31)
-2.69
(-0.64)
1.99***
(8.82)
1.74***
(10.1)
2.60***
(23.4)
2.05**
(2.29)
Hansen J-stat. 20.3
[0.441]
21.6
[0.485]
21.9
[0.407]
24.9
[0.635]
16.2
[0.299]
13.2
[0.868]
22.2
[0.771]
21.6
[0.710]
22.4
[0.664]
26.5
[0.739]
32.2
[0.951]
17.8
[0.852]
21.1
[0.822]
18.6
[0.910]
Adj. R2 0.603 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.992 0.995 0.142 0.979 0.979 0.980 0.982 0.979 0.974 0.980 0.978
DW 0.06 2.18 2.22 2.29 2.18 2.57 2.48 0.10 1.73 1.73 1.91 2.11 1.68 1.17 1.87 2.31
SBIC 2010.5 754.0 759.2 745.9 753.7 808.3 66.6 927.4 234.7 238.9 228.2 213.0 241.4 275.4 226.6 28.8
Notes: See Table A.5.2.1 for sources. Columns US1 and UK1 present the least square estimates of a basic Taylor rule identical to the one estimated for the Eurozone. A GMM estimator is used in the other regressions;
the horizons of the inflation and output gap forecasts for the US (UK) are, respectively, 12 (6) and 3 (0) months (these leads were chosen according to the SBIC); the other variables (except US_OutpGap) are all
lagged one period to avoid simultaneously problems. The set of instruments for the US includes a constant, 1-6, 9, 12 lagged values of the CoreInfl, OutpGap and Yield10yr; the set of instruments for the UK
includes a constant, 1-6, 9, 12 lagged values of the RPI_Infl, OutpGap, Yield10yr and FCI; identical lags of the other exogenous variables are also used when those variables are added to the equation. In these two
cases, a second-order partial adjustment model fits the data better than the first-order model used for the Eurozone. Robust standard errors (heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent) with Newey-
West/Bartlett window and 3 lags were computed and the respective t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The estimate of π* assumes that the long-run equilibrium real interest rate is equal to its sample average
(r=2.27 for the US and r=3.41 for the UK). The p-value of the Hansen’s overidentification test is reported in square brackets. The variable for inflation used in regression UK8 is the RPIX inflation. Regressions
in columns US7 and UK9 were estimated just over the period January 1999-December 2007 (for this period r=1.41 for US and r=3.13 for the UK). For further details see Table 5.2.
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The results presented in Table 5.3 show that two lags of the interest rate are
required to eliminate any serial correlation in the error term in the regressions for the
US and UK (see DW). The horizons of the inflation and output gap forecasts for the
US were chosen to be the same as the ones used for the Eurozone; for the UK, we
have the contemporaneous value for the output gap and lead 6 for inflation. As in the
estimations for the Eurozone, these horizons were selected using the SBIC. The set
of instruments for the US includes a constant and lags 1 to 6, 9 and 12 of CoreInfl,
OutpGap and Yield10yr; for the UK, it includes a constant and lags 1 to 6, 9 and 12
of RPI_Infl, OutpGap, Yield10yr and FCI. The validity of these instruments is
confirmed by the Hansen’s J-test in any of the GMM estimations.
The results are consistent with the Taylor rule for both countries: the
coefficients on inflation are consistently higher than unity and statistically
significant, as required; and the coefficients on the output gap are positive and
statistically significant, as expected. The results also indicate that the Fed has been
following an average target for inflation of about 3.5% from October 1982 to
December 2007, while the BOE has been following an inflation target of about 2% in
the period October 1992-December 2007, which is in line with the current inflation
target pursued by this central bank.
Contrary to the ECB, these two central banks are not targeting financial
conditions, as shown by the insignificant coefficients on FCI and EFCI in both cases.
However, some components of the extended index seem to be considered by those
central banks. As pointed out by Driffill et al. (2006), this work confirms that the Fed
reacts to the expected future evolution of interest rates. Results show that it also
reacts to the information provided by the credit spread variable. On the one hand, the
Fed aims to reduce the volatility of the spread between the futures and current
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interest rates, which induces it to follow the pace of the futures market. On the other
hand, when the long-term government bond yield rate is above the corporate bond
yield rate – which means an expected improvement of the economic conditions and
consequent inflationary pressures in the future – the Fed reacts by increasing the
interest rate. The second effect is also found for the BOE, but not the first. Moreover,
we found no evidence that these two central banks are targeting the evolution of the
exchange rate or asset prices,145 a result that is in line with the arguments advanced
by Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and Bullard and Schaling (2002) on this
matter.
These results bring about an important conclusion of this study: while the
ECB is targeting financial conditions in general to avoid imbalances in the asset and
financial markets and, in the limit, in the monetary market, the Fed and BOE are not
so worried about the financial conditions and let the financial markets, in particular
the asset markets, act free from any direct control. This different behaviour seems to
be well evident in the recent credit crunch that arose in the US housing market and
that quickly spread to the UK. Due to the integration of global markets, indirect
repercussions are also felt in the Eurozone, but its asset markets (and the economy, in
general) have shown more initial resistance to the credit crisis than their counterparts
in the US and even in the UK. Thus, targeting financial conditions might be a
solution to avoid imbalances in the financial and asset markets and, consequently, to
avoid a sharp economic slowdown.
Results from column UK6 indicate that, as in the Eurozone, the international
economic conditions (proxied by the US output gap) seem to be taken into account in
the monetary rule for the BOE as well. However, in this case the statistical evidence
145 As the coefficients on these variables have not proved to be statistically significant – either when
included individually or in group – they were not included in the estimations reported here.
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is much weaker. We also include the EcoSent_gap instead of OutpGap in the
regressions US6 and UK7, to avoid the data revision problems that affect the output
gap. The main results do not change, but the coefficient on the lag of EcoSent_gap
for the US regression is not significant, which may mean that the Fed is not relying
on consumers’ and firms’ economic sentiment as it relies on real output forecasts.
The results presented in column UK8 were obtained using a different variable
for inflation, which is computed from the retail prices index excluding mortgage
interest payments (RPIX). Results remain consistent relatively to the Taylor principle
and the estimated target for (RPIX) inflation is now 2.6%, which is remarkably close
to the official target of 2.5% that had been defined for RPIX inflation.146
Finally, to compare the monetary policy of the three central banks analysed
here in the same time period, we estimate a regression for the US and UK using data
for the period January 1999-December 2007 (see columns US7 and UK9).147 The
estimated target for the US inflation is now 2.1%, which indicates a stronger concern
by the Fed in keeping inflation low during this period. In general, the results for the
US are quite similar to the ones obtained for the Eurozone and respect the Taylor
principle. However, the estimated model for the UK – despite presenting reasonable
estimates for the implicit inflation target (2.05%) and for the coefficient on the
output gap – does not show a stabilizing reaction of the BOE to the inflation rate. In
reality, the coefficient on inflation does not respect the Taylor principle and it is not
statistically significant. One reason might be the fact that inflation has remained
146 RPIX inflation was the measure of inflation targeted by the BOE before changing to the CPI
inflation in 2003. But, as the time-span used in this study goes beyond 2003 and as results using CPI
inflation have shown more robust to the inclusion of additional regressors, the current reference for
the BOE’s monetary policy – the CPI – is preferred to the former – the RPIX.
147 Note that as operational independence was granted to the BOE in May 1997, this time-span also
covers most of the period during which it has operated independently of the government control.
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below the inflation target defined by the BOE for most of the time during the period
1999-2007 (see Figure 5.3), which makes it difficult to detect a significant reaction
of the BOE to this variable.148
In sum, after analysing the results from the estimation of the linear Taylor
rule for the ECB, Fed and BOE, we conclude that the monetary policy followed by
these three central banks can be described by a forward-looking linear Taylor rule,
which in the case of the Eurozone is clearly augmented by a composite indicator of
financial variables. However, an important question remains: Is the monetary policy
of these central banks indeed described by a linear Taylor rule or can their behaviour
be instead characterized by a more complex nonlinear monetary rule? The next
section is devoted to answering this question.
5.4. Specification and estimation of the nonlinear Taylor rule
A forward-looking nonlinear Taylor rule is specified and estimated in this
section. We start by presenting the nonlinear model and a test to detect the presence
of nonlinearities. For cases in which the nonlinearity is not rejected, we proceed with
the estimation of the respective nonlinear specifications.
5.4.1. The nonlinear Taylor rule
The Taylor rule presented and estimated above is a simple linear interest rate
rule that represents an optimal policy-rule under the condition that the central bank is
minimising a symmetric quadratic loss function and that the aggregate supply
148 Moreover, no further significant evidence was found from the inclusion of the EFCI or its
components in some experimental regressions (not reported here) for the US and the UK for this
shorter time period.
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function is linear. However, in reality, this may not be the case and the central bank
can be responding differently to deviations in aggregate variables from their targets.
If the central bank is indeed assigning different weights to negative and positive
inflation and output gaps in its loss function, then a nonlinear Taylor rule seems to be
more adequate to explain the behaviour of monetary policy.149 Moreover, inflation
and the output gap tend to show an asymmetric adjustment to the business cycle. It is
well known that output exhibits short and sharp recessions over the business cycle,
but long and smooth recoveries (see Chapter 4). Inflation also increases more rapidly
than it decreases over the business cycle.150 Under those circumstances it is natural
that the central bank has to respond differently to levels of inflation and output
above, below or around the required targets. These arguments emphasize the
importance of considering a nonlinear Taylor rule in the analysis of the central
bank’s behaviour.
To explain this non-linear behaviour, we have to consider non-linear time
series models. The main options are the Markov-switching and the smooth transition
regression (STR) models. Some studies in this field have employed the first model
(see Section 5.2 for details), but as this assumes that the regime switches are
exogenous and driven by an unobservable process, it is not able to account for the
intuition behind the nonlinear central bank behaviour. On the other hand, as the STR
model allows the regression coefficients to change smoothly from one regime to
another, it provides a better structural framework to explain a nonlinear policy
behaviour. Allowing for endogenous regime switches – in contrast to the Markov-
switching models – it also provides economic intuition for the nonlinear policy
149 See Nobay and Peel (2003), Ruge-Murcia (2003), Dolado et al. (2005) and Surico (2007a, 2007b).
150 See, for example, Hamilton (1989) and Neftçi (2001).
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behaviour of the central bank and it is able to explain why and when the central bank
changes its policy rule.
Although three versions of this model have been applied to the study of the
behaviour of some relevant central banks by Bec et al. (2000), Martin and Milas
(2004) and Petersen (2007), no study has yet applied such a model to the analysis of
the policy behaviour of the ECB.151 This study intends to do so by providing, at the
same time, a comparative analysis between the monetary policy followed by the ECB
and the one followed by the Fed and the BOE. Additionally, this study extends the
existing papers on nonlinear Taylor rules by controlling for financial conditions.
A standard STR model for a nonlinear Taylor rule can be defined as
follows:152
TtscGzzi ttttt ,...,1,),,(   (5.12)
where ),...,;~,;,...,,1( ,,11   tmtttnttt xxyiiz  is the vector of the explanatory variables,
with h=n+2+m. The parameters ),...,,( 10  h and ),...,,( 10  h represent
((h+1)×1) parameter vectors in the linear and nonlinear parts of the model,
respectively.153 The disturbance term is assumed to be independent and identically
distributed with zero mean and constant variance, ),0(~ 2 iidt . The transition
function G(η,c,st) is assumed to be continuous and bounded between zero and one in
the transition variable st. As st→-∞, G(η,c,st)→0 and as st→+∞, G(η,c,st)→1. The 
transition variable, st, can be an element or a linear combination of zt or even a
deterministic trend.
151 The presence of nonlinearities in the ECB monetary policy was studied by Surico (2007b), but
without estimating a nonlinear model.
152 For further details, see Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), Teräsvirta (1998) and van Dijk et al. (2002).
153 Some of these parameters may be zero a priori.
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A few definitions have been suggested for the transition function in the
literature. We start by considering G(η,c,st) as a logistic function of order one:
.0,)}](exp{1[),,( 1    csscG tt (5.13)
This kind of STR model is called a logistic STR model or an LSTR1 model. This
transition function is a monotonically increasing function of st, where the slope
parameter η indicates the smoothness of the transition from one regime to another,
i.e. how rapid the transition from zero to unity is, as a function of st. Finally, the
location parameter c determines where the transition occurs.
Considering this framework, the LSTR1 model can describe relationships that
change according to the level of the threshold variable. Assuming that the transition
variable is the level of inflation (st=πt), then the LSTR1 model is able to describe an
asymmetric reaction of the central bank to a high and to a low inflation regime.
Given the important weight that the central banks analysed in this study put on
inflation, we expect to find significant differences in the behaviour of these banks
when (expected) inflation is deviating considerably from a certain threshold.
The STR model is equivalent to a linear model with stochastically time-
varying coefficients and, as so, it can be rewritten as:
.,...,1,)],,([ TtzizscGi ttttttt   (5.14)
Given that G(η,c,st) is continuous and bounded between zero and one, the combined
parameters, ζ, will fluctuate between ψ and ψ+ω and change monotonically as a
function of st. The more the transition variable moves beyond the threshold, the
closer G(η,c,st) will be to one, and the closer the parameters ζ will be to ψ+ω;
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similarly, the further st approaches the threshold, c, the closer the transition function
will be to zero and the closer the parameters ζ will be to ψ.154
As a monotonic transition may not be a satisfactory alternative, this study will
also consider (and test for) the presence of a non-monotonic transition function, in
line with the work of Martin and Milas (2004). In fact, central banks may not
consider a simple point target for inflation but a band or an inner inflation regime,
where inflation is considered under control and, consequently, the reaction of the
monetary authorities will be different from a situation where inflation is outside that
regime.
The non-monotonic alternative function to consider is the following logistic
function of order two:
,)}])((exp{1[),,( 121

 cscsscG ttt  (5.15)
where η>0, c={c1,c2} and c1≥c2. This transition function is symmetric around
(c1+c2)/2 and asymmetric otherwise, and the model becomes linear when η→0. If 
η→∞ and c1≠c2, G(η,c,st) becomes equal to zero for c1≤st≤c2 and equal to 1 for other
values; and when st→±∞, G(η,c,st)→1. To distinguish this STR model from the one 
specified above, we call this the quadratic logistic STR model or LSTR2 model.155
Considering inflation as a transition variable, this model allows us to estimate
separate lower and upper bands for the inflation instead of a simple target value
(which in practice may not be easy to reach every time).
154 Note that when η→0, the logistic transition function converges to 0.5 and the model is linear; when 
η→∞, the LSTR1 model becomes a two regime switching regression model. 
155 When c1=c2, the transition function is symmetric and the model is called exponential STR (ESTR).
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5.4.2. Linearity versus nonlinearity
Before proceeding with the estimation of the nonlinear model, it is important
to test whether the behaviour of monetary policy in a particular country can really be
described by a nonlinear Taylor rule. This implies testing linearity against the STR
model.156 The null hypothesis of linearity is H0: η=0 against H1: η>0. However,
neither the LSTR1 model nor the LSTR2 model are defined under this null
hypothesis; they are only defined under the alternative. Teräsvirta (1998) and van
Dijk et al. (2002) show that this identification problem can be solved by
approximating the transition function with a third-order Taylor-series expansion
around the null hypothesis. This approximation yields, after some simplifications and
re-parameterisations, the following auxiliary regression:
,,...,1,~~~ *33
2
210 Ttszszszzi ttttttttt   (5.16)
where ),,(3
*
tttt scRz   , with the remainder R3(η,c,st), and )~,1(  tt zz where
tz~ is a (h×1) vector of explanatory variables. Moreover, jj 
~
 , where j
~ is a
function of ω and c. The null hypothesis of linearity becomes: H01: β1=β2=β3=0,
against the alternative H11: “at least one βj≠0, j=1,2,3”. A simple Lagrange-multiplier
test can be used to investigate this hypothesis, because under the null: tt uu 
* . The
resulting asymptotic distribution is χ2 with 3h degrees of freedom under the null.157 If
linearity is rejected, we can proceed with the estimation of the nonlinear model. But,
which transition function should be employed? The decision between an LSTR1 and
an LSTR2 model can be made from the following sequence of null hypotheses based
156 These tests require that the errors are uncorrelated with zt and st, and that all the variables are
stationary. Stationarity tests are provided in Table 5.1.
157 See Teräsvirta (1998) for further details.
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on the auxiliary regression (5.16): H02:β3=0; H03:β2=0|β3=0; and H04:β1=0|β3=β2=0.
Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) show that the decision rule works as follows: if the p-
value from the rejection of H03 is the lowest one, choose an LSTR2 model;
otherwise, select an LSTR1.
5.4.3. Empirical results
The empirical work presented in this section provides clear evidence that the
monetary policy followed by the ECB and by the BOE can be described by a
nonlinear Taylor rule, but the evidence is not so clear regarding the behaviour of the
Fed. The results of the linearity tests provided at the bottom of Table 5.4 (see line
H01) – where (expected) inflation is the threshold variable – show that we can reject
the linearity hypothesis at a level of significance of 5% for the ECB and BOE, but
only at 10% for the preferred model for the Fed.
Inflation is chosen to be the threshold variable because of the important
weight central banks put on this variable and also because this variable has provided
the lowest p-value for the rejection of the linear model.158 The tests for the choice of
the transition function are also presented in the bottom of Table 5.4 (see lines H02,
H03 and H04) and indicate that an LSTR1 fits better to the Eurozone, while an LSTR2
model is more adequate for the UK (and the US). This means that the ECB is
pursuing a point target, while the BOE (and perhaps the Fed) are attempting to keep
inflation within a certain range.
158 Teräsvirta (1998) argues that if there is no reason to choose one variable over any other to be the
threshold variable, and if nonlinearity is rejected for more that one transition variable, the variable
presenting the lowest p-value for the rejection of linearity should be chosen to be the transition
variable. In this study, we also tried the output gap and the EFCI as transition variables but the p-
value for the rejection of the linear model was higher than for inflation and, in most of those cases, the
linearity hypothesis was not rejected.
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The first results presented in Table 5.4 (EZ1, US1 and UK1) were obtained
from the nonlinear least squares estimation of a simple nonlinear Taylor rule without
allowing for a forward-looking behaviour or interest rate smoothing (see notes in
Table 5.4). The best fitting model is found by sequentially eliminating insignificant
regressors by using the SBIC measure of fit. The results indicate that the ECB is
reacting to inflation – according to the Taylor principle, ωπ>1 – only when it reaches
values above 2%, which remarkably coincides with the ECB’s target for inflation and
with the implicit target for inflation estimated in the linear version.159 When inflation
is well below 2%, the ECB does not react to inflation directly, but reacts to the
inflationary pressures that may arise through the economic cycle. In this case, the
ECB’s reaction to the output gap seems to become stronger when inflation grows
above the 2% target.160
Instead of pursuing a point target (of 2%) for inflation like the ECB, the Fed
and BOE try to keep inflation within, respectively, the 2.04%-3.67% and 1.61%-
1.99% ranges, according to this basic nonlinear Taylor rule. Results show that when
inflation is inside those ranges, these two central banks only react to output; and they
only react to inflation when it is outside these ranges. However, the reaction of the
BOE does not obey to the Taylor principle (note that ωπ<1).
159 Note that when inflation is above 2%, for each percentage point increase in inflation, the ECB will
react by increasing the nominal interest rate by about 1.14 percentage points. As the coefficient on
inflation is higher than one this implies that the real interest rate will increase as well, which means
that the monetary behaviour of the ECB will exert the required and desired stabilizing effect over
inflation.
160 Note that one additional advantage of using this nonlinear model is that we do not need to make
any assumption about the equilibrium real interest rate to estimate the (implicit) target for inflation.
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Table 5.4. Results from the estimation of the nonlinear monetary rule
Eurozone United States United Kingdom
EZ1 EZ2 EZ3 EZ4 US1 US2 UK1 UK2 UK3
ψ0 3.156***
(19.9)
-0.397
(-0.12)
2.636***
(14.9)
2.820***
(12.4)
4.806***
(14.9)
-1.712**
(-2.03)
5.536***
(11.0)
2.063*
(1.71)
3.357***
(2.92)
ψπ 1.353
(0.87)
ψy 0.347***
(3.56)
2.091***
(4.36)
1.979***
(4.67)
3.091***
(3.63)
0.303**
(2.24)
0.555*
(1.77)
0.257***
(2.62)
1.301**
(2.30)
1.136***
(3.59)
ψefci 0.092**
(2.34)
0.537*
(1.71)
ψcs 1.031*
(1.72)
ρ 0.963***
(112.6)
0.960***
(110.8)
0.974***
(130.9)
ρ1 1.500***
(11.6)
1.258***
(11.6)
1.267***
(14.4)
ρ2 -0.561***
(-4.37)
-0.295***
(-2.80)
-0.289***
(-3.54)
ω0 -2.784***
(-3.08)
-6.117***
(-9.51)
-1.388**
(-2.28)
ωπ 1.139***
(2.88)
1.164*
(1.83)
1.190**
(2.38)
1.169***
(2.59)
1.974***
(13.5)
2.537***
(7.52)
0.541**
(3.28)
2.356**
(2.52)
2.415***
(2.82)
ωy 0.321**
(2.45)
-2.483*
(-1.82)
-1.639
(-1.47)
η 21.19
{29.26}
95.04
{651.3}
98.60
{353.0}
15.9
{23.47}
7.22
{7.00}
8.55
{7.01}
64.33
{1490.1}
5.61
{6.64}
2.79
{3.13}
c 1.99***
(45.0)
2.47***
(190.3)
2.47***
(197.7)
2.41***
[72.4]
c1 2.04***
(20.0)
3.10***
(13.3)
1.61***
(9.96)
1.79***
(9.67)
1.75***
(5.53)
c2 3.67***
(10.0)
3.68***
(12.2)
1.99***
(9.87)
2.35***
(22.4)
2.37***
(21.4)
ψπ+ωπ 2.517*
(1.78)
ψy+ωy 0.668***
(7.30)
-0.392
(-0.31)
0.340
(0.33)
Hansen
J-stat.
16.4
[0.927]
16.3
[0.947]
17.5
[0.983]
18.9
[0.331]
18.8
[0.804]
24.3
[0.912]
Adj. R2 0.407 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.632 0.992 0.145 0.977 0.980
DW 0.54 2.27 2.36 2.30 0.09 1.98 0.15 1.50 1.60
SBIC 452.0 83.7 77.3 72.6 2006.2 817.0 942.5 262.0 247.0
H01 0.000 0.037 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.092 0.001 0.075 0.023
H02 0.053 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.274 0.646 0.187 0.224 0.016
H03 0.045 0.300 0.300 0.121 0.061 0.054 0.055 0.095 0.005
H04 0.014 0.180 0.180 0.019 0.117 0.042 0.562 0.424 0.017
Notes: See Table A.5.2.1 in Annex for the sources. Column EZ1, US1 and UK1 present the (Gauss-Newton) nonlinear Least Square (LS)
estimates of the following basic nonlinear Taylor rule: IRt=ψ0+ψπ*Inflationt-1+ψy*OutpGapt-1+(ω0+ωπ*Inflationt-1+ωy*OutpGapt-1)
*G(η,c,Inflationt-1)+ut, where IR is the respective interest rate considered for each country and G(η,c,Inflationt-1)=[1+exp(-γ 
(Inflationt-1-c))]-1, when the LSTR1 is the chosen model, or G(η,c,Inflationt-1)=[1+exp(-γ(Inflationt-1-c1)*(Inflationt-1-c2))]-1, when an
LSTR2 is preferred instead. H02 to H04 report the p-value of the tests used to choose the preferred model; H01 reports the p-value of
the linearity test. A nonlinear Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator is used in the other regressions, where the horizons of the
inflation and output gap forecasts are, respectively, 12 and 3 months for the Eurozone and the US, and 6 and 0 months for the UK.
Considering the case of the Eurozone, the equation can be written generically as follows: Eoniat=(1-ρ)*(ψ0+ψπ*Inflationt+12
+ψy*OutpGapt+3+ψefci*EFCIt-1)+ρ*Eoniat-1+(1-ρ)*(ω0+ωπ*Inflationt+12+ωy*OutpGapt+3+ωefci*EFCIt-1)*G(η,c,Inflationt+12)+εt. A
similar equation is considered for the US and UK, however, in these cases, a second-order partial adjustment model fits the data
better than the first-order model used for the Eurozone; moreover, EFCI is replaced by CredSprd in regression 3 for the UK; both
variables are lagged one period to avoid simultaneity problems. The best fitting model is found by sequentially eliminating
insignificant regressors by using the SBIC measure of fit. The set of instruments includes: a constant, 1-6, 9, 12 lagged values of the
Inflation, OutpGap, Yield10yr and M3, and the second and third lags of EFCI for the Eurozone; a constant, 1-6, 9, 12 lagged values
of the CoreInfl, OutpGap and Yield10yr for the US; and a constant, 1-6, 9, 12 lagged values of the RPI_Infl, OutpGap, Yield10yr
and FCI for the UK. Following Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1998), η is made dimension free by dividing it by the
standard deviation (LSTR1) or variance (LSTR2) of the inflation variable; since η is not defined at zero, the respective standard
error is reported (in brackets) instead of the t-statistic; η presents high standard deviations because relatively few observations are
located around the threshold. Robust standard errors (heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent) with Newey-West/Bartlett
window and 3 lags were computed and the respective t-statistics are presented in parentheses; significance level at which the null
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The delta method is used to compute the standard errors of ψπ+ωπ and ψy+ωy.
The p-value of the Hansen’s overidentification test is reported in square brackets. The time periods considered for each country are
the same as in the linear estimations. For further details see Table 5.2 and Table 5.3.
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In general the results seem quite reasonable, but the autocorrelation problems
presented by these estimations and the fact that central banks are taking into account
not only present and past information but also future inflation expectations suggest
we should proceed with the estimation of a forward-looking version of these
nonlinear models, where the nonlinear Taylor rule allows for interest rate smoothing.
A nonlinear instrumental variables (IV) estimator is used to estimate these models,
where the horizons of the inflation and output gap forecasts and the set of
instruments are the same as we considered in the estimation of the linear model. The
validity of the instruments is confirmed by the Hansen’s J-test in any of the IV
estimations. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are
used in all estimations.
Considering the Eurozone first, we start by estimating a more general version
of the model where inflation and the output gap are included in the linear and
nonlinear parts of the model. Given the relevance demonstrated by the EFCI variable
in the linear model, we extend the forward-looking nonlinear model with the lag of
this variable. The results are presented in columns EZ2 and EZ3 and confirm the
significant nonlinear reaction of the ECB to expected inflation: the ECB only starts
to react actively to inflation when expected inflation is above 2.5%, a value that is
very close to the implicit inflation target estimated in the linear model and only
slightly higher than the official inflation target announced by the ECB; moreover, the
ECB only reacts to the output gap when expected inflation is well below 2.5%
(ψy+ωy is not significant). These are very important results: first, they confirm the
main aim of the ECB of keeping inflation low; second, once this objective is
achieved, they also support the expressed ECB’s intention of promoting a sustainable
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growth.161 This means that the nonlinear Taylor rule estimated here presents a quite
accurate description of the way the ECB conducts its monetary policy – even though
its inflation target has proved to be slightly higher than the announced target of
2%.162 Moreover, the nonlinear model also provides some evidence that the ECB is
considering the information contained in some financial variables in its decisions on
the interest rate.163 Therefore, this study concludes that this augmented nonlinear
Taylor rule is the policy rule that best describes the ECB’s behaviour.164
The forward-looking Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing estimated for
the US (see column US2) does not present any significant differences in comparison
with the results presented in column US1. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize
that the forward-looking linear model for the US is only rejected at a level of
significance of 10%, which means that the Fed’s monetary behaviour can be well
explained by a forward-looking linear Taylor rule. Therefore, this study shows that
the evidence found by Petersen (2007) that the Fed follows a nonlinear Taylor rule is
161 Note that according to the ECB: “The contribution of monetary policy consists in maintaining price
stability and establishing confidence in the continuation of its efforts, thereby creating the conditions
necessary for the sustained, non-inflationary growth of output and employment.” Cf. ECB (1999,
p.10).
162 Instead of estimating c, we also tried to set c=2% and then estimate the model, but it did not
converge to reasonable values. Only for values of c around 2.5%, we were able to find robust results.
This is the case because, as shown in Figure 5.1, inflation has remained well above 2% for most of the
time period analysed here for the Eurozone. Nevertheless, we think it is preferable to estimate c than
to impose a value that, in practice, may not fit well to the available data. When a larger time-period is
available – and more time the ECB is in activity – maybe we can find a value closer to the official
target of 2%. For now, our results show that the ECB is operating with a slightly higher target, which
can be seen as a way of accommodating prevailing economic disparities between the countries that
form the Eurozone and a way of accommodating asymmetric shocks that may affect them differently.
163 Despite US_OutpGap proving significant in the linear model, it is not included in the nonlinear
regressions because, due to the complexity of the model, it was not possible to achieve convergence
after trying several combinations of initial values.
164 The results of a nonlinear Taylor rule without EFCI are presented in column EZ4 to permit a direct
comparison with the main results obtained for the other economies.
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only valid when we consider a basic nonlinear Taylor rule. As soon as we depart
from this assumption and consider a more complete framework – where the forward-
looking behaviour of the Fed and interest rate smoothing are controlled for – the
conclusion may not be the same.165 In fact, additional linearity tests (not presented
here) shown that linearity is not rejected when two relevant variables such as
CredSprd and ΔFutSprd are included in the nonlinear model. The same result was
obtained when we tried to include EFCI.
Finally, the results obtained for the UK are quite similar to the ones obtained
for the Eurozone (see columns UK2 and UK3) and update the evidence provided by
Martin and Milas (2004) that the BOE’s monetary policy can be described by a
nonlinear Taylor rule and that the BOE tries to keep inflation within a range – of
1.8%-2.4%, according to our evidence – rather than pursuing the current official
point target of 2%. Results indicate a strong reaction of the BOE to inflation when
expected inflation is outside the 1.8%-2.4% range. As soon as inflation is in this
range, it only reacts to the business cycle and, to a lesser degree, to the additional
economic information contained in the CredSprd variable.166
5.5. Conclusions
This chapter discusses two important issues. First, it asks whether central
banks, besides targeting inflation and the output gap, are also targeting the
information contained in the asset prices and financial variables. Second, it analyses
whether central banks’ monetary policy can be described by a linear Taylor rule or,
instead, by a nonlinear rule. Related to this second point, this study also considers
165 The recent evidence provided by Qin and Enders (2008) for the Fed also points in that direction.
166 As in the linear model, no other significant results were obtained with the inclusion of other variables.
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whether they are pursuing a point target or a target range for inflation. The central
banks considered in this analysis are the ECB, Fed and BOE.
To answer the first question we built a financial conditions index from the
weighted average of a group of asset prices and financial variables and included it,
first, in the linear Taylor rule. The results indicate that while the ECB is targeting the
information contained in this index in order to avoid inflationary pressures from
imbalances in the asset and financial markets, the Fed and BOE do not respond to
changes or developments in these markets. In our opinion, this different behaviour
might be one of the causes for the recent credit crunch to have arisen in the US (and
UK) housing and financial markets and not in the Eurozone – even though its
repercussions have spread to all developed markets and to the real economy. Thus,
the first main conclusion of this study is that targeting financial conditions might be a
solution to avoid imbalances in the financial and asset markets and, consequently, it
may help to avoid sharp economic slowdowns.
The results mentioned above were obtained using a linear Taylor rule but,
considering that the central banks might be responding differently to deviations of
inflation above or below from their targets, we decided to test for the presence of
nonlinearities in the rule and estimate a nonlinear model in case they are present. The
linearity tests indicate that the monetary policy followed by the ECB and by the BOE
can be described by a nonlinear Taylor rule, but the evidence is not enough to clearly
reject the linear Taylor rule for the Fed.
The estimation of the nonlinear Taylor rule using a smooth transition
regression model provides interesting results. First, they show that the ECB pursuits
a point target of about 2.5% for inflation. Second, the ECB only reacts actively to
inflation when it is above that target and it only starts to react to the business cycle
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when inflation is stabilised well below 2.5%. Thus, another important conclusion of
this study is that the nonlinear Taylor rule estimated in this chapter encompasses
quite remarkably the principles of the ECB monetary policy: (i) promoting price
stability above everything; (ii) when that is achieved, promote conditions for a
sustainable growth. The fact that the estimated inflation threshold is slightly higher
than the 2% reference value announced by the ECB may mean that the ECB is in
reality allowing for some monetary flexibility to accommodate the economic
differences among the countries that constitute the Eurozone and to accommodate
asymmetric shocks that may affect them differently.
Even after the nonlinearities are controlled for, the ECB continues to consider
the information contained in financial variables, which reinforces the first main
conclusion of this study and allows us to say that the nonlinear Taylor rule,
augmented with the financial conditions index developed in this study, is the policy
rule that best describes the monetary behaviour of the ECB.
Finally, the nonlinear Taylor rule estimated for the BOE indicates that this
central bank is pursuing a target range of 1.8%-2.4% for inflation rather than the
official point target of 2%. The BOE reacts actively to inflation when it is outside
that range, but, once inside, it only reacts to the business cycle and to the economic
information provided by the credit spread variable.
Besides extending this study to other central banks, another important
extension would be to understand whether and how financial sector regulation and
commercial banks’ off-balance sheet entities are taken into account in the central
banks’ reaction function. We believe that such an analysis could contribute a little
more to the understanding of the reasons for the recent credit crunch. Our intention is
to proceed with this analysis in future work, as soon as more data become available.
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Annex 5.1. Derivation of the forward-looking linear Taylor rule
According to the New-Keynesian model,167 the evolution of the economy can
be described by the following system of equations:
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Equation (A.5.1.1) can be interpreted in terms of a Phillips curve (or AS curve) where
inflation is sluggish and depends on the cyclical component of output, whilst
equation (A.5.1.2) can be considered as an aggregate demand curve where the output
gap depends on its lagged value and on the real interest rate. Supply and demand
disturbances are captured by μs and μd, respectively.
Assuming that the central bank uses a policy rule to control monetary policy,
the problem faced by this authority is to choose the interest rate in period t
conditional upon the information available at that time. Therefore, at time t the
central bank commits to a state contingent sequence of short-term interest rates in
order to minimize the following inter-temporal loss function:
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subject to (A.5.1.1) and (A.5.1.2). The parameter δ represents the inter-temporal discount
factor (0< δ <1) and i is the long-run equilibrium nominal interest rate ( * ri ).
Svensson (1997) shows that since it does not affect yt and πt contemporaneously,
minimizing (A.5.1.3) is equivalent to the period-by-period static minimization of:
167 For more details on the derivation of the forward-looking Taylor rule presented in this section, see
Svensson (1997) and Clarida et al. (1999).
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Therefore, after some calculations and simplifications, the first-order necessary
conditions for policy reaction function are given as follows:
),()( *** ptpttkttt yyEEii    (A.5.1.5)
which can be rewritten as equation (5.2), considering that the central bank relies on all
available information in beginning period t to choose the interest rate for that period.
This model can easily be extended to include additional equations (and
variables). In general, the vector ),...,,,,( ,,1
*
lqtmlqtjtptptktqt xxiyyfx    of
j=1,…,m linear equations (and variables) – where l=0,1,2,… and x1,…,xm are
elements of the vector x – can be added to the system of equations presented above
as a way of providing additional explanations for the evolution of the economy.
Similarly, the central bank can also take those variables into account in its
minimization problem, which means that the term 


m
j
qtjj x
1
2
,3 can be added to the
loss function. In this case, the result of the minimization problem will resemble
equation (5.5) after controlling for interest rate smoothing.
Annex 5.2. Description of the variables and descriptive statistics
A complete description of the variables used in this chapter is presented in
this part of the Annex – for the Eurozone, United States and United Kingdom – as
well as some descriptive statistics.
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Table A.5.2.1. Description of the variables and respective sources
Eurozone (January 1999-December 2007) United States (October 1982-December 2007) United Kingdom (October 1992-December 2007)
Eonia Euro Overnight Index Average (Eonia) lending interest
rate in the Eurozone money market (monthly average).
Euribor3m 3-month (Euribor) Euro Interbank Offered Rate
(monthly average).
KeyIR Key ECB interest rate of the main refinancing
operations; minimun bid rate (end of the month).
FedRate Effective Federal Reserve funds interest rate (monthly
average).
Libor3m 3-month (Libor) Interbank US Dollar lending rate
(monthly average).
3-month (Libor) Interbank Sterling lending rate
(monthly average).
TreasRate 3-month Treasury bill discount rate (monthly average).
OfficRate Official Central Bank interest rate (end of the month).
Inflation Inflation rate computed as the annual rate of change of
the harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP, base
year: 2005=100), seasonally adjusted.
Inflation rate computed as the annual rate of change of
the consumer price index (CPI, base year: 1982-84=100)
for all urban consumers and all items, seasonally
adjusted.
Inflation rate computed as the annual rate of change of
the CPI (base year: 2005=100), seasonally adjusted.
Note: The official CPI starts in 1996 but historical estimates back to
1988 were calculated by the UK Office for National Statistics based
on archived RPI data.
CoreInfl Core inflation rate computed as the annual rate of
change of the consumer price index (CPI, base year
1982-84=100) for all urban consumers and all items less
food and energy, seasonally adjusted.
RPI_Infl Retail price index (RPI) inflation rate computed as the
annual change of the RPI all items (January 1987=100).
RPIX RPI excluding mortgage interest payments (Jan.1987=100).
OutpGap Output gap computed as the percentage deviation of the
(log) industrial production index (total industry,
seasonally adjusted) from its Hodrick-Prescott trend.
Output gap computed as the percentage deviation of the
(log) industrial production index (total industry,
seasonally adjusted) from its Hodrick-Prescott trend.
Output gap computed as the percentage deviation of the
(log) industrial production index (total industry,
seasonally adjusted) from its Hodrick-Prescott trend.
M3 Annual growth rate of the monetary aggregate M3
(seasonally adjusted, 3-month moving average).
FCI Financial conditions index computed as the weighted
average of the real effective exchange rate, real share
prices and real property prices.
Financial conditions index computed as the weighted
average of the real effective exchange rate, real share
prices and real property prices.
Financial conditions index computed as the weighted
average of the real effective exchange rate, real share
prices and real property prices.
EFCI Extended financial conditions index computed from the
weighted average of the real effective exchange rate,
real share prices and real property prices plus credit
spread and futures interest rate spread.
Extended financial conditions index computed from the
weighted average of the real effective exchange rate,
real share prices and real property prices plus credit
spread and futures interest rate spread.
Extended financial conditions index computed from the
weighted average of the real effective exchange rate,
real share prices and real property prices plus credit
spread and futures interest rate spread.
(To be continued in the next page…)
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(… Continued from the previous page.)
REER Real effective exchange rate of the Euro against a group
of 24 currencies (CPI deflated); a depreciation of the
Euro corresponds to an increase in REER.
Real effective exchange rate of the US Dollar against
the currencies of a group of 26 major US trading
partners (CPI deflated); a depreciation of the US Dollar
corresponds to an increase in REER.
Real effective exchange rate of the UK Pound against
the currencies of the major UK trading partners (CPI
deflated); a depreciation of the UK Pound corresponds
to and increase in REER.
RStock Real share price index computed as the monthly average
of the Dow Jones Euro STOXX price index (HICP
deflated).
Real share price index computed as the monthly average
of the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 composite share price
index (CPI deflated).
Real share price index computed as the monthly average
of the FTSE 100 share price index (CPI deflated).
RHPI Real house price index obtained by linear interpolation
of half yearly data for the Eurozone residential property
price index (period 1995-07; 2004=100; HICP deflated).
Real house price index obtained from the linear
interpolation of the quarterly data for the US residential
property price index (1980Q1=100; CPI deflated).
Real house price index obtained from the Nationwide
monthly house price index (1993Q1=100; CPI deflated
and seasonally adjusted).
Yield10yr 10-year Eurozone government benchmark bond yield
(monthly average).
10-Year US Treasury benchmark bond yield
(government constant maturity rate, monthly average).
10-year monthly average yield from British Government
Securities.
CorpBond Eurozone Corporate Bond Yield, i.e. interest rate returns
on commercial corporate bonds (monthly average).
UK Corporate Bond Yield, i.e. interest rate returns on
commercial corporate bonds (monthly average).
BAAYield Moody's Seasoned BAA Corporate Bond Yield
(monthly average).
FutIR 3-month Euribor interest rate futures contracts (monthly
average).
3-month Eurodollar interest rate futures contracts
(monthly average).
3-month Sterling interest rate futures contracts (monthly
average).
CredSprd Difference between Yield10yr and CorpBond. Difference between Yield10yr and BAAYield. Difference between Yield10yr and CorpBond.
ΔFutSprd Monthly change of the difference between FutIR in the
previous quarter and the current Euribor3m.
Monthly change of the difference between FutIR in the
previous quarter and the current FedRate.
Monthly change of the difference between FutIR in the
previous quarter and the current TreasRate.
EcoSent Economic sentiment indicator developed by the
European Commission and based on surveys of firms
and consumers at national level (seasonally adjusted).
Economic sentiment indicator computed as the simple
average of the consumer sentiment and manufacturing
industrial confidence indicators (seasonally adjusted).
Economic sentiment indicator computed as the simple
average of the consumer and industrial confidence
indicators (seasonally adjusted).
RT_Inflation Real time inflation rate obtained from the inflation
estimates reported in the Euro Area Statistics of the
ECB Monthly Bulletins for each month.
RT_OutpGap Real time output gap computed as the ex-post OutpGap,
but from the most recent values for the industrial
production published in each ECB Monthly Bulletin.
Sources: European Central Bank Statistics and Monthly Bulletins
(http://www.ecb.int/stats/html/index.en.html);
Datastream for CorpBond and FutIR.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Economic Data – FredII
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/);
ECB Statistics for Libor3m;
Datastream for REER, RStock and FutIR.
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(http://www.ofheo.gov/hpi_download.aspx) for RHPI.
Bank of England Statistics
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/index.htm);
UK Office for National Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/);
OECD, Main Economic Indicators for REER, RStock and EcoSent;
Nationwide Building Society for RHPI
(http://www.nationwide.co.uk/hpi/historical.htm);
Datastream for CorpBond and FutIR.
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Table A.5.2.2. Descriptive Statistics: Eurozone (January 1999 – December 2007)
Variable No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Eonia 108 3.077 0.900 1.97 5.06
Euribor3m 108 3.213 0.939 2.03 5.09
KeyIR 108 3.014 0.891 2.00 4.75
Inflation 108 2.057 0.451 0.76 3.09
OutpGap 107 0.021 0.995 -2.33 3.30
M3 107 7.101 1.941 3.80 12.30
FCI 107 -0.161 1.347 -6.39 3.02
EFCI 107 0.007 0.502 -1.62 2.95
REER 108 102.605 8.895 89.38 121.18
RStock 108 334.188 78.552 191.24 506.99
RHPI 108 96.853 10.965 80.94 114.53
Yield10yr 108 4.442 0.653 3.16 5.70
CorpBond 108 4.706 0.847 3.35 6.18
FutIR 108 3.228 0.938 1.94 5.20
EcoSent 108 102.548 7.713 87.30 117.40
RT_Inflation 108 2.117 0.483 0.80 3.40
RT_OutpGap 107 -0.033 1.225 -2.58 4.05
Sources: See Table A.5.2.1.
Table A.5.2.3. Descriptive Statistics: United States (October 1982 – December 2007)
Variable No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
FedRate 303 5.501 2.458 0.98 11.64
Libor3m 277 5.362 2.203 1.11 10.30
CoreInfl 303 3.227 1.114 1.09 5.86
Inflation 303 3.124 1.070 1.07 6.38
OutpGap 303 -0.035 1.469 -6.29 3.38
FCI 303 -0.035 1.543 -4.74 3.72
EFCI 303 0.004 0.317 -1.10 1.01
REER 303 105.350 11.081 78.59 123.50
RStock 303 4174.309 1998.298 1258.44 8233.81
RHPI 303 138.922 23.750 113.39 201.41
Yield10yr 303 6.913 2.284 3.33 13.56
BAAYield 303 8.999 2.256 5.82 15.15
FutIR 303 5.841 2.574 1.03 12.98
EcoSent 303 95.568 5.104 79.68 106.77
Sources: See Table A.5.2.1.
Table A.5.2.4. Descriptive Statistics: United Kingdom (October 1992 – December 2007)
Variable No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
TreasRate 183 5.223 0.972 3.31 7.47
Libor3m 183 5.535 1.094 3.42 8.32
OfficRate 183 5.440 1.048 3.50 8.00
Inflation 183 1.817 0.621 0.50 3.10
RPI_Infl 183 2.709 0.855 0.70 4.80
RPIX_Infl 183 2.599 0.466 1.50 3.90
OutpGap 182 0.026 0.930 -3.85 2.43
FCI 182 0.208 1.505 -3.21 6.10
EFCI 182 0.129 0.569 -0.81 2.51
REER 183 108.309 8.648 97.35 127.21
RStock 183 80.367 17.296 50.32 113.43
RHPI 183 201.461 81.685 117.01 352.54
Yield10yr 183 5.895 1.461 4.08 8.90
CorpBond 183 6.817 1.486 5.10 10.49
FutIR 183 5.597 1.089 3.44 7.84
EcoSent 182 100.446 1.714 94.36 103.56
Sources: See Table A.5.2.1.
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6. Overall conclusions
This dissertation comprises four essays on topics of particular interest for the
EU economy and for other industrial countries: first, it considers the impact of EU’s
fiscal rules on economic growth; then, it studies the reasons for an EU country
entering into excessive deficit and, therefore, breaking the 3% of GDP fiscal rule for
the deficit; the effect of some economic and political variables on the duration of
expansions and contractions in some EU and non-EU countries is analysed next;
finally, this thesis analyses the policy behaviour of three influential central banks –
ECB, Fed, BOE – and discusses whether their monetary policy can be described by a
linear (augmented) Taylor rule or by a more complex nonlinear rule. Here we
emphasize the behaviour of the recently created ECB and the role of the information
contained in a financial conditions index.
The main conclusions of this dissertation are summarized next. The first
essay shows that growth in the EU countries was not negatively affected in the
period after Maastricht. This is true either comparing recent performance of the EU
countries with their past performance or with the performance of other developed
countries. Therefore, Chapter 2 concludes that Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules
should not be blamed for harming growth of real GDP per capita in the EU area. On
the contrary, evidence shows that, on average, growth is statistically higher in the
period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit started to be officially
assessed. Furthermore, the essay presented in Chapter 2 provides some evidence
favouring the EU fiscal rules for the public deficit and debt.
Chapter 3 studies the reasons for excessive deficits in the EU countries. It
provides evidence that unfavourable economic conditions, parliamentary elections
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and political instability, and majority left-wing governments are the main causes of
excessive deficits in the EU countries, where a deficit is considered excessive when
it exceeds 3% of GDP. The results also indicate that the institutional constraints
imposed after Maastricht over the EU countries’ fiscal policy have been important in
reducing the probability of excessive deficits in the EU, especially in small countries
and in countries traditionally characterised by a higher propensity to excessive
deficits. The empirical evidence does not indicate any significant erosion of the fiscal
efforts made by the EU countries after they have been accepted in the EMU.
This chapter stresses the idea that the inclusion of political variables is
important to fully explain excessive deficits in the EU. It provides a detailed analysis
of the presence of political opportunism and partisan effects in that context. Elections
and majority left-wing governments are two important causes of excessive deficits in
the EU, a situation that remains well evident even after the implementation of the
fiscal constraints over the EU countries. Nevertheless, the evidence provided by this
analysis also emphasises that fiscal constraints are a necessary condition to avoid
excessive deficits in a monetary union without a centralized budget.
This dissertation proceeds with the analysis of the factors that affect the
duration of expansions and contractions. One interesting aspect of this analysis is that
it allows to get additional insights about the impact of the EU fiscal constraints on
the business cycle in some EU countries. However, this is not the major issue of the
analysis provided in Chapter 4. The main focus of the essay presented in that chapter
is to identify other factors that can affect the likelihood of an expansion or
contraction ending, beyond its own length.
The study of the duration of business cycle phases shows that duration
dependence is not the only factor that can explain the duration of a business cycle
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phase. Positive duration dependence is found for both expansions and contractions,
but the duration of expansions is also significantly related to the performance of the
variables in the OECD composite leading indicator. The duration of contractions is
essentially explained by the duration of the previous expansion. The likelihood of an
expansion ending is also affected by the behaviour of private investment, the price of
oil and by external influences. The evidence provided by this study shows that the
duration of expansions tends to increase when private investment accelerates and the
price of oil decreases. There is also some evidence that when the US economy
reaches a peak (and enters into recession), the likelihood of an expansion ending
increases substantially in the other industrial countries. Political conditionings do not
seem to be as important as economic factors to explain the duration of the business
cycle phases and no support was found for the idea that fiscal rules have lengthened
recessions in the EU. Finally, the “Great Moderation” in output volatility is a period
in which evidence of positive duration dependence disappears for expansions and
increases for contractions in the US economy. However, our evidence also shows
that this result cannot be generalized to the panel of countries analysed in this study.
Therefore, Chapter 4 concludes that the duration of expansions and
contractions is not only affected by their current age, but also by the behaviour of
other economic factors, some of which encompass the expectations of the economic
agents about the future trend of the economy. Moreover, contractions tend to present
evidence of increasing positive duration dependence, whilst constant positive
duration dependence is found for expansions, which means that the probability of a
contraction ending increases more rapidly with its age than an expansion.
Finally, Chapter 5 discusses two important issues concerning the behaviour of
modern central banks. First, it asks whether central banks, besides targeting inflation
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and the output gap, are also targeting the information contained in asset prices and
financial variables. Second, it analyses whether central banks’ monetary policy can
be described by a linear Taylor rule or, instead, by a more complex nonlinear rule.
Related to this second point, this dissertation also considers whether they are
pursuing a point target or a target range for inflation.
Regarding the first question, the results indicate that while the ECB is
targeting the information contained in this index in order to avoid inflationary
pressures from imbalances in the asset and financial markets, the Fed and BOE do
not respond to changes or developments in these markets. In our opinion, this
different behaviour might be one of the causes for the recent credit crunch to have
arisen in the US (and UK) housing and financial markets and not in the Eurozone –
even though its repercussions have spread to all developed markets and to the real
economy. Thus, the first main conclusion of this analysis is that targeting financial
conditions might be a solution to avoid imbalances in the financial and asset markets
and, consequently, it may help to avoid sharp economic slowdowns.
Concerning the second question, results do not provide any clear evidence to
reject the linear Taylor rule for the Fed, but provide significant evidence that the
monetary policy followed by the ECB and by the BOE can be described by a
nonlinear Taylor rule. In particular, results show that the ECB pursues a point target
of about 2.5% for inflation – whilst the BOE follows a target range of 1.8%-2.4% for
inflation rather than the official point target of 2% – and that the ECB only reacts
actively to inflation when it is above that target. This means that it only starts to react
to the business cycle when inflation is stabilised well below 2.5%. Thus, another
important conclusion of this essay is that the nonlinear Taylor rule estimated in this
chapter encompasses quite remarkably the principles of the ECB monetary policy: (i)
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promoting price stability above everything; (ii) when that is achieved, promote
conditions for a sustainable growth. The fact that the estimated inflation threshold is
slightly higher than the 2% reference value announced by the ECB may mean that
the ECB is in reality allowing for some monetary flexibility to accommodate the
economic differences among the countries that constitute the Eurozone and to
accommodate asymmetric shocks that may affect them differently.
Even after the nonlinearities are controlled for, the ECB continues to consider
the information contained in financial variables, which reinforces the first main
conclusion of this study and allows us to say that the nonlinear Taylor rule
augmented with the information contained in the financial conditions index is the
policy rule that best describes the ECB’s policy behaviour during its (yet) short life.
To sum up, this dissertation provides evidence that the institutional changes
in which several European countries were involved during the last decade, and that
culminated with the creation of the EMU in Europe, do not undermine the economic
performance of those countries. Moreover, those institutional changes, in particular
at the fiscal level, were important to discipline fiscal policy in a monetary union
without a centralised budget and to consolidate public accounts in some EU
countries. Our evidence also indicates that the creation of the ECB has contributed
greatly to reinforce the monetary and financial stability in the Eurozone. In addition,
it shows that the ECB’s monetary policy is well described by a nonlinear Taylor rule
augmented with information from the asset and financial markets. Results indicate
that the ECB tends to react more to inflation when it is above its target. Finally, this
dissertation provides further evidence that the likelihood of expansions and
contractions ending is dependent on other factors, in addition to the age of each of
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these business cycle phases, and that this likelihood increases more rapidly for
contractions than for expansions.
Some lines for future research were already mentioned at the end of each
essay included in this dissertation, but it is important to mention a final and broader
extension. Considering that this study analyses economic growth, fiscal policy and
monetary policy issues separately, the next thing to do might be to provide an
analysis where the relations between them are taken into account in a single
model/framework. The idea is to implement a more rigorous analysis of the
reciprocal relationship between fiscal policy, monetary policy and economic growth
in Europe. For example, the link between economic growth and public finances has
been shown to be the most important issue for the operation of Maastricht and SGP
fiscal rules: on the one hand, economic growth determines the budgetary
performance and the sustainability of public finances; on the other hand, fiscal
policies also affect growth. Unfortunately, in the literature those links have been
analysed independently in the European Union’s context. The work of Artis and
Onorante (2006) is an exception: they estimate a set of structural vector
autoregressive models, one for each EU country, to assess the possible effects of
alternative sets of fiscal rules. Considering the role of monetary policy in such an
analysis will certainly contribute further for a deeper understanding of the working of
the EU economy under the institutional changes that took place in Europe during the
1990s. Simultaneous equations and/or structural vector autoregressive models are
potential tools to be used in such a challenging task, which the author will try to
embrace in his next endeavour.
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